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Abstract
Wireless communications oer data transmission services anywhere
and anytime, but with the inevitable cost of introducing major security
vulnerabilities. Indeed, an eavesdropper can overhear a message con-
veyed over the open insecure wireless media puing at risk the con-
dentiality of the wireless users. Currently, the way to partially prevent
eavesdropping aacks is by ciphering the information between the au-
thorised parties through complex cryptographic algorithms. Cryptog-
raphy operates in the upper layers of the communication model, bit it
does not address the security problem where the aack is suered: at
the transmission level.
In this context, physical layer security has emerged as a promising
framework to prevent eavesdropping aacks at the transmission level.
Physical layer security is based on information-theoretic concepts and
exploits the randomness and the uniqueness of the wireless channel.
In this context, this thesis presents signal processing techniques to
secure wireless networks at the physical layer by optimising the use
of multiple-antennas. A masked transmission strategy is used to steer
the condential information towards the intended receiver, and, at the
same time, broadcast an interfering signal to confuse unknown eaves-
droppers. is thesis considers practical issues in multiple-antenna
networks such as limited transmission resources and the lack of ac-
curate information between the authorised transmission parties. e
worst-case for the security, that occurs when a powerful eavesdrop-
per takes advantage of any opportunity to put at risk the transmission
condentiality, is addressed. e techniques introduced improve the
security by oering ecient and innovative transmission solutions to
lock the communication at the physical layer. Notably, these transmis-
sion mechanisms strike a balance between condentiality and quality
to satisfy the practical requirements of modern wireless networks.
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Chapter1
Introduction
‘We le the gold and gems for
common thieves. Instead our mice
stole leers, ledgers, charts… later,
they would read them and leave
them where they lay. Secrets are
worth more than silver or
sapphires’, Varys claimed.
George R.R. Martin
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the contents coveredin this thesis. It rst focuses on describing the security problem in wire-less communications in an accessible manner, and then presents the re-
search objectives pursued by this thesis and how it is structured. e concepts
informally introduced here will be covered in later chapters with technical rigour.
1.1 Security in wireless networks
Wireless communications have experienced a dramatic boost during the last decade.
Nowadays, the number of electronic devices connected wirelessly to the Internet
has superseded the number of wired ones. Mobile devices are everywhere using
wireless means as de facto technology to access to the Internet. erefore, wireless
networks, in all of their dierent technological avours, have become pervasive in
providing coverage and connectivity almost everywhere. As a result, mobile users
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enjoy permanent data connectivity and freedom of mobility with high data rates
and great levels of reliability. ese technological advances have enabled the so-
cial communication revolution that we are experiencing today and it is reected in
the dramatic change in the way that people have been communicating with each
other in the recent years. Moreover, the emerging ‘Internet of ings’ foresees that
wireless connectivity would play a starring technological role underpinning the
access of millions of devices to the Internet to establish machine-to-machine com-
munications. Remarkably, most of the information conveyed over wireless links is
critical and sensitive in terms of security.
Wireless communications oer data transmission services anywhere and any-
time. However, the freedom, mobility, and versatility introduced by the broadcast
nature of wireless networks has a major drawback: Security [1]. Indeed, as a result
of their open nature, wireless communications introduces major security breaches
that can be exploited by hostile aackers. Moreover, the massive increase in per-
sonal devices carelessly connected to wireless networks, for instance using weak
passwords, is aracting new types of threats targeting the end users’ personal
information. ese factors have generated a dramatic increase in the number of
cyber-aacks resulting in signicant economic losses for business and individuals
alike. is problem will only be exacerbated with the growth in technologies and
applications that are focused around end users accessing a variety of information,
ranging from conventional Internet trac (email, web) to personal/condential
data (nancial, health, location). ese services will aract an unknown number
of malicious aackers; therefore, securing them across a range of wireless tech-
nologies is a key challenge for the designers of next generation wireless systems.
Wireless systems are vulnerable to eavesdropping aacks occurring when a
non-authorised party overhears a secret message transmied over the open inse-
cure media. Eavesdropping is referred to as a passive aack that involves a mali-
cious aacker listening to the communication and recovering data without inter-
action with the network. In contrast, data alteration is regarded as an active aack
in which the information exchanged between the transmission parties can suer
modications. In addition, the lack of a physical connection in wireless networks
facilitates impersonation aacks, where aackers fake legitimate user credentials
to gain access to the network. Moreover, the openness of the wireless channel
makes it susceptible to denial-of-service aacks. ese aacks can be caused by
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non-authorised users that jam the channel or by legitimate network clients overus-
ing the communication resources [2, §1.1]. ese intrinsic vulnerabilities of the
wireless channel as well as the characteristics typical of a wireless environment,
such as users roaming between networks, devices with limited power and pro-
cessing capabilities and users misusing the technology, make the task of securing
wireless networks cumbersome [3].
With the objective of securing wireless networks, industrialists and researchers
have developed authentication, condentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and pri-
vacy services. Notably, all of these services have been implemented by computa-
tional based technologies. Here, the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the wireless chan-
nel medium are addressed by services running in upper layers of the communica-
tion model without aacking the root of the security problem where it occurs; that
is the wireless channel itself. Moreover, the mobility oered by wireless communi-
cations and the lack of appropriate user behaviours towards security cause many
additional vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, most of these weaknesses are discovered
only aer the products and technologies are commercialised. ese security issues
demand soware patches and partial a-posteriori solutions that have generated an
inecient threat-response cycle that is continuously repeated as new exploits are
discovered [4].
One notable example of this security vulnerability trend is the way in which
eavesdropping aacks are currently prevented in wireless networks. Conden-
tiality is provided by ciphering the information between the authorised parties
by computational expensive cryptographic algorithms that rely on shared secret
keys between the authorised users. ese cryptographic techniques operate in the
upper layers of the communication model not facing the security problem where
it actually occurs: in the communication mechanism itself. Cryptographic tech-
niques present many security vulnerabilities arising from the way that the algo-
rithms are implemented and how they are used; therefore, they do not provide a
totally secure wireless transmission [5]. Moreover, cryptographic services demand
either security key distribution/management (symmetric cryptography) or compu-
tationally intensive algorithms (asymmetric cryptography) to cipher the sensitive
information. ese requirements become a great limitation in wireless networks
topologies where key management is not possible due to accessibility diculties
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and where computation capabilities are limited due to the lack of power and im-
plementation constraints, e.g., smart grid networks, wireless sensor networks, etc.
[6].
e described scenario underlines the urgent necessity of addressing wireless
security from a radically dierent approach in order to eectively ‘lock the front
door of the communication model’ by securing the actual wireless transmission di-
rectly at the transmission level.
1.2 Locking at the front door of wireless commu-
nications
To illustrate the condentiality problem of wireless security we use an analogy
of the way that we secure our valuable belongings at home. Let us suppose that
we have to leave home for a holiday and we sensibly decide to keep our treasured
belongings, such as jewellery, cash, condential information, etc., safe from bur-
glars. A good security strategy is to keep the valuables safe by storing them in a
safe box protected by a strong combinatorial key that only we know. Now that our
valuables are safely stored, we are free to leave. However, here we ask ourselves a
question: ‘would we leave the front door of the house wide open while we are away?’.
e logical answer is ‘No’. In fact, the rst intuitive step to keep our valuables safe
is to close and lock the front door of the house irrespective of the additional se-
curity, such as the safe box, that we might put in place. By leaving our front door
wide open, we are eectively inviting thieves to break in, to go straight to our safe
box and then to try to open it by brute force or by simply guessing the security
code. It is obvious that the rst safety security measure at home is to close the
front door of the house. Aer this basic common sense measure, the safe box is
simply an additional security mechanism to reinforce the primary security oered
by the front door.
Unfortunately, this primary level security is not provided in wireless commu-
nications. Indeed, the broadcasting nature of the radio frequency wireless channel
eectively leaves the front door of the transmission (physical layer) wide open to
aacks on the condentiality of the information. Even though conventional strate-
gies seek to secure wireless transmissions by deploying upper layer communica-
tions approaches such as encryption, they do not actually stop the aacker from
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Figure 1.1: Ways to provide security in wireless networks.
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listening our transmission and intercepting the communication. In fact, whilst
cryptographic security can act to prevent eavesdroppers from deciphering a con-
dential message, it does not stop them from receiving the transmied signal and
then going straight to our communication safe box to try to break the crypto-
graphic security by computer ‘brute force’. is security aw is depicted graphi-
cally in the Figure 1.1a.
In this scenario, the obvious counter-aack measure is to ‘lock the front door’
of the communication model by securing the actual wireless transmission directly
at the physical layer. is is the underpinning idea of ‘physical layer security’;
a new security framework that allows us to eectively secure the wireless com-
munications by exploiting the intrinsic characteristics of the wireless communica-
tions channel, such as the unique and random nature of the radio links between
transmission. e objective is to incorporate security strategies right down at the
transmission level, thus preventing aackers from even intercepting the encrypted
message. Figure 1.1b illustrates how physical layer security acts over a wireless
network.
1.3 Securingwireless networks at the physical layer
Physical layer security evolved from information theory and has been enriched
by signal processing algorithms to introduce a set of techniques that oer wire-
less secrecy at the transmission level. It is particularly aractive to sophisticated
wireless infrastructures that require a strong level of security or to networks with
computationally limited resources. In the rst case, securing sensitive information
justify the cost in terms of capacity and quality that deploying physical layer secu-
rity would demand on the network. In the second scenario, physical layer security
can oer condentiality services to networks that cannot aord computationally
demanding cryptographic services. is is the case of body area sensor networks
or smart grid networks, where security services have to be addressed from a novel
point of view to ensure a good level of security under very tight power and imple-
mentation complexity budget constraints [7]. In this context, physical layer secu-
rity can be one of the enabling tools to secure the emerging ’Internet of ings’.
Physical layer security is based on the ‘wiretap channel’ model that prevents
eavesdropping aacks without cryptography by creating signicantly stronger
1.3 Securing wireless networks at the physical layer 7
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Figure 1.2: Example of a network secured at the physical layer by steering the information
towards the intended receiver and simultaneously jamming the eavesdroppers.
signals at the intended receiver and simultaneously deteriorating the signal strength
at the eavesdropper [8]. is can be done by applying signal processing techniques
to multiple-antenna systems that allow the transmier to steer the condential
message only towards the intended receiver. ese techniques exploit the knowl-
edge of the unique mathematical representation of the fading wireless channel
between the transmission parties to mathematically convey the information to-
wards the intended receiver. Additionally, multiple-antenna systems enable the
transmier to simultaneously confuse possible eavesdroppers by jamming them
with an interfering ‘articial noise’ signal transmied in such a way that it does
not aect the legitimate receiver’s quality of reception. is model is graphically
depicted in Figure 1.2. Moreover, physical layer security can also oer strategies
beyond the wiretap channel model to incorporate authentication mechanisms, dis-
til secrecy keys for upper-layer ciphering, and code the information for secrecy to
provide a reliable and secure system.
Physical layer security has become a popular research topic in the academic
community that has foreseen the potential that this eld has to oer to wireless
security. Physical layer security has been nurtured by contributions from both the
information-theoretic and the signal processing research communities. Indeed,
during the last years there has been a remarkable amount of active research in
physical layer security as evidenced in recently published books [9, 10], special
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issues of top technical journals being devoted entirely to security in the physical
layer [11, 12, 13] and special sessions in important technical conferences across
the world exclusively centred on this topic.
In contrast to the huge academic interest and large theoretical work carried
out in physical layer security, we notice a lack of practical proof of concept of op-
erative wireless networks secured at the physical layer. e reasoning behind this
fact is that there is still required fundamental theoretical research in order to an-
swer crucial questions that will underpin the practical realisation of physical layer
security. Particularly, this research has to marry theoretical solutions with practi-
cal deployments to allow the development of commercial networks. Additionally,
current physical layer security endeavours address condentiality issues in an iso-
lated fashion, based on many idealised, non-practical system assumptions. Most
importantly, physical layer security research currently does not consider a holistic
design strategy towards practical implementations.
In this thesis we aempt to answer some of these open questions by devising
signal processing transmission mechanisms to address practical issues that wire-
less security faces.
1.4 Objective
is thesis aims to provide ecient signal processing strategies to secure multiple-
antenna networks at the physical layer against eavesdropping aacks; that is, at-
tackers that listen to the communication and capture the transmied information
without transmiing any information.
With this objective in mind, we optimise multiple-antenna transmission strate-
gies to mathematically steer the condential message towards the intended re-
ceiver, and, at the same time, broadcast a jamming signal to confuse the eavesdrop-
pers. e idea is to deliver wireless transmission strategies that not only secure
the network but also oer good signal quality at the receiver. ese transmission
schemes have to provide valid answers to open questions in physical layer security
arising from practical issues that pose serious security threats. In particular, we
devise transmission schemes that consider constrained transmission resources in
terms of power and antennas, limited or erroneous information regarding the link
1.5 Outline 9
between the transmission parties, and eavesdropping aackers that take advan-
tage of any opportunity to threaten the physical layer based security.
To deliver this objective, we use mathematical tools, such as stochastic analysis,
convex optimisation, linear algebra and statistical analysis, which through signal
processing schemes enable transmission strategies that can cope with the security
demands of current and future wireless networks.
1.5 Outline
is thesis is divided into seven chapters.
• Chapter 2 covers physical layer security concepts from an information the-
oretic perspective. Particular aention is devoted to the wiretap channel as
the underpinning model for eavesdropping aacks in multiple-antenna net-
works. Here the novel contribution of this thesis and the assumptions used
throughout are detailed.
• Chapter 3 addresses the threat of hidden eavesdroppers strategically located
close to the transmier to improve their chances to retrieve the conden-
tial communication. e solution proposed is an outage based transmission
technique that distributes the power between the information and the jam-
ming signal to guarantee a high probability of secrecy. e deployment of
a physical eavesdroppers-free area is proposed to prevent close quarter at-
tacks.
• Chapter 4 provides a solution to the practical problem arising from the lack
of accuracy in the estimation of the link between the transmission parties. A
robust transmission endeavour is devised to maximise the secrecy and also
to reduce the use of power, even in the presence of errors in the mathematical
representation of the link between the transmier and receiver.
• Chapter 5 presents a study about the possible practical contribution of fre-
quency dispersive channels towards securing multiple-antenna networks.
Here, we analyse the possible threats to the security posed by a powerful
multiple-antenna aacker.
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• Chapter 6 introduces an alternative to secure resource constrained wire-
less systems at the physical layer by interfering aackers jointly from both
the receiver and from the transmier. e jamming source selection de-
pends upon the transmission conditions and the availability of resources.
We present techniques to reduce the level of associated complexity to se-
cure the communication at the two legitimate ends of the transmission.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising the most important insights
and contributions presented in this research study. Moreover, new pathways
for further research are presented and a brief discussion about the challenges
that the physical layer security techniques introduced here face in terms of
their implementation.
1.6 Notation
e following notation is used throughout this thesis. Boldface capital and lower
case leers denote matrices and vectors respectively. 0 and 0N are respectively
an N -size vector and an N ×N matrix with all the elements zero. IN denotes an
N × N identity matrix. CN denotes the set of N -dimensional complex vectors
while CN×M denotes the set of the N ×M dimensional complex matrices. AH ,
Tr(A), A†, rank(A) and vec(A) denote the Hermitian (conjugate) transpose, the
trace, the pseudo-inverse, the rank and the vectorisation operations of the matrix
A respectively. A  0 means that matrix A is a Hermitian positive semidenite
while A  0 means thatA is a Hermitian positive denite matrix. e expressions
||A||F and ||a|| denote the Frobenius norm of the matrix A and the Euclidean
norm of the vector a. ⊗ represents the Kronecker product operator and Re{·} the
real part of a complex number. E{·} is the statistical expectation operator and P
denotes probability. [a]+ represents max{a, 0}. Finally, a ∼ CN(α,Σ) means that
a is a random vector following a complex circular Gaussian distribution with mean
α and covariance matrix Σ.
Chapter2
Physical layer security
‘Listen, do you want to know a
secret? Do you promise not to tell?
Closer, let me whisper in your ear,
say the words you long to hear:
I’m in love with you. I’ve known
the secret for a week or two.
Nobody knows, just we two.’
J. Lennon, P. McCartney
Information condentiality is a maer of paramount importance in wirelessnetworks. Indeed, wireless devices have become increasingly pervasive of-fering a fertile ground for security aacks that jeopardise the privacy and
integrity of wireless communications. e reason behind this vulnerability is the
fact that wireless systems are particularly susceptible to security aacks because
of the inherent openness of the transmission medium that leaves sensitive infor-
mation within the reach of malicious eavesdroppers. As a result, data conden-
tiality has become a growing concern which is demanding new strategies, both
from academia and industry, for locking the wireless communication in a holistic
fashion starting from the transmission level upwards. is is the principal objec-
tive of physical layer security which uses signal processing techniques to ensure a
level of information-theory security and to complement pre-existing, upper-layer
cryptographic security services.
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e purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief synopsis of the fundamental
concepts that enable physical layer security and how it compares to and comple-
ments traditional cryptographic security policies. In this context, this chapter de-
scribes the open problems in multiple-antenna physical layer security, which are
addressed in this thesis, and the novel contributions being developed towards their
solution. Finally, we point out complementary, emerging physical layer security
approaches that can enhance wireless security services by exploiting the intrinsic
characteristics of the randomness and uniqueness nature of the wireless channel.
2.1 Information-theoretic security
Information-theoretic security is commonly accepted as the strictest form of secu-
rity. It is based on the combination of cryptographic schemes with channel coding
techniques to exploit the randomness of the wireless communication channel to
prevent an eavesdropper from decoding a condential message [14]. In the seminal
work in [15], Shannon postulated the information-theoretic foundations and intro-
duced the concept of perfect secrecy between a legitimate pair of communicating
parties in the presence of an unauthorised receiver. Here, a condential message
M is coded into a codewordC through a non-reusable private keyK and then it is
transmied over a noiseless channel. Perfect secrecy is aained when the eaves-
dropper can only randomly guess the condential message in spite of having an
identical copy of the intended receiver’s coded message, being aware of the coding
strategy applied and having innite computational power at its disposal (although
not having access to the key). is is achieved by ensuring that the message M
and the output of the encoder C are statistically independent; in other words, the
mutual information between M and C is exactly zero; i.e., I (M ;C) = 0. is
condition can only be guaranteed if the secret key has at least as much entropy as
the original message; therefore, ensuring perfect secrecy requires that the secret
keyK to be at least as long as the messageM . e immediate consequence of this
remarkable conclusion is the impossibility to eciently develop practical coding
schemes capable of aaining perfect secrecy.
Motivated by these ndings, Wyner considered the imperfections in the com-
munication introduced by the channel and introduced the concept of the degraded
wiretap channel [16]. is model was later extended to the non-degraded wiretap
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channel by Csizar and Korner in [17]. ese two ground-breaking contributions
proved that there exist channel codes that can guarantee a low error probability at
the destination subject to condentiality constraints at the eavesdropper. Here, the
enabling condition is to guarantee the existence of a quality advantage between
the legitimate parties’ channel and the eavesdropper’s counterpart. However, this
condition can be seen as restrictive; therefore, Die and Hellman in response de-
veloped an alternative method that ignores the eect of the channel and introduces
the basic principles of public-key cryptography [18]. is work paved the way for
the development of computation-based security to provide information conden-
tiality based on cryptographic algorithms that later would become the security
scheme adopted by modern communication systems.
2.1.1 Cryptographic solutions for wireless networks
Condentiality services in wireless networks have been traditionally addressed at
higher layers of the communication model using cryptographic based protocols.
For instance, current commercial Wi-Fi systems use Wi-Fi protected access (WPA)
and WPA2 as security services which are based on cryptographic schemes, such
as the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP) and the counter mode cipher block
chaining message authentication code protocol (CCMP) [19]. Both of these pro-
tocols use the advanced encryption standard (AES) that is a symmetric-key algo-
rithm. In other words, a common key is used at both sides of the communication
for encrypting and decrypting the condential data. On the other hand, cellu-
lar 2G GSM networks uses the A3, A8, A5/2 and A5/3 stream ciphers for ensuring
over-the-air voice privacy while 3G UMTS and 4G LTE systems use KASUMI block
cipher based protocols [20]. All of these condentiality services use symmetric-
key cryptography to encrypt the data sent over the wireless link. In these cellular
networks, the ciphering secret key is generated using an authentication key stored
in the subscriber identity module (SIM) card of the device.
ese symmetric encryption algorithms raise serious practical issues regard-
ing the key distribution and management, eectively posing a major threat to
computation-based data condentiality. As an alternative to tackle these issues,
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms such as RSA public-key cryptosystems do
not require private key exchange; instead, they rely on highly computational, com-
plex operations, such as factoring the product of two large prime numbers. Here,
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the security lies in the assumption that it is computationally infeasible for the at-
tacker to recover the secret key from the publicly shared key due to the hardness of
reversing the mathematical operations involved in its calculation [21, §8]. In other
words, information condentiality relies on a computational restriction imposed
on the eavesdropper side that cannot be guaranteed in practical systems. Indeed,
this premise becomes a serious vulnerability particularly due to the current relent-
less growth of computational power [1].
Beyond these intrinsic vulnerabilities of cryptographic schemes, the imple-
mentation stage in practical protocols of these algorithms has introduced major
security aws that have been widely exploited in order to break computational-
based security. ese aacks target vulnerabilities at the design and implementa-
tion stages, the insecure and naive behaviour of network users, the trust model of
the system, and the physical deployment of the algorithms into the hardware [5].
As a result, we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of publicly known
aacks to the security of wireless networks. For example, recently, a fundamental
aw in WPA2, named Hole 196, exposed design vulnerabilities at the authentica-
tion stage of Wi-Fi networks that can be exploited to perpetrate eavesdropping
and man-in-the-middle aacks [22].
e security weaknesses in cryptography have motivated a resurgence of inter-
est in information-theoretic secrecy operating at the physical layer. e objective
is to augment already existing upper-layer security measures and therefore pro-
vide an holistic multilayer approach to signicantly enhance the security of next
generation data networks.
2.1.2 e Wiretap channel
In recent years, information-theoretic secrecy has demonstrated that taking ad-
vantage of the properties of transmission channels can ensure information con-
dentiality. Indeed, when the channel between the transmier and the receiver is
beer than the one between the transmier and the eavesdropper, a condential
message can be encoded so that only the intended receiver can reliably decode
it. Meanwhile the eavesdropper retrieves nothing from the condential message.
Remarkably, instead of using cryptographic algorithms, this condentiality is at-
tained by channel coding techniques, known as secrecy or wiretap codes [14]. e
transmission rate at which the condential message can be reliably transmied
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Figure 2.1: Wiretap channel models
towards the intended receiver while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant about the
content is referred to as the ‘secrecy rate’.
Information-theoretic security is based on the concept of the wiretap channel,
which consists of a transmission source, an intended or legitimate receiving des-
tination and an eavesdropper that aempts to intercept the condential message
conveyed from the transmier to the receiver. e link between the transmier
and receiver is known as the main channel, while the transmier to eavesdrop-
per counterpart is denoted as the wiretap or the eavesdropping channel. Both are
assumed to be discrete memoryless channels. In this scheme, the transmier and
the receiver agree a publicly-known encoding system. In other words, the eaves-
dropper is totally aware of the mechanism used to encode the condential mes-
sage. Indeed, it is assumed that the wiretapper does not have any computational
limitation. In Wyner’s degraded wiretap channel model [16], the eavesdropper’s
received signal is a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s signal (see Figure
2.1a) while in Csiszar and Korner’s non-degraded wiretap channel model, the main
channel and eavesdropping channels are supposed to be independent from each
other (see Figure 2.1b) [17]. e laer is a suitable scenario to model the secrecy
problem in wireless communications.
e objective of the wiretap channel is to ensure a transmission rate R in the
main channel at which the information leaked to the eavesdropper is negligible.
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Figure 2.2: Single-antenna wiretap channel model.
Bearing this objective in mind, the transmier encodes the condential message
W into a codeword Xn that is uniformly distributed over
{
1, · · · , 2nR}, where n
is the block length of the communication. e information is transmied over the
main link and the legitimate receiver observes Y n while the eavesdropper receives
Zn at the output of the wiretap channel. e wiretap channel model described is
depicted in Figure 2.2. Here, the equivocation rate at the eavesdropper Re rep-
resents the uncertainty about the message W , and it is given by the conditional
entropy function H by
Re =
1
n
H (W |Zn) . (2.1)
Wyner’s notion of security in [16] is dened by requiring that for a suciently
large n and for every  > 0 it holds
Re −  ≤ 1
n
H (W |Zn) . (2.2)
Perfect secrecy implies that asn goes to innite, the information revealed to the
eavesdropper vanished; i.e., the eavesdropper’s equivocation rate Re approaches
the entropy of the messageH(W ). erefore, the information leaked to the eaves-
dropper is given by the mutual information function I by
R−Re = 1
n
I (W ;Zn) , (2.3)
therefore, when the equivocation rateRe is arbitrarily close to the information rate
R as n goes to innity and  = 0, then the message W is asymptotically perfectly
secure from the eavesdropper. In other words, the eavesdropper’s received signal
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Zn does not reveal any information about the condential message W by simply
enforcing
lim
n→∞
[
1
n
I (W ;Zn)
]
= 0. (2.4)
It is worth highlighting that Wyner’s denition of secrecy in [16] is weaker
than the one proposed by Shannon [15] because it assumes that the information
leaked to the eavesdropper vanishes in the limit of a long code length. In contrast,
Shannon’s perfect secrecy requires the mutual information at the eavesdropper to
be zero regardless of the code length. Wyner’s requirement is called ’weak secrecy’
and it may not be rigorous enough to perfectly secure a system because it does
not prevent few bits of the message W being leaked through the eavesdropper’s
received signal Zn. As an alternative, this denition has been strengthened by
introducing the concept of ‘strong secrecy’ which considers that the total amount
of information about W , aer the eavesdropper observing Zn, goes to zero as the
code length increases towards innity. In other words, strong secrecy enforces
lim
n→∞
I (W ;Zn) = 0. (2.5)
From these denitions, it is clear to see that
perfect secrecy⇒ strong secrecy⇒ weak secrecy.
Both security requirements, strong and weak secrecy, are valid security deni-
tions that aim to completely confuse the eavesdropper about the message, leaving
it no beer informed that if it were not receiving any signal and with no other
option than to randomly guess the condential message. e denition of secrecy
to be used would depend upon the level of secrecy required by the application.
Interestingly, Mauler and Wolf have proven in [23], that in theory, both secrecy
constraints are able to aain the same coding rates. However, practical stronger
secrecy could be achieved by trading-o against coding rate, thereby reducing the
information throughput of the system [24].
A transmission rate that satises the secrecy constraints mentioned above is
referred to as the ‘secrecy rate’ RS . e ‘secrecy capacity’ CS of the wiretap chan-
nel is the supreme of the transmission secrecy rates between the transmier and
the intended receiver at which both reliability and information-theoretic security
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against an eavesdropper are guaranteed. In general, the secrecy capacity of a wire-
tap channel is given by
CS = max
V→X→Y,Z
I (V ;Y )− I (V ;Z) , (2.6)
where V is an auxiliary variable that allows channel prexing, which is the process
of mapping the message carrying signal to the channel inputX . In the case of a de-
graded wiretap channel as in [16], the legitimate receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s
output channels Y and Z satisfy the Markov chain X → Y → Z not requiring
prexing; i.e., X = V is optimal. e degraded model eectively enforces a beer
quality main channel. erefore, the secrecy capacity reduces to
CS = max
X
I (V ;Y )− I (V ;Z) . (2.7)
is means that, in the case of the Gaussian wiretap channel [25], the secrecy
capacity is a function of the mutual information and, therefore, of the Shannon
capacities of the main and wiretap channels given respectively by CM and CW .
is is CS = CM − CW , which means that a main channel with a larger capacity
than the eavesdropping link (i.e., main channel is beer than wiretap one) yields
non-zero secrecy capacity.
e secrecy capacity in (2.7) is achieved by a stochastic encoder. is means
that a Gaussian input X maximises the dierence in mutual information between
the main and eavesdropping links and therefore delivers the largest secrecy ca-
pacity [25]. is condition implies that the condential message is encoded using
a random Gaussian codebook. However, in practical communications systems,
the input codebooks consists of symbols from a nite-alphabet. As a result, the
achievable secrecy capacity for a nite-alphabet input scenario can be dramati-
cally reduced compared with the idealistic Gaussian codebook’s secrecy capacity
[26, 27].
It has to be noted that the above secrecy capacity expressions are derived based
on the assumption that the eavesdropping channel’s knowledge is perfectly avail-
able at the transmier. is condition (arguably) is not practical. As a result, alter-
native secrecy metrics using the eavesdropper’s channel statistics have been intro-
duced, such as outage probability performance metrics. is has been particularly
useful for addressing fading channels. For example, in [28], Barros and Rodrigues
2.1 Information-theoretic security 19
analysed the outage probability and outage secrecy capacity of slow fading chan-
nels, showing that information-theoretic security can be aained, even when the
eavesdropper’s average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is beer than the legitimate re-
ceiver’s. In the case of fast varying fading channels, a message can be encoded
across a large number of channel states to dene an alternative secrecy metric
based on the ergodic secrecy rate [29]. In this context, Li et al. showed in [30] that
a non-zero ergodic secrecy rate can be achieved even if on average the wiretap
channel is beer than the main link. ese two conclusions are based on the idea
of opportunistic transmissions during the time intervals when the main channel
is beer than the eavesdropping one. It is worth pointing out that these secrecy
metrics are weak owing to the fact that condentiality is provided in a probabilistic
or ergodic sense.
e total lack of information about the eavesdropper channel is a challeng-
ing problem from the point of view of the security. In this context, in [31], Liang
et al introduce the concept of the compound wiretap channel to understand the
information-theoretic limits of the wiretap channel that has no information re-
garding the eavesdropper. Here, security is enforced in any of the assumed states
that the eavesdropper’s channel can take from a nite known set of states. e
compound wiretap channel can also be viewed as a multicast channel with multi-
ple eavesdroppers where the transmier conveys information towards all the re-
ceivers while keeping the information secret from all the wiretappers. is model
of the wiretap channel has paved the way to address security issues in multi-user
networks [32].
Finally, the information-theoretic capabilities of multiple-antenna systems have
been studied through the multiple-antenna wiretap channel [33, 34, 35]. ese
contributions and the popularity of multiple-antenna systems have motivated a
plethora of both information-theoretic studies about the secrecy capabilities of
multiple-antenna systems and also about signal processing transmission approaches
to enable condential transmissions at the physical layer using the wiretap chan-
nel structure [36]. is thesis focuses on the laer (signal processing) scenario and
seeks to deliver transmission strategies based on multi-antenna systems to devise
innovative solutions to practical problems in securing multiple-antenna wireless
networks.
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2.2 e contribution of this thesis
In this thesis we study security in multiple antenna systems, both, in multiple-
input single-output (MISO) and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems.
We use information-theoretic concepts to devise novel signal processing tech-
niques to address practical problems arising from securing wireless networks. In
particular, we exploit the multiple-antenna degree of freedom to dynamically con-
vey sensitive information in a secure fashion towards the legitimate receiver while
the transmier broadcasts an interfering signal to deteriorate the eavesdroppers’
signal quality [37]. is masked channel precoding transmission technique has
been proven to enhance the security of wireless transmissions in terms of secrecy
rate improvements; however, it faces many open issues. e remainder of this
thesis will focus on the following challenging problems:
• e security threat that multiple unknown eavesdroppers pose to the net-
work. ese aackers can be strategically located in the surroundings of
the transmier to increase their likelihood of successfully intercepting con-
dential information.
• e transmier may only have inaccurate or outdated information about the
intended receiver’s channel.
• Achieving secure communications in networks with constrained resources;
particularly, when the transmier has limited resources in the form of trans-
miing antennas and power.
• Guaranteeing acceptable levels of quality at the intended receiver and at the
same time providing an information-theoretic security to avoid eavesdrop-
ping aacks.
In this context, in this thesis we introduce ecient and innovative signal pro-
cessing mechanisms to tackle these technical challenges. e novel contribution
is summarised as follows:
• Guaranteeing a high probability of secrecy in the presence of unknown eaves-
droppers by an intelligent outage based power allocation between informa-
tion and the interfering signal.
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• A study about the impact of the location of the eavesdroppers on the secrecy
of the multiple-antenna wireless network.
• An enhancement in the wireless secrecy by avoiding close-quarters eaves-
dropping aacks through the deployment of an exclusion zone (named the
protected zone). is security area also allows an ecient use of the avail-
able power. A strategy is presented to dene the size of this exclusion zone
in order to meet probabilistic secrecy objectives.
• A robust transmission scheme to maximise the secrecy rate when the trans-
mier has inaccurate (erroneous or outdated) information about the main
channel under the presence of a close and unknown aacker.
• A robust transmission scheme to cope with uncertainties in the transmier-
to-receiver link’s information to ensure an average secrecy rate where the
size of the protected zone and the amount of power used is minimised by
prioritising the use of resources.
• A study of the contribution of frequency selectiveness towards securing
multiple-antenna wireless networks using OFDM signalling.
• A secure transmission mechanism when the jamming signal is jointly trans-
mied from both legitimate multiple-antenna communication parties; i.e.,
the transmier and the receiver. is strategy is particularly aractive to
a resource constrained transmier conveying an information-theoretically
secure condential message.
• A robust scheme where the optimal transmission strategy is sought to max-
imise the secrecy rate in global and individual power constrained networks.
Here the receiver and the transmier can both jam the eavesdroppers, con-
sidering a degree of uncertainty in all the communication channels.
ese signal processing channel precoding techniques oer valid answers to
security problems in wireless networks by designing ecient transmission schemes
that can cope with the security and quality requirements of practical wireless net-
works. Indeed, the proposed solutions have a great potential to be exploited by the
telecommunications industry because they are exible, scalable and cost-eective
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ways to provide secure communications at the physical layer. ese strategies not
only tackle current security aws, but also pre-empt new future security threats.
2.3 Assumptions used throughout this thesis
In this section we explicitly state the assumptions made and the denitions used
throughout this thesis. ese considerations will allow us to beer contextualise
the contribution and the scope of the work presented here. e assumptions are
as follows.
• We address security from an information-theoretic point of view. As such,
strong security is enforced by secrecy metrics such as secrecy rate and se-
crecy capacity. Security is provided at the physical layer without relying on
upper layer cryptographic algorithms. erefore, the analysis of the perfor-
mance of complementary cryptographic techniques is beyond the scope of
this thesis.
• It is assumed that legitimate users have been authenticated and their iden-
tities have been proven. In other words, the legitimate transmier and re-
ceiver pair have previously gone through an authentication process and they
do not pose a threat to the transmission. Impersonation aacks such as man-
in-the-middle are outside of the context of this study.
• We consider the existence of a feedback channel between the transmier
and the eavesdropper. erefore, both the legitimate transmission parties
are aware of the channel state information (CSI) of their link; i.e., we use co-
herent detection. We consider perfect channel reciprocity; that is the uplink
and downlink channels are subject to the same channel impulse response.
We assume an error-free CSI unless it is stated otherwise; particularly, when
robust problems are addressed to deal with mismatched CSI.
• We assume that the symbols transmied are from a Gaussian codebook; that
is, an non=practical innite and random code alphabet.
• We address unicast single-user communications that may be eavesdropped
by multiple aackers. In other words, a transmier conveys a condential
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message to only one intended receiver at a time over the downlink channel
in the presence of (an) eavesdropper(s). e receiver acts as a passive en-
tity on the communication, and when the receiver communicates with the
transmier over the uplink channel,the receiver and transmier eectively
switch roles to establish again the one-direction wiretap channel model.
• We consider at quasi-static fading wireless channels unless the contrary is
clearly specied when we deal with frequency selective channels. In other
words, the channel’s fading coecients remain constant during the duration
of the transmission of the symbol and change randomly for the next one.
• We do not impose any computational or processing limitations at the eaves-
dropper side. However, depending upon the problem topology, we assume a
single-antenna or multiple-antenna eavesdropper for the MISO and MIMO
cases respectively.
• We address pure eavesdropping aacks in the sense that the aacker does
not transmit information or alter the data conveyed by the transmier. e
aacker neither transmits an interfering signal to jam the communication
between intended parties. In other words, the study of man-in-the-middle
or jamming aacks are out of the scope of this thesis.
• roughout this thesis we use the non-degraded Gaussian wiretap channel
model. We use the ‘main link’ to refer to the transmier to receiver link,
and ‘eavesdropping’ or ‘wiretap’ channel to refer to the transmier to eaves-
dropper channel. We use the terms ‘eavesdropper’, ‘aacker’, ‘wiretapper’
to refer to the malicious adversary pretending to overhear the condential
communication.
• Following the notation used in the wireless secrecy literature, we refer to
the ‘passive eavesdropping’ case as the scenario when the transmier is not
aware of the instantaneous CSI of the aackers. On the other hand, we refer
to an ‘active eavesdropping’ scenario when the eavesdroppers’ instantaneous
CSI is perfectly known by the transmier.
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2.4 Physical layer security beyond thewiretap chan-
nel model
e implementation of the wiretap channel model requires coding for secrecy. In-
deed, signalling and coding techniques used in tandem can be particularly power-
ful towards the realisation of practical physical layer security [38]. is need has
underpinned the construction of appropriate practical code designs, not only to
oer error correction capabilities, but also to provide information-theoretic secu-
rity. ese codes have been based on low density parity check codes [39] and on
nested coding [40].
Remarkably, in [23], Maurer introduced a strategy to achieve a positive trans-
mission rate even when the main link channel is worse than the one that the eaves-
dropper observes. is work was based on the joint development of a secret key by
the legitimate transmission pair communicating over a public, and therefore, inse-
cure error-free feedback channel. is seminal work paved the way for a new eld
of research in information-theoretic secrecy, and in contrast to Wyner’s key-less
wiretap channel secrecy model, a key is used to secure information in practical net-
works. is work generated many contributions that exploit common randomness,
take advantage of distillation, information reconciliation and privacy amplication
procedures to agree on a secret key between the legitimate communication parties
[41, 42, 43, 44]. e general idea is to exploit the randomness and uniqueness of
the wireless channel to generate a key to secure condential information.
Finally, it is worth remarking that the wiretap channel model is based on the
assumption of a pre-authenticated main channel. In this context, authentication
initiatives have been developed to provide alternative ways to validate the identity
of the legitimate users using the transmission physical media. For instance, the
transmied message can be ngerprinted as a way to validate legitimate users’
credentials [45].
All the aforementioned security techniques have the potential to complement
and develop the level of information-theoretic security of the wiretap channel
model towards practical implementations. erefore, there is a clear necessity for a
holistic multi-layer approach to combine secrecy strategies and then provide eec-
tive techniques to combat the current and future security threats faced by wireless
communications.
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It is important to remark that the aim of this thesis is to study signal process-
ing techniques to provide information-theoretic security in single-user multiple
antenna wireless networks by using the wiretap channel model. erefore, secu-
rity strategies such as those mentioned in this section, are out of the scope of this
work. However, it is important to highlight their security potential to comple-
ment and enhance the security provided by the transmission strategies introduced
in this work.

Chapter3
Outage based physical layer security
for MISO systems
‘Apparently Seldon had been
working up to his last moments on
psychohistorical equations […] it
has been said that Hari Seldon le
this life as lived it, for he died with
the future he created unfolding all
around him.’ - Encyclopedia
Galactica
Isaac Asimov
In this chapter we address physical layer security in multiple-antenna commu-nication systems in the presence of unknown passive eavesdroppers. Here,the additional degree of freedom that the multiple-input single-output chan-
nel (MISO) introduces over the system is exploited to enhance the security of a
wireless network. We investigate a probabilistic resource allocation strategy to
devise an ecient solution to tackle practical security challenges that MISO wire-
less networks face. For instance, we address threats arising from aackers that
remain hidden in the network and might be strategically located near to the trans-
mier to receive a favourable signal and so eectively jeopardise the security of a
transmission. Providing security in this scenario is challenging; particularly, when
the availability of resources at the transmier is limited; therefore, it is necessary
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to use them eciently to provide both security and good quality of service at the
intended receiver.
To address the aforementioned practical problems, in this chapter we use a
‘masked beamforming’ strategy that uses multiple-antennas at the transmier to
steer the information towards the intended receiver and to broadcast a jamming
signal in the form of ‘articial noise’ to confuse passive eavesdroppers. In this
scenario, providing total condentiality is not possible; therefore, a probabilistic
treatment of secrecy is necessary. erefore, in this chapter we introduce two
outage based power allocation mechanisms to guarantee a given probability of se-
crecy. We incorporate a study of the impact on the security of the distance between
transmission parties by deploying a ‘protected zone’ to quantify the cost in terms
of power of providing secrecy under the presence of an eavesdropper located in
the immediate vicinity of the transmier.
e structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 provides a literature
background to the existing signal processing techniques addressing physical layer
security in MISO networks. In section 3.2 we model the MISO system under the
presence of unknown eavesdroppers. Subsequently, in section 3.3 we introduce
the rst outage power allocation technique based on ality of Service (QoS) con-
straints. e next section (3.4) features the second outage based technique that
allocates resources considering the distance between transmission parties when a
protected zone is deployed. Finally, section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
3.1 Physical layer security in MISO systems
e degree of freedom that multiple-antenna systems introduces in wireless com-
munications oers not only the possibility of improvements in capacity and quality
but also improvement in security. Indeed, the use of multiple-antenna techniques
powered by signal processing algorithms has aracted the aention of the research
community as a valid framework to provide new means to secure wireless net-
works [36]. In this context, the secrecy capabilities of multiple-antenna channels
is studied for the rst time by Shae and Ulukus in [46] and by Khisti et al. in
[34, 47, 48] where the remarkable contribution that multiple-antennas introduce
into the wireless security is highlighted.
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In the case of a fully characterised MISO system, a transmission strategy us-
ing a Gaussian codebook with rank-one covariance matrix has been proven to
be the optimal transmission strategy to achieve the secrecy capacity CS [46]. In
other words, when the CSI of the intended receiver and the eavesdropper are both
perfectly known (i.e., active eavesdropping) and the channel input is restricted
to Gaussian signalling, then the secrecy capacity is achieved by beamforming as
close as possible to the intended receiver’s channel direction and as orthogonal
as possible to the eavesdropping channel direction. Interestingly, in [46] Shaee
also shows that in the case when the CSI of the eavesdropper is not available (i.e.,
passive eavesdropping), then the best secure strategy is to beamform towards the
legitimate receiver. A similar study is carried out later in [49, 50] through semidef-
inite programming (SDP) proving that transmit beamforming is also a secrecy rate
optimal strategy for MISO networks in the presence of multiple single-antenna
eavesdroppers.
3.1.1 Masked beamforming
Beamforming has become a popular transmission mechanism to secure MISO com-
munications; moreover, this technique can elegantly be enhanced by broadcasting
articial noise (AN) to confuse passive eavesdroppers [51]. Indeed, the additional
degree of freedom that the multiple-antenna channel introduces allows simultane-
ously conveying the information towards the intended receiver and broadcasting
a jamming signal which does not aect the receiver [37]. e resulting technique
coined as ‘beamforming and articial noise generation’ or ‘masked beamforming’
has received a lot of research aention as an eective way to secure networks
where the eavesdroppers remain hidden in the network and therefore their CSIs
are unknown or only partially known [52]. In the case of pure passive eavesdrop-
ping cases the information is steered towards the legitimate receiver while the AN
is broadcast over the nullspace of the legitimate receiver channel’s signature, so it
does not ‘jam’ the receiver [53].
e lack of knowledge about the single-antenna eavesdropper’s CSI prevents
the beamforming strategy from achieving perfect secrecy because the multiple-
antenna transmier cannot null the eavesdroppers by conveying the condential
message over the eavesdropper channel’s nullspace. erefore, condential in-
formation can be leaked to the aacker compromising the security. Under this
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scenario, like in the single-antenna transmier case [14], a statistical treatment of
secrecy is necessary to formulate ergodic and outage denitions of secrecy. In the
rst case, the statistical information of the eavesdropper’s link CSI is assumed to
maximise (on average) the MISO ergodic secrecy rate [54]. Meanwhile, in the sec-
ond case, the statistical information of the wiretap CSI is used to characterise the
probability of having a secure communication [55, 56]. In all these contributions it
is shown that either achieving an arbitrary low secrecy outage probability or max-
imising the ergodic secrecy rate cannot be achieved without judiciously adjusting
the power allocated for the information and for the AN. In this context, in [57, 58]
Zhou et al. introduce a power allocation mechanism to maximise the ergodic se-
crecy rate of MISO channels under the presence of unknown eavesdroppers show-
ing that equal power distribution between information and AN is near-optimal as
a strategy to maximise on average the secrecy rate. It is important to point out
that these contributions do not address the power distribution problem from an
outage perspective to ensure a given probability of secrecy.
All of the aforementioned transmission strategies consider the secrecy rate as
the natural metric that determines the secrecy capabilities of the MISO link. How-
ever, a valid alternative to dene a secure system is by enforcing ality of Service
(QoS) constraints at the transmission parties. In other words, a system is consid-
ered secure when the quality of the signal at the intended receiver, given by the
SNR, satises a reliability constraint, and, at the same time, the quality signal of
the eavesdropper is below a maximum security tolerable level [53, 55]. is strat-
egy eectively xes the secrecy rate to a value given by the dierence in capacity
between the required QoS thresholds at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper.
Using this denition of security, Liao et al. present in [59] an optimised masked
beamforming technique to optimise the beamforming vector and the AN transmis-
sion covariance matrix to satisfy QoS requirements in a power constrained MISO
network. is setup can deal with the passive eavesdropping case by assuming
knowledge of the second order statistics of the eavesdropping channel; however,
likewise [57, 58], only an average QoS based security is ensured rather than guar-
anteeing an outage based probability of secrecy.
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3.1.2 Impact of the distance between transmission parties
Owing to the channel path-loss eect, the distance between the transmission par-
ties is of prime importance in order to guarantee secrecy. In this context, single-
antenna receivers and eavesdroppers randomly scaered in the space are consid-
ered to study the secrecy capacity between nodes [60]. e impact on throughput
due to the inclusion of security constraints in a network with single-antenna ran-
dom nodes distributed according a Poisson point process is investigated in [61].
Subsequently, in [62] a statistical framework is introduced to quantify the proba-
bility of secrecy in the presence of unknown eavesdroppers whose locations and
channels are unknown. ese approaches are extended to the case when masked
beamforming is used as multiple-antenna security strategy in [63]. It is important
to highlight that even though all these strategies consider the eect of the location
of the nodes and the path losses associated, none of them consider the worst-case
for the security; i.e.; issues that emerge when an aacker is located in the vicinity
of the transmier.
A major threat to security arises when unknown eavesdroppers are physically
present in the immediate vicinity of the transmier. In this scenario, and due to the
reduced path losses, the quality of the eavesdropper’s received signal is likely to be
beer than the further legitimate receiver counterpart, thus threatening the overall
security of the system. erefore, avoiding intruders close to the transmier is of
paramount importance in achieving a secure transmission. is can be realised, as
is done in ad-hoc networks in [64], by controlling any nodes’ presence in the trans-
mier’s surrounding area. is idea is exploited in [65] where the transmier is
assumed to be able to detect eavesdroppers inside a ‘Secrecy Guard Zone’ and then
dene its transmission strategy based on their existence or absence. By contrast,
Chang et al. suggest in [66] that an eavesdroppers-free ’Secure Zone’ can signif-
icantly improve the secrecy rate and/or save transmit power in MISO networks;
however, no mechanism is devised to quantify either the size of the exclusion area
or its impact over security.
3.1.3 is chapter’s contribution
In this chapter we endeavour to oer transmission strategies to address the impor-
tant open issues regarding the distribution of power between information and AN
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to enforce a given probability of secrecy and the security threat resulting from a
close eavesdropper. erefore, two probabilistic resource allocation strategies are
introduced as follows
• e rst outage based allocation strategy distributes the available power be-
tween information and AN to guarantee a given probability of secrecy that is
dened based on QoS constraints to be satised at the transmission parties.
• e second resource distribution approach considers the eect of the dis-
tance between nodes to set the size of an eavesdropper exclusion zone (called
the Protected Zone (PZ)) and the amount of power devoted for information
and AN. Here a given probability of secrecy dened by the MISO secrecy
rate is enforced.
ese two outage based resource allocation techniques are based on formulat-
ing minimisation problems where the likelihood of achieving secrecy is dened
by probabilistic constraints. ese constraints are wrien as Gaussian quadratic
forms whose CDF is evaluated by using step functions and their complex inte-
gral representation. is formulation allows us to solve the rst outage based QoS
power allocation problem by a closed-form expression while the second resource
distribution problem is solved by numerical algorithms. Moreover, two particular
cases of the second problem are studied oering valuable insight into the resource
allocation behaviour when the transmission parties are equidistant and when the
protected zone vanishes leing the aackers approach the transmier without re-
striction. e numerical results show that the two introduced allocation strategies
can guarantee a high probability of secrecy by prioritising the use of the available
resources; i.e., the transmit power and the size of the protected zone. e improve-
ment in secrecy obtained is illustrated when this approach is benchmarked against
an existing technique that does not consider outage formulation and therefore can
only provide security in average.
3.1.4 Very recent contributions
It is worth pointing out some important works on MISO security based on an out-
age formulation that have either appeared in the literature later than the original
publication date of this work, or have been inspired by the ideas presented in this
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chapter. In [67], Gerbracht et al. minimise the outage probability of secrecy of
masked beamforming when the transmier has only partial information about the
eavesdropping channel. e analysis is generalised to the perfect eavesdropper’s
CSI knowledge and the unavailability of the eavesdropper channel signature cases
showing that AN is not necessary for active eavesdropping. In [68], Zhang et
al. design a masked beamforming system considering the power allocation and
the rate parameters of the wiretap code to maximise the secrecy throughput con-
strained by a maximum allowable secrecy outage probability. Recently, in [69] the
impact of the AN over the secrecy of a large scale decentralised MISO network was
studied where the nodes’ location follow Poisson point processes. In addition, the
outage based power allocation strategy work presented in this chapter motivated
the closed-form power allocation between information and AN introduced in [70]
that minimises the secrecy rate outage probability in power constrained MISO net-
works. Finally, in [71] our novel concept of a the protected zone was used to study
the security performance of a network with unknown eavesdroppers randomly
distributed outside of the exclusion area.
3.2 System model
In this section, we model a MISO system in the presence of multiple unknown and
non-colluding eavesdroppers; i.e., the eavesdroppers do not work in a coopera-
tive fashion. e wireless secrecy model is followed, so the legitimate transmier
and receiver are named ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’ respectively while the eavesdroppers are
collectively referred to as ‘the Eves’.
Alice is equipped with Nt ≥ 2 antennas while Bob and all of the K Eves each
have a single antenna. e Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-the kth Eve at-fading chan-
nel vectors are denoted by hb ∈ CNt and hek ∈ CNt . In order to consider the
propagation path loss eect the distance between transmission parties is consid-
ered; therefore the channel vectors are given by hb = r
−α
2
b h˜b and he = r
−α
2
ek h˜ek
where rb and rek are the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-the kth Eve distances and α is
the path loss exponent (α ≥ 2). Finally, h˜b and h˜ek are mutually independent small
scale fading channel vectors that are not aected by the communication range. e
vector h˜b has uncorrelated zero-mean Gaussian distributed elements with variance
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Figure 3.1: MISO system model. A multi-antennas transmier (Alice) conveys a secret mes-
sage to the single-antenna receiver (Bob) in the presence of K single-antenna eavesdroppers
(Eves).
σ2
h˜b
, i.e., h˜b ∼ CN(0, σ2h˜bINt); similarly, h˜ek ∼ CN(0, σ
2
h˜ek
INt). e system is de-
picted in Figure 3.1. We consider a passive eavesdropping scenario; therefore hb is
perfectly known to Alice while hek remains unknown to her. However, Alice can
assume statistical information about Eve’s channel.
We choose a masked beamforming secure transmission strategy that consists of
steering information towards Bob and at the same time broadcasting AN to confuse
unknown non-colluding eavesdroppers. So let s ∈ CNt denote the beamformed
signal vector transmied by Alice modelled as
s =
√
awd+
√
bη (3.1)
where the scalar variables a and b dene the absolute powers allocated to the infor-
mation and AN respectively. Here w ∈ CNt is the unit norm beamforming vector;
i.e., ||w|| = 1; η ∈ CNt is the AN vector with covariance matrix Cη = E{ηηH}
s.t. Tr{Cη} = 1; and d ∈ C is the scalar, complex information symbol chosen
from a Gaussian codebook with E{|d|2} = 1. e covariance matrix of the vector
s is denoted by Cs = E{ssH} and P =Tr{Cs} = a+ b is Alice’s total transmied
power.
In order to determine the transmission vectors w and η, we use the same strat-
egy as in [53, 72] that broadcasts AN in all directions except towards Bob. ere-
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fore, the beamforming vector w= h˜b||h˜b|| is the eigenvector (t1) corresponding to
the single non-zero eigenvalue of the rank-one matrix h˜bh˜Hb . e AN vector η is
then constructed by a linear combination of the remaining Nt − 1 eigenvectors
so that orthogonality between the beamforming and AN vectors is preserved; i.e.,
wHη = 0. Uniform power distribution among the remaining Nt − 1 eigenvectors
{ti}Nti=2 is enforced; therefore, η is obtained as follows
η =
1√
Nt − 1
Nt∑
i=2
tiηi, (3.2)
where ti is the ith eigenvector of h˜bh˜Hb , and ηi ∈ C is an independent, complex,
random variable with unit magnitude and uniformly distributed phase; i.e., ηi =
ejςi and ςi ∈ [0, 2pi). us the AN covariance matrix is given by
Cη =
1
Nt − 1
Nt∑
i=2
tit
H
i . (3.3)
is technique eectively conveys the information only towards Bob and broad-
casts the AN over the null space of the rank-one matrix h˜bh˜Hb . In other words, the
AN is mathematically ‘invisible’ to Bob but it can potentially confuse the Eves. is
can be easily visualised by analysing the scalar signals received by Bob and the kth
Eve that are explicitly given by
u =
√
ar
−α
2
b h˜
H
b t1d+ nb (3.4)
vk =
√
ar
−α
2
ek h˜
H
ek
t1d+
√
br
−α
2
ek h˜
H
ek
η + nek (3.5)
where the scalar terms nb and ne represent complex additive Gaussian noise at
Bob’s and Eves’ antennas such that nb ∼ CN(0, σ2b ) and ne ∼ CN(0, σ2ek).
Finally, the received SNRs at both Bob and at the kth Eve are given by
SNRb =
a||h˜b||2
rαb σ
2
b
(3.6)
SNRek = atH1 h˜ek
[
bh˜HekCηh˜ek + r
α
ek
σ2ek
]−1
h˜Hekt1 (3.7)
while the achievable secrecy rate of the modelled system is
RS = [log2 (1 + SNRb)− log2 (1 + SNRe)]+ [bps/Hz] . (3.8)
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3.3 Anoutage security formulation based onal-
ity of Service
As explained before, under passive eavesdropping aacks it is not possible to oer
perfect secrecy between the legitimate transmission parties; therefore, a proba-
bilistic treatment of secrecy must be used. So in this section we introduce an outage
probability based power distribution allocation to optimally allocate the available
power between the information and AN to satisfy QoS requirements at the trans-
mission parties. Here, secrecy is based on enforcing QoS constraints dened by the
SNR both at the receiver and (probabilistically) at the unknown eavesdroppers.
3.3.1 Optimisation problem
e aim of the allocation strategy is to oer a given probability of secrecy dened
by β, by enforcing a minimum SNRb at Bob (γb) and ensuring probabilistically that
the SNRek at each eavesdropper is appropriately upper bounded by γe. In this
section, and without loss of generality, we consider the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-
Eve distances equal and normalised; i.e., rab = rae = 1.
We formulate an optimisation problem to nd the optimal power allocation
that minimises the transmied power (P = a+ b) subject to guaranteeing a given
probability of secrecy β ∈ [0, 1) satisfying a given QoS as follows
min
a,b
a+ b (3.9a)
s.t. SNRb ≥ γb (3.9b)
P [SNRe1 ≤ γe, · · · , SNRek ≤ γe] ≥ β (3.9c)
a > 0, b ≥ 0. (3.9d)
Since all hek are mutually independent, aer dropping the ‘k’ sub-index from
SNRek , the constraint in (3.9c) simplies to
(P [SNRe ≤ γe])K ≥ β. (3.10)
Now using the SNR denitions in (3.6) and (3.7) and the constraint in (3.10),
the problem (3.9) becomes
min
a,b
a+ b (3.11a)
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s.t. a||h˜b||2
[
σ2b
]−1 ≥ γb (3.11b)
P
[
atH1 h˜e
[
bh˜He Cηh˜e + σ
2
e
]−1
h˜He t1 ≤ γe
]
≥ β 1K (3.11c)
a > 0, b ≥ 0. (3.11d)
We draw aention to the constraint in (3.11c). Its LHS can be wrien in terms
of a random Hermitian quadratic form Y = h˜He Ah˜e whose CDF can be evaluated
in a closed-form expression by using step function representation and complex
integration as introduced in [73]. We address this procedure in the next section.
Evaluating the CDF of a random Hermitian quadratic form
e LHS of the constraint (3.11c) can be re-wrien as follows
P
[
h˜He Ah˜e ≤ σ2e
]
(3.12)
where
A =
a
γe
t1t
H
1 − bCη. (3.13)
Hence, (3.12) corresponds to the CDF of an indenite Hermitian quadratic form
(Y = h˜He Ah˜e) in the random vector h˜e ∼ CN(0, σ2heINt). In order to consider the
general case of σ2he 6= 1 and still be able to apply the procedure in [73] developed for
σ2he = 1, an auxiliary variable he =
h˜e
σh˜e
is introduced such that he ∼ CN(0, INt).
erefore, Y is wrien as Y = hHe Ahe; then A = σ2h˜eA and the eigenvalues of A
are σ2
h˜e
λi (A). Considering the denitions of Cη in (3.3) and of A in (3.13) yields
A = σ2
h˜e
[
a
γe
t1t
H
1 −
b
Nt − 1t2t
H
2 − · · · −
b
Nt − 1tNtt
H
Nt
]
. (3.14)
is expression corresponds to the eective eigen-decomposition of the matrix
A whose Nt eigenvalues are λ1 and λ2 with multiplicity orders equal to one and
Nt − 1 respectively. In other words, the eigenvalues of A areλ1, λ2, · · · , λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nt
 = [aσ2h˜e
γe
,−
bσ2
h˜e
Nt − 1 , · · · ,−
bσ2
h˜e
Nt − 1
]
. (3.15)
Following the procedure detailed in [73], and bearing in mind the described
multiplicity order of the eigenvalues of A, the CDF of Y for a value y is
FY (y) = u (y) +
α1
|λ1|e
− y
λ1 u
(
y
λ1
)
+
Nt−1∑
k=1
αk+1
(k − 1)!|λ2|k y
k−1e−
y
λ2 u
(
y
λ2
)
(3.16)
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where u(x) denotes the unit step function.
Since in our problem λ1 > 0 and λ2 < 0, and as we are only interested in
FY (y) for positive values of y, since y = σ2e ≥ 0 (see (3.12)), then {αk+1}Nt−1k=1 in
(3.16) can be neglected. Meanwhile α1 is given by
α1 = − λ1(
1− λ2
λ1
)Nt−1 . (3.17)
Finally, using the eigenvalues of A in (3.15), the equivalent CDF in (3.16) and
the denition in (3.17) the nal expression for FY (y) for y ≥ 0 is obtained as
follows
FY (y) = 1− 1(
1 + b
a
γe
Nt−1
)Nt−1 e− γeaσ2h˜e y, y ≥ 0. (3.18)
Once the CDF within the constraint (3.11c) has been evaluated, now it can be
re-wrien as
1− 1(
1 + b
a
γe
Nt−1
)Nt−1 e− γeaσ2h˜e σ2e ≥ β 1K (3.19)
where (3.19) results from evaluating FY (σ2e) in (3.18). us the resulting problem
becomes
min
a,b
a+ b (3.20a)
s.t. a||h˜b||2
[
σ2b
]−1 ≥ γb (3.20b)
1− 1(
1 + b
a
γe
Nt−1
)Nt−1 e− γeaσ2h˜e σ2e ≥ β 1K (3.20c)
a > 0, b ≥ 0 (3.20d)
and this can be solved to nd the optimal power allocation given by a? and b? in
closed-form expression as follows
a? =
γbσ
2
b
||h˜b||2
(3.21a)
b? =
a?(Nt − 1)
γe
 Nt−1
√√√√e− γea?σ2h˜e σ2e
1− β 1K − 1


+
. (3.21b)
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e closed-form solution in (3.21) shows that ensuring a given probability of
secrecy is achieved at the expense of supplying power for AN generation. A high
probability of secrecy can be provided by devoting additional power to the AN
meanwhile the power allocated to the information transmission remains constant
irrespective of the target probability of secrecy β.
In the case of a power constrained system, we dene the maximum transmit
power available at Alice as Pmax. erefore, in the case where the solution to the
problem (3.9) given by (3.21) requires more than the available power; i.e., a?+b? >
Pmax, then the problem is infeasible. In this scenario, the system is considered in
outage and, for the sake of the secrecy, Alice does not transmit any information
for that particular channel realisation. As we will see in the next section, this has
an impact on the secure throughput of the system.
3.3.2 Numerical results
In this section we present simulation results to show the achieved secrecy proba-
bility, the secrecy throughput and the power distribution for two cases:
1. the idealistic scenario where the total power available is not constrained
(i.e., P ∈ [0,∞)),
2. the practical case where the power available at the transmier is limited
(i.e., P ∈ [0, Pmax]).
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed outage based power allo-
cation method, it is necessary to compare it against a technique that also denes
security by QoS constraints as in [59]. In this referenced work, the authors as-
sume that the Eves’ CSIs are perfectly available at the transmier. However, [59]
also oers an option to use only statistical knowledge about the eavesdroppers,
i.e., E
{
h˜eh˜
H
e
}
= σ2
h˜e
INt . is setup is similar to the one used throughout the
work presented in this chapter enabling us to fairly benchmark both techniques.
e main dierence is that our approach considers an optimisation problem based
on outage probability formulation while [59] uses the statistical knowledge of the
Eves’ CSI to satisfy the QoS constraints in average. e instantaneous informa-
tion of the legitimate channel is assumed to be exactly known by Alice for both
approaches.
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Table 3.1: Simulation parameters setup.
Parameter Value Description
Nt 5 Alice’s number of antennas
σ2
h˜b
1 Main channel elements variance
σ2
h˜e
1 Eavesdropping channel elements variance
γb 10 dB QoS constraint at Bob
γe 0 dB QoS constraint at Eve
σ2b 1 Bob’s AWGN power
σ2e 1 Eve’s AWGN power
Pmax 6 Maximal power for constrained systems
normalised relative to the AWGN power
For the simulations, three and ve eavesdroppers are considered (K = 3, 5)
under the same channel and noise statistical conditions, so indices can be omied.
200,000 Monte Carlo runs are considered with simulations parameters listed in
Table 3.1. In all the gures, the proposed outage based power allocation method
and the reference technique are referred to as ‘Prop:’ and ‘Ref:’ respectively.
In Figure 3.2 the achieved probability of secrecy resulting from the outage
based power allocation technique in (3.21) is shown when the target probability of
secrecy β varies from 0.05 to 0.95. From the graphs it is clear that the proposed ap-
proach guarantees the intended probability of secrecy (β) while the reference tech-
nique can only oer a constant probability of secrecy independent of the power
available at the transmier. Indeed, the referenced technique [59] oers a maxi-
mum achieved probability of secrecy even for the unconstrained power scenario
because it does not consider outage probability in the allocation mechanism.
In the power constrained case, as explained before, transmission only takes
place when (i): (3.9b) and (3.9c) are both satised and (ii): the solution in (3.21)
requires P = a? + b? ≤ Pmax. So there is a trade-o between guaranteeing a high
probability of secrecy (β) and the secrecy throughput. is behaviour is observed
in the Figure 3.3 where the normalised secrecy throughput is depicted. Here, we
dene the normalised secrecy throughput as the achieved probability of secrecy
times the ratio between the number of channel realisations whose information is
‘securely transmied’ (i.e., constraint (3.9c) is satised) and the total number of
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Figure 3.2: Achieved probability of secrecy versus target probability of secrecy (β) for un-
constrained and constrained transmit power systems.
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Figure 3.3: Achieved normalised secrecy throughput in aempting to achieve a target prob-
ability of secrecy (β) for both unconstrained and constrained transmit power systems.
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channel realisations considered in the simulations. From these plots the proposed
technique in most of the cases oers a higher throughput than the reference one.
Indeed, for the power unconstrained system, the target probability of secrecy is
always guaranteed thus achieving the maximum possible secrecy throughput. On
the other hand, for the power constrained case, as the security conditions become
more demanding and the probability of secrecy β approaches one, the through-
put decreases due to the fact that transmissions only take place for fewer channel
realisations.
It is worth pointing out that in the case of power constrained systems, and
unlike the reference technique in [59], the secrecy throughput of the proposed
scheme can be improved by incrementing the power available at the transmier.
is is clearly shown in Figure 3.4 where the eect of increasing Pmax is analysed
for values of target probability of secrecy β = 0.8, 0.9. Here, for larger values
of Pmax, the proposed scheme is perfectly capable of guaranteeing the maximum
secrecy throughput rates while the reference method is constrained to a xed value
of secrecy throughput, irrespective of Pmax.
In Figure 3.5 the power distribution for the power unconstrained case is il-
lustrated for dierent values of the target probability of secrecy (β). Here, the
average power requested for the strategy is observed, where ‘average power’ is
the mean value of P over those Monte Carlo runs where transmission takes place
(i.e., P ≤ Pmax). In Figure 3.6 the trade-o between allocating power for AN and
information is depicted for the power constrained scenario when the normalised
Pmax = 6 relative to the AWGN power.
Note that the outage based power allocation scheme is also capable of guaran-
teeing a given probability of secrecy for a larger number of eavesdroppers; how-
ever, it is necessary to provide more power at the transmier. is can be seen
from the closed-form result in (3.21) and in all the above gures when the results
are considered for K = 3 and K = 5, especially in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 where the
power distribution is shown.
Finally, it is important to remark upon the simplicity of the proposed outage
based power allocation scheme that provides a closed-form expression to distribute
power relying on simple mathematical calculations. is is in contrast to [59] that
requires complex computational algorithms to solve the optimisation problem.
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Figure 3.4: Normalised secrecy throughput for constrained transmit power systems under
dierent values of maximum power (Pmax) (normalised relative to the AWGN power) and
unconstrained systems for β = 0.8, 0.9.
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Figure 3.5: Power distribution between information and articial noise (normalised relative
to the AWGN’s power) for achieving a given probability of secrecy (β) in an unconstrained
transmit power system.
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Figure 3.6: Power distribution between information and articial noise for achieving a given
probability of secrecy (β) in a constrained transmit power system.
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3.4 An outage secrecy rate formulation with pro-
tected zone
is section incorporates the analysis of the proximity of the nodes and how this
inuences the secrecy performance of the MISO system. Here the critical prob-
lem of having a physically close eavesdropper is examined and how this situation
can become a serious threat to the system’s security due to the advantageous (re-
duced) path losses aecting the eavesdropper compared to a more distant intended
receiver.
As an eective way to prevent a closer unknown eavesdropper and to incor-
porate the distance eect under a worst-case scenario, we will introduce into the
problem setup an eavesdropper exclusion area named the ‘protected zone’ (PZ).
In this context, a prioritised outage based optimisation problem is formulated to
determine the minimum requested transmission power and the smallest size of
the PZ to guarantee a given level of security (probabilistically dened). Here, the
secrecy rate is used as the natural physical layer security metric rather than a re-
strictive QoS-based secrecy, as was done before in §3.3. is approach allows us to
prioritise the use of power over enlarging the PZ, or to save power by deploying a
large PZ. Furthermore, this formulation sheds light into the additional power con-
sumption levels needed to achieve high security when an eavesdropper is close to
the transmier or, on the other hand, into the possible savings in power due to a
distant aacker.
3.4.1 Protected zone
e Protected Zone (PZ) is a novel way to improve the security of the system by
dening an eavesdropper-free area where Alice only allows the presence of autho-
rised nodes by using physical means. e motivation for deploying a PZ is twofold.
First, it contributes to the secrecy by preventing aacks at close-quarters; and sec-
ond, it allows an ecient use of the available power.
To illustrate this concept, we can consider practical deployments where the
transmission facilities are located in restricted-access areas thereby preventing
the physical access of a potential aacker. Some examples are equipment rooms,
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Figure 3.7: MISO system model with a protected zone. A multi-antennas transmier (Alice)
conveys a secret message to the single-antenna receiver (Bob) in the presence of a single-
antenna eavesdropper (Eve).
transmission antennas placed on the top of communication towers or on roofs pro-
tected by restricted-access perimeters like the ones built into critical microwave
backbone network repeaters or cellular base stations in high risk areas. ese com-
monly deployed physical layouts inherently dene a PZ; alternatively, where no
PZ physically exists, a security perimeter may be intentionally deployed to achieve
a given level of secrecy, especially in power constrained scenarios.
A PZ, as depicted in the Figure 3.7, is dened by the ‘Security Radius’ (rs) that is
the transmier-to-the PZ border distance. e inclusion of the PZ is equivalent to
restricting the Alice-to-Eve distance (re) to be larger or equal than the secrecy ra-
dius; i.e., re ≥ rs. is formulation is meaningful not only because it improves the
security, but also because it gives insights about the impact of the eavesdroppers’
location over the security. Indeed, incorporating a PZ into the design allows us
to quantify the additional power required to achieve high levels of security in the
presence of a close aacker (i.e., re → 0) or the possible savings in power when
Eve is far away from Alice (i.e., re  0).
In the remaining of this chapter, a PZ is incorporated into the analysis to for-
mulate an optimisation problem that aims to determine the radius of a PZ (rs) and
the power distribution to deliver a probabilistically secured MISO network. For
the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, the analysis is restricted to
the case of one eavesdropper, i.e., K = 1. However, the extension to the multi-
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ple eavesdropper case is straightforward following the guidelines presented in the
previous section.
3.4.2 Optimisation Problem
e objective is to nd the optimal resource allocation given by the size of the
PZ and the power distribution between information and AN to ensure that the
probability of secrecy is larger than a target β. Here, the probability of secrecy is
dened as the likelihood that the secrecy rate RS in (3.8) is guaranteed to be above
or equal to the target secrecy rate R. In other words, the probability of secrecy is
dened by
PSEC(R) = P [RS ≥ R] . (3.22)
To achieve this goal, a Weighted Normalised Cost Function (WNCF) is intro-
duced to eciently allocate both available resources that aect the security per-
formance: (i) the total transmied power (P = a + b), and (ii) the PZ’s size given
by the secrecy radius (rs). So the WNCF is
CF(a, b, rs) = κ1
a+ b
Pmax
+ κ2
rs
rsmax
. (3.23)
Here Pmax and rsmax are the maximum available transmission power and the
maximum allowable radius of the PZ while κ1 and κ2 are the weights to prioritise
the use of one resource over the other. e values of κ1 and κ2 are chosen to re-
ect whether it is more convenient to use additional power rather than extending
the PZ or vice versa. is design criteria can be motivated by either the resource
availability or the practical feasibility to deploy a PZ. It is worth pointing out that
normalising the cost function takes into account Pmax and rsmax , making meaning-
ful weighting between absolute values rather than considering dierent and not
related resources such as power and distance. is new idea eectively enables us
to jointly distribute both network resources and to dene how they are used.
Considering the restriction on the eavesdropper location introduced by the PZ,
the optimisation problem can now be wrien as follows
min
a,b,rs
CF (a, b, rs) (3.24a)
s.t. PSEC(R) = P [RS ≥ R] ≥ β (3.24b)
a+ b ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax (3.24c)
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re ≥ rs, a > 0, b ≥ 0. (3.24d)
Substituting the denitions of the SNRb in (3.6) and of the secrecy rate in (3.8)
into the probabilistic constraint in (3.24b) yields
P [SNRe ≤ ψ] ≥ β, s.t. ψ = 2−R
(
1 +
a||h˜b||2
rαb σ
2
b
)
− 1. (3.25)
From (3.25), and considering that the SNRe must be a positive value, then ψ ≥
SNRe > 0 ⇒ ψ > 0. erefore, for β > 0, the probabilistic constraint (3.24b)
and its equivalent expression in (3.25) imply that the problem is feasible if the total
available power Pmax can satisfy the minimum power required for the information
(a) to guarantee the target secrecy rate R as follows
a >
γbr
α
b σ
2
b
||h˜b||2
, s.t. γb =
(
2R − 1) . (3.26)
Now, substituting the denition of SNRe in (3.7) into the probabilistic constraint
in (3.25) yields
P
[
h˜He
(
at1t1
H − bψCη
)
h˜e ≤ rαe ψσ2e
]
≥ β, (3.27)
which can be viewed in terms of the CDF of an indenite Hermitian quadratic form
Y = h˜He Ah˜e in a random vector h˜e, where A = at1tH1 − bψCη. Following the
same procedure detailed in §3.3.1 where the CDF of a random Hermitian quadratic
form is evaluated, the CDF of this quadratic distribution is given by
FY (y) = 1−
(
1 +
bψ
a (Nt − 1)
)1−Nt
exp
(
− y
aσ2
h˜e
)
, y > 0. (3.28)
Now, from the term inside of the brackets of the LHS of the probabilistic con-
strain in (3.27) and from the CDF in (3.28), we are only concerned with the scenario
when y = rαe ψσ2e > 0, not considering the infeasible case of y = 0. Indeed, y = 0
clearly neither satises (3.25) for β > 0 nor ensures the condition ψ > 0.
Substituting ψ from (3.25), and y = rαe ψσ2e from (3.27) into the CDF in (3.28),
the probabilistic constraint in (3.24b) becomes
1−
(
1 +
b
a
γe
(Nt − 1)
)1−Nt
exp
(
−r
α
e γe
aσ2
h˜e
σ2e
)
≥ β (3.29a)
3.4 An outage secrecy rate formulation with protected zone 51
s.t. γe =
a||h˜b||2 − rαb σ2b
(
2R − 1)
2Rσ2br
α
b
. (3.29b)
Finally, the resulting optimisation problem is formulated by considering the
worst-case for the secrecy that happens when the eavesdropper lies exactly on the
border of the PZ; i.e., re = rs. erefore, aer taking into account the constraints
(3.26) and (3.29), the problem becomes
min
a,b,rs
κ1
a+ b
Pmax
+ κ2
rs
rsmax
(3.30a)
s.t. 1− 1(
1 + b
a
γe
(Nt−1)
)Nt−1 exp
(
−r
α
s γe
aσ2
h˜e
σ2e
)
≥ β (3.30b)
a >
γbr
α
b σ
2
b
||h˜b||2
(3.30c)
a+ b ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax , b ≥ 0 (3.30d)
where γb and γe are given in (3.26) and (3.29b) respectively. It is worth pointing out
that (3.30c) is implied by the condition γe > 0 in the constraint (3.30b) for β > 0
and might be omied. However, this constraint is intentionally retained because it
will later be useful to illustrate two particular cases of this optimisation problem.
e derivation of a closed-form solution to the problem in (3.30) is mathemati-
cally dicult due to the exponential nature of the constraint (3.30b). erefore, in
order to obtain additional insight into the internal structure of the problem and to
devise an ecient way to solve it, we present in the next two sections an analysis
of the asymptotic behaviour and the monotonically increasing characteristic of the
probabilistic constraint in (3.30b).
Analysis of the asymptotic behaviour of the probabilistic constraint
In order to understand the behaviour of the probabilistic constraint in (3.30b), we
replace γe from (3.29b) in the LHS of (3.30b) to write it explicitly as follows
F (a, b, rs) = 1−
exp
(
− r
α
s σ
2
e(a||h˜b||2−rαb σ2b(2R−1))
2Rarαb σ
2
bσ
2
h˜e
)
(
1 + b
a
(
a||h˜b||2−rαb σ2b (2R−1)
2Rrαb σ
2
b (Nt−1)
))Nt−1 , (3.31)
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Table 3.2: Analysis of the asymptotic behaviour of the probabilistic constraint.
a b rs A(a, b) B(a, rs) Asymptotic value
of F (a, b, rs)
X
ρ
0 0 1 0 0
X
ρ
0 ∞ 1 0 0
X
ρ
∞ 0 1 0 0
X
ρ
∞ ∞ 1 0 0
∞ 0 0 1 0 0
∞ 0 ∞ 1 rαs ZρY 1− exp
(−rαs ZρY )
∞ ∞ 0
(
1 + b ρ
Y (Nt−1)
)Nt−1
0 1− 1(
1+b ρ
Y (Nt−1)
)Nt−1
∞ ∞ ∞
(
1 + b ρ
Y (Nt−1)
)Nt−1
rαs
Zρ
Y
1− exp(−r
α
s
Zρ
Y )(
1+b ρ
Y (Nt−1)
)Nt−1
that can be wrien as
F (a, b, rs) = 1−
exp
(−rαs ZY (ρ− Xa ))(
1 + b
Y (Nt−1)
(
ρ− X
a
))Nt−1 (3.32)
where X, Y, Z and ρ are all non-zero positive values (except for the trivial case
when R = 0) given by
X =rαb σ
2
b
(
2R − 1) (3.33a)
Y =2Rrαb σ
2
b (3.33b)
Z =
σ2e
σ2
h˜e
(3.33c)
ρ =||h˜b||2. (3.33d)
e minimum value that guarantees feasibility for a is given in (3.26), and by
(3.33a) and (3.33d) corresponds to a > X
ρ
. Moreover, the expression in (3.32) can be
wrien as F (a, b, rs) = 1− exp(−B(a,rs))A(a,b) where A(a, b) and B(a, rs) are functions
that ease the analysis of the asymptotic behaviour of (3.30b) considering the three
optimisation variables (a, b, rs). is analysis is depicted in the Table 3.2.
Equation (3.32) reveals that for the information power (a) greater than and very
close to X
ρ
(a ' X
ρ
), then F (a, b, rs) ≈ 0 irrespective of the value given for both
the AN power (b) and the security radius (rs); this is also the case when b = rs = 0.
3.4 An outage secrecy rate formulation with protected zone 53
is case follows intuition because this condition implies that the SNRe =∞ due
to the zero-value denominator in (3.7).
Table 3.2 also shows that when more power is devoted to the information (a)
with the AN power b > 0 and/or secrecy radius rs > 0, then (3.32) monotonically
increases to its limiting value
lim
a→∞
F (a, b, rs) = 1− 1(
1 + b ρ
Y (Nt−1)
)Nt−1 exp(−rαs ZρY
)
. (3.34)
is analysis shows that by just providing increasing power for the informa-
tion alone is not enough to achieve a high probability of secrecy; i.e., F (a, b, rs) ≈
1. erefore, a smart allocation strategy is needed to distribute the power between
information and the AN or to consider an appropriate PZ size to keep Eve su-
ciently far away from Alice. Also this analysis conrms that when Eve is close
to Alice; i.e., rs → 0, a larger amount of AN power is required to achieve a high
probability of secrecy. is follows the intuition that, in order to increase the likeli-
hood of achieving secrecy, it is necessary not only to provide a good signal quality
at Bob, but also to deteriorate in someway the quality of Eve’s received signal by
either broadcasting AN or enlarging the PZ.
Analysis of the positive monotonically increasing behaivour of the prob-
abilistic constraint
In order to show that the LHS of the constraint (3.30b) is a positive monotonically-
increasing function (PMIF), it is useful to analyse it as a composition of functions.
erefore, we rewrite (3.32) as
F (a, b, rs) = 1− 1
A(a, b) exp (B(a, rs))
(3.35)
where
A(a, b) =
(
1 +
b
Y (Nt − 1)
(
ρ− X
a
))Nt−1
(3.36a)
B(a, rs) = r
α
s
Z
Y
(
ρ− X
a
)
(3.36b)
and the denitions in (3.33) are used.
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e function in (3.36a) can be expressed as the composite of two functions as
follows
A(a, b) = (1 + f1(b)f2(a))
Nt−1 (3.37)
where
f1(b) =
b
Y (Nt − 1) (3.38a)
f2(a) =
(
ρ− X
a
)
. (3.38b)
Recalling from (3.32), X, Y, Z and ρ are all positive values, so it is straightfor-
ward to see that f1(b) is a linear PMIF in b for b > 0. Likewise, f2(a) is a PMIF in a
when a > X
ρ
and that comes from the feasibility condition in (3.30c). us, A(a, b)
becomes an exponential PMIF resulting from the multiplication of two PMIFs.
Following the same methodology,B(a, rs) in (3.36b) can be expressed as a com-
posite function of the two PMIFs f3(rs) and f2(a), where
f3(rs) = r
α
s
Z
Y
. (3.39)
Clearly f3(rs) is an exponential PMIF in rs for rs > 0; thereforeB(a, rs) is also
a PMIF.
Finally, (3.35) and then the LHS of the constraint (3.30b) is the result of a sub-
tracting from 1 the inverse of the multiplication on the denominator of two PMIFs;
therefore it is also a PMIF in a, b and rs that asymptotically approaches one.
Once the asymptotic behaviour and the positive monotonically increasing prop-
erty of the probabilistic constraint (3.30b) have been discussed, we have enough
insight to look for ecient means to solve the optimisation problem in (3.30). In-
deed, as pointed out previously, the derivation of a closed-form solution to (3.30) is
mathematically dicult. However, its objective function in (3.30a) and the inequal-
ities (3.30c) and (3.30d) are linear in all the optimising variables. Moreover, the LHS
of the constraint in (3.30b) is a positive monotonically-increasing function in all
the optimising variables (a, b, rs) within the boundaries of the feasible region and
asymptotically approaches one. erefore, considering the aforementioned char-
acteristics of the problem (3.30), we can conclude that it can be eciently solved
by numerical methods with a reasonable level of complexity.
Finally, it is important to point out that when the problem (3.30) is infeasible
for a specic channel condition, mainly due to not satisfying the power constraint
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in (3.30d), then the system is considered to be in outage and in order to preserve
the security, no transmission takes place.
In the next two sections we study two particular cases of the outage resource
allocation optimisation problem. ese scenarios enable us to stablish connections
with previous works and oer additional insight into the power allocation and the
PZ contribution towards the secrecy of a MISO system.
3.4.3 Resource allocations when the transmission parties are
equidistant.
First, we consider the case when all the nodes are equidistant to the transmier;
i.e., re = rb = rs. Under this condition the resource allocation problem in (3.30)
becomes a non-weighted power minimisation similar to the one studied in §3.3.1
but considering secrecy rate as the security metric rather than based on a QoS
metric.
To analyse this problem we use the equidistant condition and set all the nodes’
distances to re = rb = rs = r. Subsequently, the constraint in (3.30c) can be
wrien as
a˜ >
γbσ
2
b
||h˜b||2
, (3.40)
where a˜ = a
rα
. Now, the constraint (3.30b) is used to nd an expression for b˜ = b
rα
as follows
b˜ ≥ a˜ (Nt − 1)
γ˜e

Nt−1
√√√√√exp
(
− σe
a˜σ2
h˜e
σ2e
)
1− β − 1
 , (3.41)
where
γ˜e =
a˜||h˜b||2 − σ2b
(
2R − 1)
2Rσ2b
. (3.42)
ese expressions for a˜ and b˜ are similar to the ones included in the closed-
form solution in (3.21) for the outage QoS problem studied in §3.3 except that the
equality does not hold for a˜. is dierence results from considering a secrecy rate
based formulation rather than a QoS constraints, and it hinders a straightforward
solution for the resulting non-weighted power minimisation problem in closed-
from. However, a non-weighted one-variable (a˜) minimisation problem can be
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formulated by adding the expression for b˜ in (3.41) into the objective function for
a˜. is problem is now as follows
min
a˜
a˜+
a˜ (Nt − 1)
γ˜e

Nt−1
√√√√√exp
(
− σe
a˜σ2
h˜e
σ2e
)
1− β − 1
 (3.43a)
s.t. a˜ > γbσ
2
b
||h˜b||2
, P ≤ Pmax. (3.43b)
e above problem is convex in the optimisation variable a˜ because it results
from adding to the linear (increasing) variable a˜ the monotonically decreasing
function for b˜ (as a function of a˜) in (3.41). Indeed, the value for b˜ as a function of
a˜ decreases from b˜ = +∞ (when a˜ = γbσ2b||h˜b||2 ) to its asymptotic value given by
lim
a˜→∞
b˜ =
2Rσ2b (Nt − 1)
||h˜b||2
(
Nt−1
√
1
1− β − 1
)
. (3.44)
From the above expression is clear to see the importance of allocating AN when
the transmission parties are equidistant. Indeed, the asymptotic behaviour of b˜
reveals that allocating power to AN generation is always necessary irrespective
of the amount of power devoted to information. e value will depend on the
particular transmission conditions, (e.g., instantaneous channel, distance between
nodes, number of antennas) and the probability of secrecy (β) that we have to
satisfy. Finally, the solution for the above minimisation problem, as for the one in
(3.30), can be eciently obtained by numerical algorithms.
3.4.4 Resource allocation without a protected zone.
e second case of study arises when the PZ vanishes; i.e., rs = 0. erefore,
the resources allocation problem in (3.30) becomes a single-variable (in a) non-
weighted power minimisation problem. It is worth pointing out that not consider-
ing the PZ allows the eavesdropper to get close to Alice; indeed, the worst-case for
security happens when Eve is co-located with Alice (re = 0) and this is mathemati-
cally equivalent to seing Eve’s AWGN power to zero; i.e., σ2e = 0. is assumption
has been considered before in [55] as an eective way to formulate the worst-case
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for security. Under this condition the SNR at Eve (from (3.7)) becomes
SNRe = atH1 h˜e
[
bh˜He Cηh˜e
]−1
h˜He t1 (3.45)
and the probabilistic constraint in (3.30b) yields
b ≥ a
(
1
Nt−1
√
1− β − 1
)(
2Rrαb σ
2
b (Nt − 1)
a||h˜b||2 + rαb σ2b (1− 2R)
)
(3.46)
which can be substituted into the objective function of the original problem (3.30)
to obtain the following non-weighted one-variable power minimisation problem
min
a
a+ a
(
1
Nt−1
√
1− β − 1
)(
2Rrαb σ
2
b (Nt − 1)
a||h˜b||2 + rαb σ2b (1− 2R)
)
(3.47a)
s.t. a > γbr
α
b σ
2
b
||h˜b||2
, P ≤ Pmax. (3.47b)
e problem above is convex in the optimisation variable a because it results
from adding the linear increasing value of a and the monotonically-decreasing
function for b in (3.46). is last function decreases from b = +∞ (when a =
γbr
α
b σ
2
b
||h˜b||2 ) to its asymptotic value given by
lim
a→∞
b =
(
1
Nt−1
√
1− β − 1
)(
2Rrαb σ
2
b (Nt − 1)
||h˜b||2
)
. (3.48)
erefore, the minimisation problem of (3.47) can be eciently solved by using
numerical algorithms. However, we note that the mathematical complexity of the
problem in its current format has been reduced due to the simplication of the
exponential term. erefore, a closed-form solution can be provided by seeking
the saddle point obtained when the gradient of the objective function is zero. en,
we take the rst derivative of the objective function (3.47a) and we equalise it to
zero to obtain a quadratic function in a that can be easily solved obtaining
a =
γbr
α
b σ
2
b
||h˜b||2
(
1 +
√
2R
2R − 1
(
1
Nt−1
√
1− β − 1
))
. (3.49)
In the expression above, we only consider the positive root of the quadratic
function because the negative one will lead to an infeasible value for a consider-
ing the constraint in (3.47b). e expression (3.49) determines the value of power
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required for the information and enables us to compute the power for the AN (b)
using (3.46).
As expected, the solution to this problem is similar to the one provided by the
weighted resources optimisation problem in (3.30) when rsmax is set to a value ar-
bitrarily close to zero. By seing rsmax = 0, the problem is not mathematically
tractable due to the division by a zero term in the cost function in (3.30a). It is
worth pointing out that by assuming the worst-case condition for security (i.e.,
re = 0, equivalent to σ2e = 0), this scenario demands additional power for the
AN generation. is can be easily seen by comparing the terms within the rad-
ical expression in the solution for b? in (3.21) against the one presented here in
(3.46) where the exponential function has taken the maximum possible value of
one. From these results, the feasibility rate of solving the problem is expected to
decrease substantially in power constrained scenarios thus aecting the transmis-
sion throughput.
3.4.5 Numerical Results
e analysis of the outage based secrecy rate formulation is based on both, the re-
source allocation and the secrecy performance considering the feasibility of solv-
ing the problem and its impact on throughput. us, as in §3.3.2, the normalised
secrecy throughput (TSEC) is dened as the achieved probability of secrecy (PSEC)
times the ratio between the number of channel realisations where transmission
takes place (i.e., the problem is feasible) and the total number of channel realisa-
tions in the simulations. Additionally, the parameter φ is dened as the ratio of
the cost function weights, i.e., φ = κ2
κ1
. 4000 Monte Carlo simulations have been
considered with setup values summarised in the Table 3.3.
Figure 3.8 depicts how the resources are allocated with respect to the total
available power (Pmax) (AWGN). e ratio of the cost function weights is φ = 1;
i.e., same priority for using power and enlarging the PZ. Here it is shown how
the secrecy radius rs (relative to rb) required by the technique decreases as more
power is made available; indeed, for a high target probability of secrecy (β) and
low maximal power (Pmax) the PZ approaches its maximum possible size given by
rsmax (relative to Alice-to-Bob distance rb = 1). Interestingly, the total allocated
power (P = a + b) reaches a point where (on average) no more power is neces-
sary to achieve the target probability of secrecy β even though that power is still
3.4 An outage secrecy rate formulation with protected zone 59
Table 3.3: Parameters for the simulation.
Parameter Value Description
Nt 5 Alice’s number of antennas
σ2
h˜b
1 Bob’s channel elements variance
σ2
h˜e
1 Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2b 1 Bob’s AWGN power
σ2e 1 Eve’s AWGN power
Pmax 6 Maximal power for constrained systems
normalised relative to the AWGN power
α 2 Path loss exponent
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Maximum available power (P
max
) [normalised]
A
llo
ca
te
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
(P
, a
, b
, r s
) [
no
rm
ali
se
d]
 
 a, β=0.75
b, β=0.75
r
s
, β=0.75
P, β=0.75
a, β=0.95
b, β=0.95
r
s
, β=0.95
P, β=0.95
P
a
r
s
b
Figure 3.8: Resources allocation. Transmit power (P = a + b) and secrecy radius (rs)
(relative to rb = 1) versus maximum available power (Pmax) (normalised relative to AWGN
power) for dierent values of probability of secrecy (β) when φ = 1, R = 2 bps/Hz, and
rsmax = 2 (relative to rb).
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Figure 3.9: Achieved probability of secrecy (PSEC ) and normalised secrecy throughput
(TSEC ) versus maximum available power (Pmax) (normalised relative to the AWGN power)
for dierent values of probability of secrecy (β) and rsmax when φ = 1 and R = 2 bps/Hz.
available. However, Figure 3.9 implies that the availability of extra resources has a
positive impact on the normalised secrecy throughput TSEC because it improves
the feasibility rate of the system. It is worth pointing out that the target proba-
bility of secrecy (β in (3.24b)) is achieved no maer what the available resources
are; although, there is a cost to pay in throughput for high resource constrained
conditions. It is also worth remarking on the high normalised secure throughput
oered by the implementation of a large PZ even when the total available power
(Pmax) is low.
Now, let us devote our aention to the way that the resources are allocated.
Prioritising the use of power rather than extending the size of the PZ (i.e., φ = 2)
results in a scenario where full power is used, mainly for AN generation, keeping
the size of the PZ as small as possible. is behaviour is illustrated in Figure 3.10a.
In contrast, as is seen in Figure 3.10b, when the ratio of the cost function weights
prioritises saving power (i.e., φ = 0.5), the PZ is extended to its maximum size
for demanding conditions; i.e., a large R, devoting a smaller amount of power for
AN generation. Whilst the amount of power devoted for information remains the
same for both prioritising schemes, the trade-o between increasing power for
AN generation and enlarging the PZ’s size is clear because both methods pursue
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Figure 3.10: Resources allocation. Transmit power (P = a + b) and secrecy radius (rs)
versus target secrecy rate (R) for dierent values of rsmax (relative to rb) when normalised
Pmax = 8 (relative to the AWGN power) and β = 0.95.
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the same objective: deteriorate the quality of the eavesdropper’s link. In both
plots in Figure 3.10, making a larger PZ radius available (i.e., a larger rsmax), not
only contributes to saving transmit power, but it also has a positive impact on the
secrecy throughput as is also shown in Figure 3.8. On the other hand, a small PZ
given by a small rsmax demands high power and negatively aects the normalised
secrecy throughput. is result corroborates the analytic ndings in §3.4.4 where
the worst-case security strategy is analysed when a PZ is not deployed; i.e., rs =
re = 0. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the considered weights in the WNCF
in (3.23) given by κ1 and κ2 dene how the resources are actually used while the
security performance of the strategy is dictated by the availability of resources.
3.5 Discussion and summary
In this chapter we have presented two probabilistic frameworks to distribute the
network resources in masked beamforming MISO networks under the presence of
passive eavesdroppers. First, we have introduced a closed-form power distribution
strategy between information and articial noise to guarantee a given probability
of secrecy dened by QoS constraints both at the intended receiver and at the
eavesdroppers. Second, we have devised an approach to guarantee a given prob-
ability of secrecy dened by a target secrecy rate. Here, the technique distributes
the network resources by allocating the power between information and arti-
cial noise and also determines the required size of a protected zone to avoid close
eavesdroppers.
Both approaches make an ecient use of the available resources to eectively
guarantee a high probability of secrecy by striking a balance between secrecy and
quality. ere is a trade-o between achieving a high probability of secrecy and
the secrecy throughput that can be improved by augmenting the total amount of
power available at the transmier. e introduced probabilistic outage based tech-
niques compare favourably against methods that provide security in an average;
therefore, the presented techniques use more eciently the available power by
improving the security performance.
Introducing a protected zone is a meaningful security measure that not only
improves the security by avoiding close-quarter eavesdropping aacks, but also
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enables us to quantify the impact in terms of power consumption through provid-
ing security in the presence of a close eavesdropper. In fact, providing secrecy in
the absence of a protected zone requires a substantially larger amount of power
mainly devoted for articial noise generation. e introduced resources allocation
method makes it possible to prioritise between using power for articial noise gen-
eration and increasing the size of the protected zone to deteriorate the eavesdrop-
per’s received signal quality. Interestingly, the optimisation strategy prioritisation
criterion does not aect the security performance of the system, which is given by
the amount of resources available, but it does introduce a degree of exibility in
the system design.
e introduced techniques are aractive for practical implementation because
they oer exibility by eciently using the network resources. For instance, the
security level, given by the probability of secrecy, that a wireless user surng
the web requires might be dierent to that of a high security military applica-
tion. erefore, seing dierent targets of probability suits these dierent security
needs allowing an ecient use of power. Moreover, the security is enhanced by
taking advantage of physical network deployments that intrinsically dene eaves-
droppers’ exclusion areas such as security perimeters or restricted access rooms.
We have incorporated these criteria into the network design to enhance the secu-
rity of a MISO system through deploying a protected zone to eciently use the
power.

Chapter4
A MISO robust transmission for
physical layer security
‘You, secret, who feed me; you,
secret, pledge of my freedom; for
the guilt that I give you, for the
kiss that you give me’
Silvio Rodrı´guez
In this chapter we introduce a robust transmission strategy to convey con-dential information from a multiple-antenna transmier towards a single-antenna receiver in the presence of a single-antenna passive eavesdropper.
We study the practical problem that arises when the measure of the main link’s
channel state information (CSI) available at the transmier is subject to errors.
Indeed, in practical networks it is not possible for the transmier to obtain a per-
fect CSI of the main link due to errors during the channel estimation and feedback
processes. is inaccuracy can jeopardise the security of the transmission strat-
egy; therefore, it is necessary to devise robust transmission mechanisms that can
cope with a degree of uncertainty in the main link’s CSI and still provide a secure
transmission.
In order to tackle this problem, we use a masked beamforming transmission
scheme to formulate two robust optimisation problems to determine the trans-
mission covariance matrices of the steering information signal and the articial
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noise. e objectives are to maximise the worst-case secrecy rate in a resource-
constrained system and to minimise the use of resources to ensure a target worst-
case average secrecy rate. We incorporate into the analysis the impact of the dis-
tance between the transmission parties and study how an eavesdropper physi-
cally located in the vicinity of the transmier can put at risk the network’s se-
curity. erefore, as a countermeasure, we deploy a ‘Protected Zone’ to prevent
close-quarters eavesdropping aacks. e proposed robust masked beamforming
scheme oers a secure performance even with erroneous estimates of the main
channel enhancing the network security by deploying a PZ and therefore making
an ecient use of the power.
Regarding this chapter’s structure, in section 4.1 we present a review of the
state-of-art of the existing secure robust transmission schemes. In section 4.2 we
model the multiple-input multiple-output (MISO) system considering the robust
formulation and the worst-case denition of secrecy. Subsequently, in section 4.3
the worst-case secrecy rate robust problem is studied while the robust transmis-
sion resources minimisation problem is addressed in section 4.4. In section 4.5 we
carry out a detailed analysis of the properties of the optimal solutions of the two
problems to provide valuable insight into the transmission strategy nature. Finally,
the section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.1 Physical layer security robust schemes inMISO
networks
Beamforming has been proven as the optimal transmit strategy to maximise the
secrecy rate in MISO networks with perfect CSI available for the main link for both
active and passive eavesdropping scenarios [46, 47, 49, 50]. Furthermore, this tech-
nique can be elegantly enhanced by broadcasting articial noise (AN) to confuse
unknown eavesdroppers [37]. Notwithstanding the remarkable contribution of
masked beamforming based transmission schemes to improve wireless security in
MISO systems, this technique still faces open issues regarding its practical imple-
mentation. Indeed, the transmier might have access only to an erroneous version
of the intended receiver’s link CSI. is mismatch can occur due to either imper-
fect feedback links between the transmier and receiver generating errors during
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the channel estimation and feedback processes or outdated versions of the avail-
able CSI. Neglecting these errors introduces important security breaches resulting
from steering the information into an incorrect direction and unintentionally jam-
ming the intended receiver [74]. Moreover, an inaccurate version of the main link
CSI can result in an intended receiver not being able to decode the package due to
exceeding the transmission data rate that it can support [75]. Finally, an erroneous
CSI would introduce errors into the optimal distribution of the available power be-
tween information and AN [76, 77]. In this scenario, the paramount importance of
considering the practical limitations of acquiring an error-free CSI becomes clear.
erefore, in this chapter we introduce secure robust masked beamforming trans-
mission strategies able to cope with a given degree of uncertainty in the main link’s
CSI in the presence of an unknown eavesdropper.
Robust precoding techniques have been introduced to deal with uncertainties
in the CSI between multiple-antenna transmission parties. In general, we can use
two kind of robust approximations to model the channel uncertainties. e rst
one considers a random Gaussian model where the channel errors are assumed to
be random and normal distributed; therefore, they are associated with a channel
uncertainty covariance [52, 78, 79, 80]. In other words, the channel uncertain-
ties are assumed stochastic and they are statistically modelled to aain a given
performance in a probabilistic fashion. e second approach is based on the as-
sumption that all the possible states of the channel are dened deterministically
within a given set whose norm is known [81, 82, 83, 84]. is second case is a
conservative design because it considers the worst-case performance. Indeed, this
model guarantees a given performance for any admissible CSI uncertainty within
the deterministic set; even the worst one. Both robust formulation cases generally
result into nonconvex and then hard-to-solve problems; indeed, the latest mod-
elling leads to hard-to-solve maximin or minimax optimisation problems. In this
scenario, convex optimisation machinery becomes a particularly useful mathemat-
ical tool to recast these problems into tractable convex formulations that can be
eciently solved by interior-point algorithms.
4.1.1 Secure robust beamfoming by convex optimisation
Convex optimisation has become a powerful mathematical framework widely used
in the design and analysis of communication systems and signal processing algo-
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rithms [85, 86]. Convex optimisation refers to the minimisation of a convex objec-
tive function subject to constraints that are either convex or ane functions. An
important property of convex optimisation techniques is that in a convex problem
a local optimal point is also a global optimal point and therefore rigorous opti-
mality conditions and duality properties can be used to validate the optimality of
the solution [87, §4.2]. Moreover, powerful numerical algorithms based on the
interior-point method can eciently provide a solution to convex problems with
reasonable complexity [87, §11]. As a result, hard-to-solve nonconvex problems
can be eciently solved by recasting them into tractable convex equivalent prob-
lems.
Physical layer security MISO techniques have been nurtured from convex op-
timisation approaches; that is the case of the works presented in [49, 50, 59]. Re-
garding robust formulations to deal with channel uncertainties, in [88], Zhang et
al. introduce an approach to model the partially known eavesdropping channel
based on deterministic uncertainties. Here a steering information signal is solely
conveyed to devise a transmission solution by establishing a relationship between
the MISO cognitive radio and the MISO wireless security problem. In the work
presented in [89], the MISO worst-case secrecy rate is maximised considering also
the sole transmission of information. In contrast to these works, in [90], Li et al.
consider a masked transmission method where steering information is transmied
along with AN. Here, the eavesdropping channel is partially known and stochastic
channel uncertainties are assumed about the aacker channel to formulate an out-
age optimisation problem that looks towards maximising the secrecy rate. Now,
in [91, 92], Huang and Swindlehurst also consider masked beamforming but use
the deterministic model over the imperfect eveadropper link’s CSI to address the
worst-case secrecy rate maximisation. Finally, in [93, 94] Li and Ma extended this
analysis to the multiple-antenna multi-eavesdroppers case considering the deter-
ministic uncertainty model while Pei et al. assume in [95] a stochastic uncertainty
scenario but enforce a minimum mean square error (MMSE) reception combiner
at the multiple-antenna eavesdroppers.
Remarkably, all the aforementioned techniques conclude that the optimal in-
formation transmission covariance matrix is rank-one. In other words, transmit
beamforming is the optimal strategy that maximises the secrecy rate for MISO
systems when there is partial knowledge of the eavesdropping channel. All these
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frameworks use robust formulations to model a partially known eavesdroppers’
CSI; however, neither of them addresses the most demanding case for the security
of a MISO network that arises when the main link is prone to estimation errors.
is case is investigated in two contributions. First, in [96], a robust transmit de-
sign conveys steering information using deterministic uncertainties in both the
partially know multiple-antenna eavesdropping channel and in the main channel.
is work only considers steering information transmission without AN while in
contrast, [72] introduces a robust masked beamforming framework using a second-
order perturbation analysis of the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the main
channel. It is worth pointing out that the laer approach does not use convex opti-
misation techniques. Indeed, here the denition of security is based on restrictive
QoS constraints rather than in secrecy rate and the information is steered over
the erroneous main channel signature while the AN is generated isotropically and
orthogonal to the main channel.
4.1.2 is chapter’s contribution
e contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, we consider a masked robust
transmission strategy to deal with a mismatch in the MISO main channel with-
out prior knowledge about the instantaneous eavesdropping link; that is a pure
passive eavesdropping scenario. Second, we consider the eect of the distance be-
tween the nodes on the overall security and, as in the previous chapter’s §3.4, we
deploy a ‘protected zone’ (PZ) to avoid close-quarters eavesdropping aacks and
then make an ecient use of the available resources of the network. Our objective
is to calculate the steering information and AN transmission covariance matrices
along with the size of the PZ. We consider a conservative approach and assume
deterministic uncertainties to formulate two worst-case optimisation problems:
• the maximisation of the average worst-case secrecy rate in a resource con-
strained network.
• the minimisation of the use of resources given by the power and size of the
PZ subject to ensure a target average worst-case secrecy rate.
Both optimisation problems turn out to be nonconvex and hard-to-solve; there-
fore, we recast them into tractable convex semidenitive programs (SDP) by using
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convex optimisation tools. e equivalent SDPs can be solved by interior-point
based solvers. We study the nature of the obtained optimal solutions by analysing
their convex optimisation optimality conditions and thus showing two insights.
e information transmission covariance matrices for both problems are unique
and rank-one and the AN is isotropically generated over the nullspace spanned by
the rank-one transmission covariance matrix. In other words, the optimal trans-
mission for the average worst-case secrecy rate maximisation and the resources
minimisation problems is beamforming while the AN is orthogonal to the beam-
former vector and isotropically broadcast. For both problems numerical simula-
tions are presented showing that not only do the resulting transmission strategies
enhance the system security but also that restricting the presence of an aacker
in the transmier’s vicinity allows us to save power.
4.1.3 Robust cooperative techniques for physical layer secu-
rity
It is worth pointing out that similar robust approaches as the ones used in this
chapter can be used for cooperative networks [97, 98]. Here, cooperative relays act
as a virtual array to achieve spatial diversity similar to a multiple-antenna trans-
mier [99]. Moreover, an AN signal can be transmied by using cooperative jam-
ming techniques from trusted relays to confuse passive eavesdroppers [100, 101].
In this context, the authors of [91, 92] used a deterministic approach to formulate
a robust transmission scheme to maximise the secrecy rate when cooperative jam-
mers aid a multiple-antenna transmier. We present an interesting alternative to
cooperative techniques in chapter 6 of this thesis.
4.2 System model
In this section, we model a MISO system in the presence of an unknown single-
antenna eavesdropper. We follow the wireless secrecy model where the transmit-
ter, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are named ‘Alice’, ‘Bob’ and ‘Eve’
respectively.
Alice is equipped with Nt ≥ 2 antennas while Bob and Eve are single an-
tenna nodes. e Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve channel vectors are denoted by
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hb ∈ CNt and he ∈ CNt . In order to incorporate the impact of the distance be-
tween the transmission parties into the system model, we consider the path-loss
eect in the channel modelling; therefore hb = r
−α
2
b h˜b and he = r
−α
2
e h˜e. Here, rb
and re are respectively the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve distances and α ≥ 2 de-
notes the path loss exponent. e small-scale fading channel vectors h˜b ∼ CN(0,
σ2
h˜b
I) and h˜e ∼ CN(0, σ2h˜eI) are mutually independent and not aected by the
communication range. A pure passive eavesdropping scenario is considered and
so he remains unknown to Alice; however, she can make statistical assumptions
about it.
e masked beamforming secure transmission strategy considers the trans-
mission of information and AN simultaneously; therefore, the transmied signal
vector s ∈ CNt is modelled as s = w + η. Here, the condential information
vector w ∈ CNt is chosen from a Gaussian codebook, and it has covariance ma-
trix Cw = E{wwH}. Likewise, η ∈ CNt is the AN vector with covariance ma-
trix Cη = E{ηηH}. As a result, the covariance matrix of the transmied sig-
nal vector s is Cs = E{ssH} and so Alice’s total transmied power is given by
P =Tr{Cs} =Tr{Cw}+Tr{Cη}.
e scalar signals received by the single-antenna Bob and Eve are respectively
given by
u = r
−α
2
b h˜
H
b w + r
−α
2
b h˜
H
b η + nb (4.1)
v = r
−α
2
e h˜
H
e w + r
−α
2
e h˜
H
e η + ne (4.2)
where nb ∼ CN(0, σ2b ) and ne ∼ CN(0, σ2e) are the additive Gaussian noise com-
ponents at Bob’s and Eve’s antennas.
It is worth pointing out that here we use a totally dierent masked beamform-
ing scheme from the one considered in the previous chapter 3’s §3.2. Previously
we restricted the analysis to the case when the transmier steers the information
towards the legitimate receiver alongside an AN signal generated over Bob’s chan-
nel nullspace. In contrast, here we have not enforced any assumption about the
information and the AN vectors’ directions. As a result, the AN vector η may not
be aligned orthogonally to Bob’s channel signature and then it could eectively
deteriorate the legitimate receiver’s performance. is can be clearly seen when
comparing the received signal at Bob’s antenna in (4.1), where the AN vector η
aects the legitimate received signal, against the expression in (3.4) where the AN
eect is cancelled due to the fact that η is orthogonal to Bob’s channel vector h˜b.
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is system setup allows Alice to steer the information in a direction in such a
way that secrecy can be achieved even when she has an erroneous CSI of the main
link.
Finally, the received instantaneous signal-to-noise-ratios (SNRs) at Bob and
Eve are
SNRb =
h˜Hb Cwh˜b
h˜Hb Cηh˜b + r
α
b σ
2
b
(4.3)
SNRe =
h˜He Cwh˜e
h˜He Cηh˜e + r
α
e σ
2
e
(4.4)
and they yield the achievable secrecy rate RS of the modelled system as follows
RS = [log2 (1 + SNRb)− log2 (1 + SNRe)]+ [bps/Hz] . (4.5)
4.2.1 Worst-case robust transmit design
We consider that Alice has available an error-prone estimate of the intended re-
ceiver’s link CSI due to errors during the channel estimation and feedback pro-
cesses. erefore, a worst-case (deterministic) robust model is now considered.
In this scenario, the actual instantaneous channel lies within a known set of un-
certainty values whose range represents the ‘amount of uncertainty’ about the
channel. is is illustrated in Figure 4.1 where the system model of a determin-
istic robust system is depicted. A worst-case robust design achieves a given per-
formance level for any channel realisation within the deterministically dened
uncertainty set [84]. erefore, we incorporate this robust formulation into our
transmission strategy in order to deal with a mismatch in the main channel with-
out prior knowledge about the instantaneous eavesdropping link considering the
eect of the distance between the transmission nodes on the overall security. A
’Protected Zone’ (PZ) is deployed to avoid eavesdroppers close to the transmier.
We dene the Alice-to-Bob channel as
hb = (rˆb + ςb)
−α
2
(
hˆb + δb
)
(4.6a)
s.t. δb ∈∆b = {δb : ||δb|| ≤ b} , (4.6b)
ςb ∈ ξb = [0, rb ] (4.6c)
where the actual instantaneous channel hb is dened by both the error vector δb ∈
CNt , by the error distance ςb ∈ R and by the observed mismatched version of the
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PZ
hˆb, rˆb
hb, rb
δb
∆b
h
er
e
r s
b
A
B
E
Figure 4.1: Systemmodel with mismatched main channel and protected zone deployed. Alice
knows both the erroneous channel hˆb and the range b that dene the uncertainty set ∆b
within which the actual channel hb lies.
small-scale fading main channel hˆb and the erroneous distance between Alice and
Bob rˆb. e errors δb and ςb are unknown to Alice, but they respectively lie within
the sets ∆b and ξb upper-bounded by the known values of b and rb .
Protected Zone
In order to avoid close-quarter eavesdropping aacks, we consider in the system
model a Protected Zone (PZ) as introduced in the previous chapter’s §3.4.1 and
originally published in our work in [102]. e PZ is dened by the Security Radius
(rs) that is the transmier-to-the PZ border distance. As illustrated in Figure 4.1,
the inclusion of the PZ is equivalent to restricting the Alice-to-Eve distance to
re ≥ rs. is formulation is meaningful and relevant by itself. Moreover, it allows
us to quantify the impact on the security of the eavesdroppers’ location and the
additional power required by the robust strategy to preserve condentiality in the
presence of a close aacker (i.e., rs → 0). Also this formulation let us understand
the possible savings in power resulting from an Eve located far away from Alice
(i.e., rs  0).
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4.2.2 Average worst-case secrecy rate
e problem of interest is the passive eavesdropping scenario; therefore, Alice
can only model statistically the Eve’s link CSI. In this context, and according to
Shaee and Ulukus [46] and Li and Petropulu [54], the ergodic secrecy rate (RS)
for a MISO system when the main link’s CSI is perfectly known and only statistical
information about the eavesdropper’s channel is available at Alice, is given by
RS = log2
(
1 +
h˜Hb Csh˜b
σ2b
)
− Eh˜e
{
log2
(
1 +
h˜He Csh˜e
σ2e
)}
,
[
bits
Hz
]
(4.7)
where we recall that Cs denotes the covariance matrix of the transmied signal.
In this current work, and in contrast to the results presented in [46] and [54],
the transmied vector s is composed of both steering information and AN com-
ponents. Moreover, as described in §4.2.1, Alice only knows an erroneous version
of the actual Alice-to-Bob channel. erefore, Alice can only assume statistics re-
garding the small-fading eavesdropping channel’s elements that are given by the
covariance matrix Rh˜e = E{h˜eh˜He } = σ2h˜eINt . Regarding the channel’s path loss
component associated with the distance between Alice-to-Eve, we consider the
worst-case for the security in a system where a PZ has been deployed. is occurs
when Eve lies exactly on the PZ boundary; i.e., re = rs. Under this scenario, a
security performance metric for our robust scheme is introduced to quantify the
average worst-case security rate as follows
RwcS =
[
log2
(
1 + min
δb∈∆b,
ςb∈ξb
SNRb
)
− log2
(
1 + SNRe
)]+
,
[
bits
Hz
]
(4.8)
where
SNRe =
Tr{CwRh˜e}
Tr{CηRh˜e}+ rαs σ2e
. (4.9)
e denition in (4.8) is a conservative estimate due to consideration of the
worst-case SNRb; i.e., the channel dened within the uncertainty ∆b set that de-
livers the worst performance at Bob given by his lowest achievable SNRb. It is
worth highlighting that in (4.8) the expected value of the logarithmic function in
the second term of the RHS of (4.7) is approximated to the average SNRe dened
as SNRe. Here, we have used the concavity property of the logarithm function and
Jensen’s inequality
E {log2 (1 +X)} ≤ log2 (1 + E {X}) (4.10)
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where the expectation is taken over the random variable X [87, §3.1.8]. By this
approximation, the problem is restricted to a potentially suboptimal solution by
considering a lower-bound of the actual ergodic secrecy rate in (4.7). However,
the problem formulation is simplied to allow us to later solve it in an ecient
and tractable way. We will later benchmark the performance of our metric and the
ergodic secrecy rate by simulations.
4.3 Worst-case secrecy ratemaximisationproblem
In this section we are interested in a robust transmission strategy to maximise the
secrecy rate considering errors in the main link’s CSI under the presence of a pas-
sive eavesdropper. e strategy should allocate the available resources to enhance
the secrecy performance dened by the average worst-case secrecy rate in (4.8).
In other words, we look for a transmission mechanism to maximise the secrecy
considering the worst possible performance resulting from all the main link’s un-
certainties dened deterministically accordingly (4.6). To do this we formulate an
optimisation problem that is recast as an SDP and oers direct connection to QoS-
based security endeavours.
4.3.1 Optimisation problem
We aim to nd the information and the AN optimal transmission covariance ma-
trices (Cw, Cη) and also the radius of the PZ (dened by the rs) to maximise the
average worst-case secrecy rate RwcS in a resources constrained system. is prob-
lem is stated as follows
max
Cw,Cη ,rs
RwcS (4.11a)
s.t. Cw  0,Cη  0 (4.11b)
P ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax (4.11c)
where Pmax and rsmax denote the total available power and the PZ’s maximum
deployable radius respectively.
Problem (4.11) is hard to solve due to the nonconvexity nature of the objective
function dened in (4.8). erefore, as a rst step to deal with this problem in
a mathematically tractable fashion, we split the objective function (4.8) into two
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terms. is is done by introducing the slack variable γe > 0 and so (4.11) becomes
max
Cw,Cη ,rs,γe
1
1 + γe
1 + min
δb∈∆b,
ςb∈ξb
SNRb
 (4.12a)
s.t. SNRe ≤ γe (4.12b)
Cw  0,Cη  0 (4.12c)
P ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax , γe > 0. (4.12d)
Problem (4.12) is still nonconvex, so in order to recast it into a tractable con-
vex formulation, we set γe to an arbitrary xed value. Hereby, we are implicitly
optimising the problem for a given SNR level at Eve as follows
max
Cw,Cη ,rs
min
δb∈∆b,
ςb∈ξb
SNRb (4.13a)
s.t. SNRe ≤ γe (4.13b)
Cw  0,Cη  0 (4.13c)
P ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax . (4.13d)
e above formulation reminds us of QoS-based designs that, as in the previ-
ous chapter’s §3.3, secrecy is dened by seing tolerable quality thresholds at the
nodes. Here, the system is considered secure if the signal quality at Eve is below
the threshold γe [53, 59, 72, 103]. In contrast to these techniques, now we are in-
terested in maximising the secrecy rate irrespective of Eve’s QoS, and so we devise
an iterative algorithm to seek the optimal value of γe that delivers the best security
performance at the cost of introducing an additional level of complexity.
To eciently solve the nonconvex maximim optimisation problem in (4.13) we
recast it as a mathematically tractable SDP. is procedure is detailed in the next
section.
Problem reformulation into a semidenite program
e rst step to transform the problem (4.13) into a tractable SDP is done by using
the Charnes-Cooper transformation [104]. e fractional nature of the objective
function in (4.3) leads to a quasiconvex problem than can be handled by bisection
[87, §4.2.5]. is procedure needs to solve several SDPs to converge to an optimal
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solution. As an alternative, we can eciently solve this problem by a single SDP by
introducing the slack variable ξ > 0 and then replacing the optimisation variables
by Cw = C˜wξ and Cη =
C˜η
ξ
.
Now, we minimise the objective function (4.13a) by, as in [96], by separately
maximising the denominator and minimising the numerator to address the worst-
case formulation by considering separately the channel that delivers the worst
performance for the transmied information and the one that amplies the eect
of the AN. Finally, the robust denition in (4.6) is incorporated into the problem
(4.13) to explicitly write it as
max
C˜w,C˜η,
rs,ξ
min
δb∈∆b
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C˜w
(
hˆb + δb
)
max
δb∈∆b
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C˜η
(
hˆb + δb
)
+ max
ςb∈ξb
ξ (rˆb + ςb)
α σ2b
(4.14a)
s.t. Tr
{[
C˜w
γe
− C˜η
]
Rh˜e
}
− ξrαs σ2e ≤ 0 (4.14b)
Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜η
}
≤ ξPmax (4.14c)
C˜w  0, C˜η  0, ξ > 0. (4.14d)
e Charnes-Cooper transformation allows us, by introducing the slack vari-
able ξ > 0, to set the denominator of (4.14a) to one. It is straightforward to see that
for the problem above the maximiser for ςb is its maximum admissible value given
by rb . On the other hand, RwcS is maximised by considering the worst performance
that we can enforce at Eve’s SNRe. is is obtained by enlarging the size of the PZ
to the maximum admissible value by seing rs = rsmax in (4.14b) and therefore
eectively keeping Eve as far away as possible. All these considerations yield a
problem as follows
max
C˜w,C˜η,
ξ
min
δb∈∆b
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C˜w
(
hˆb + δb
)
(4.15a)
s.t. max
δb∈∆b
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C˜η
(
hˆb + δb
)
+ ξ (rˆb + rb)
α σ2b = 1 (4.15b)
Tr
{[
C˜w
γe
− C˜η
]
Rh˜e
}
− ξrαsmaxσ2e ≤ 0 (4.15c)
where the constraints (4.14c) and (4.14d) hold.
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Now, in order to deal with the maximin problem in the objective function,
we can introduce a slack variable u ≥ 0 to eectively set a lower-bound for the
inner minimisation. erefore, by using the epigraph formulation [87, §4.1.3], the
objective function in (4.15a) now becomes
max
C˜w,C˜η,
ξ,u
u (4.16a)
s.t.
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C˜w
(
hˆb + δb
)
≥ u,∀δb : ||δb|| ≤ b (4.16b)
where we also have incorporated the deterministic robust denition in (4.6) to
enforce that the resulting channel, aer considering all the uncertainties within
the dened set ∆b, is lower-bounded by u. e two inequalities in (4.16b) can be
expanded as
−δHb C˜wδb − 2Re
{
hˆHb C˜wδb
}
− hˆHb C˜whˆb + u ≤ 0 (4.17a)
δHb δb − 2b ≤ 0. (4.17b)
e above worst-case condition in (4.17a) is quadratic and convex in the chan-
nel error vector δb for a xed C˜w. Moreover, δb is dened over a nonempty convex
set ∆b. us, according to the S-procedure [87, Appendix B.2], the two quadratic
inequalities in (4.17) hold i there exists a variable µ1 ≥ 0 such that[
µ1INt + C˜w C˜whˆb
hˆHb C˜w −µ12b + hˆHb C˜whˆb − u
]
 0. (4.18)
Eectively, we have reformulated the worst-case inner minimisation problem
in (4.15a) into a linear matrix inequality (LMI) that is independent of the determin-
istic value of the innite possible channel error vectors δb but which considers the
denition of the set ∆b in which they lie.
Likewise, the worst-case constraint (4.15b) can be wrien as
δHb C˜ηδb + 2Re
{
hˆHb C˜ηδb
}
+ hˆHb C˜ηhˆb + ξ (rˆb + b)
α σ2b − 1 ≤ 0 (4.19a)
δHb δb − 2b ≤ 0 (4.19b)
where (4.19a) is introduced aer considering the worst-case maximisation in (4.15b).
It is worth pointing out that, in order to use the S-procedure, the original equality
in (4.15b) resulting from the Charnes-Cooper transformation has been relaxed to
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the inequality in (4.19a). Here, it is straightforward to see that the optimal values
are obtained when the equality holds. Finally, using the S-procedure, the above
two quadratic inequalities hold i there exists a variable µ2 ≥ 0 such that[
µ2INt − C˜η −C˜ηhˆb
−hˆHb C˜η 1− µ22b − hˆHb C˜ηhˆb − ξ (rˆb + ςb)α σ2b
]
 0. (4.20)
Finally, the original problem in (4.13) is reformulated by considering the new
objective function in (4.16a), the LMIs resulting from the worst-case formulations
in (4.18) and (4.20), the constraints (4.15c), (4.14c), (4.14d) and the denitions of the
introduced slack variables ξ, µ1 and µ2. e resulting convex SDP is
min
C˜w,C˜η,
ξ,µ1,µ2,u
− u (4.21a)
s.t. Tr
{[
C˜w
γe
− C˜η
]
Rh˜e
}
− ξrαsmaxσ2e ≤ 0 (4.21b)[
µ1INt + C˜w C˜whˆb
hˆHb C˜w −µ12b + hˆHb C˜whˆb − u
]
 0 (4.21c)[
µ2INt − C˜η −C˜ηhˆb
−hˆHb C˜η 1− µ22b − hˆHb C˜ηhˆb − ξ (rˆb + rb)α σ2b
]
 0 (4.21d)
Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜η
}
≤ ξPmax (4.21e)
C˜w  0, C˜η  0, u ≥ 0, ξ ≥ 0, µi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 (4.21f)
where we recall that we have dened Cw = C˜wξ and Cη =
C˜η
ξ
. Note that ξ > 0
is relaxed to ξ ≥ 0 with no eect on the problem since any feasible ξ has to be
positive to satisfy the constraints (4.14c) and (4.19a).
e above SDP is eciently solved by interior-point algorithms implemented
by on-the-shelf tools like SeDuMi [105] and the parser applications Yalmip [106],
and CVX [107].
Remark 1 Owing to the instantaneous availability of the small-scale fading main
channel hˆb, the optimal solution for the information covariance matrix C?w is unique
and rank-one.
erefore, the transmied information vector w becomes a beamforming vec-
tor that can be straightforwardly obtained as the principal eigen-vector corre-
sponding to the unique nonzero eigen-value of C?w. We arrive to this conclusion
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aer the detailed analysis of the structure and characteristics of the SDP (4.21) and
its solution C?w that is carried out in the §4.5 of this chapter.
Remark 2 Due to the lack of the instantaneous availability of the small-scale eaves-
dropping fading channel hˆe, the strategy broadcasts the AN orthogonal to hˆb and w.
is empirical assertion is based on analysing the simulation results where the
AN power is isotropically distributed over the (Nt−1) equal non-zero eigenvalues
of C?η that span the (Nt − 1) dimensional space orthogonal to the rank-one space
spanned by C?w where hˆb lies. Indeed, the strategy allocates the AN isotropically
into the nullspace of C?w and thus not aecting the legitimate receiver’s perfor-
mance. is result coincides with [67, 90] and corroborates the eectiveness of
AN isotropic designs for passive eavesdropping that broadcast the noise orthogo-
nally to the steering beamforming vector’s direction. is is the case for the secure
strategy used in chapter 3.
4.3.2 Average worst-case secrecy rate lower bound
We recall that the SDP in (4.21) considers a xed value of γe. erefore, we have to
nd the optimal value for γe that oers the best secrecy performance; that is the
largest RwcS . As a rst step, now we have to evaluate RwcS for the xed value of γe;
thus it is necessary to determine the channel’s error vector δ?b ∈ ∆b that delivers
the worst security performance. is can be done by formulating an optimisa-
tion problem that takes into account the optimal information and AN covariance
matrices C?w and C?η obtained from solving the SDP (4.21). is problem is
min
δb∈∆b,
ςb∈ξb
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C?w
(
hˆb + δb
)
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C?η
(
hˆb + δb
)
+ (rˆb + ςb)
α σ2b
(4.22a)
s.t. δHb δb − 2b ≤ 0 (4.22b)
0 ≤ ςb ≤ rb . (4.22c)
In the above problem, it is straightforward to see that the minimiser of (4.22a)
for the error in distance ςb is its maximum admissible value rb dened in (4.6c); i.e.,
Bob is located as far away as possible. Now, to nd the minimiser value for δb, it is
necessary to solve the quasiconvex problem in (4.22) and this can be done by using
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the bisection methodology [87, §4.2.5]. is approach increases the complexity of
our technique due to the necessity of solving several feasibility SDPs. erefore, as
a valid alternative, we take advantage of the nature of C?η discussed in the Remark
2 to relax the problem (4.22) by considering that Alice broadcasts AN orthogonally
to hˆb and w and then we approximate
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C?η
(
hˆb + δb
)
≈ 0. Now, e
problem (4.22) is relaxed to
min
δb∈∆b
(
hˆb + δb
)H
C?w
(
hˆb + δb
)
(4.23a)
s.t. δHb δb − 2b ≤ 0. (4.23b)
e problem above is convex and it can be formulated as an SDP by introduc-
ing the slack variable Λb = δbδHb . is new variable is relaxed to Λb  δbδHb and
subsequently expressed by the Schur complement [87, Appendix B.2]. e follow-
ing equivalent formulation allows us to eciently solve the problem in (4.22) by
only one SDP as follows
min
δb∈∆b,
Λb
Tr {C?wΛb}+ 2Re
{
hˆHb C
?
wδb
}
+ hˆHb C
?
whˆb (4.24a)
s.t.
[
Λb δb
δHb 1
]
 0 (4.24b)
Tr{Λb} ≤ 2b . (4.24c)
It is worth pointing out that simulations have shown that the approximation in
(4.23) returns the same result as using the bisection methodology in (4.22). ere-
fore, the complexity of our technique, given by the number of SDPs that it has
to solve to converge towards a solution, is reduced without aecting the perfor-
mance. Indeed,
(
hˆb + δ
?
b
)H
C?η
(
hˆb + δ
?
b
)
= 0 holds even for the worst-case
channel (hˆb + δ?b ). Now, RwcS can be evaluated for the xed γe using the expression
in (4.8).
4.3.3 Linear searching algorithm tomaximise the worst-case
secrecy rate
e next step is to nd the optimum γ?e that maximises RwcS . To do this, we can
take advantage of the nature of RwcS as a function of γe to develop a linear searching
algorithm. To do this, we rst analyse the structure of RwcS in (4.8).
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Analysis of the concave nature of RwcS
e worst-case secrecy rate RwcS is a concave function in γe. is property results
from the way that the strategy solves the SDP (4.21) and the rank-one property
of the optimal information covariance matrix C?w. Let us start the analysis by
highlighting the denition of the worst-case secrecy rate RwcS in (4.8). Here, in
order to ensure RwcS > 0 it is necessary that the worst-case SNRb > γe ≥ SNRe.
Now, from the denitions of SNRb in (4.3) and SNRe in (4.9) we can see that SNRb
increases as more power is devoted to the information transmission covariance
matrix Cw while SNRe increases if less power is allocated to the AN’s covariance
matrix Cη. erefore, the technique eectively xes SNRe to its largest admissible
value (γe) to use the minimum power for AN generation and then allocate the
maximum possible power to information in order to maximise RwcS . As a result,
the SNRb increases monotonically with γe until we arrive at the point where it is
not possible to satisfy the condition SNRb > γe that guarantees a positive worst-
case secrecy rate; i.e., RwcS > 0 . Finally, RwcS in (4.8) is a function of the logarithmic
dierence between the worst-case SNRb and SNRe; thus, it increases with γe until
a maximum saddle point and then decreases to approach zero. is characteristic
is clearly seen in Figure 4.2, where the concave nature of RwcS in γe is shown for one
particular channel realisation. Here, the considered small-scale fading channel is
set to hˆb = [0.23+0.66i,−0.92+0.17i,−0.31−0.49i, 0.24−0.46i]T , the maximum
power Pmax = 5 (normalised relative to the AWGN power) and the secrecy radius
rsmax = 0.5 (relative to rb). e uncertainties upper-bounds for the uncertainties
are xed to b = 0.3 and rb = 0.3.
Now, the concave nature of RwcS as a function of γe can be exploited to develop
a linear searching algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 1
• Initialise γinie to a value larger but approximately equal to 0; i.e., γinie ' 0
and γende =
Pmax||hˆb||2
rˆαb σ
2
b
.
• Dene ρ as the accuracy tolerance for optimal γ?e and N intervals.
• Repeat while γende − γinie > ρ
– γie = γinie +
(i−1)
N
(
γende − γinie
)
, i ∈ [1, N + 1]
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of γe.
– Calculate RwcS (γie) by evaluating the SDPs (4.21) and (4.24) ∀γie
– Set ix = i corresponding to the maximum value among RwcS (γie)
– γinie =
{
γinie , ix = 1
γix−1e , ix 6= 1 , γ
end
e =
{
γix+1e , ix 6= N + 1
γende , ix = N + 1
• Set γ?e = 12
(
γinie + γ
end
e
)
.
e transmission allocation that maximises the worst-case secrecy rate RwcS is
the outcome of solving the SDP (4.21) for γ?e .
Remark 3 Owing to specic problem conditions such as the erroneous channel in-
stantaneous realisation, power available, level of uncertainties, etc. and the value of
γe, the results from the SDP in (4.21) might return RwcS ≤ 0. If this remains the same
for all γe ∈
[
γinie , γ
end
e
]
, then there is not a feasible solution to guarantee RwcS > 0
and the system is considered to be in outage. For the sake of secrecy, transmission does
not actually take place under this condition.
4.3.4 Numerical results
In this section we address the performance analysis of the worst-case secrecy rate
maximisation robust technique by numerical simulations. e analysis is based on
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Table 4.1: Parameters for the simulation.
Parameter Value Description
Nt 4 Alice’s number of antennas
σ2
h˜b
1 Bob’s channel elements variance
σ2
h˜e
1 Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2b 1 Bob’s AWGN power
σ2e 1 Eve’s AWGN power
Pmax 5 Maximal power for constrained systems
normalised relative to the AWGN power
α 2 Path loss exponent
rˆb 1 Alice-to-Bob erroneous distance
normalised relative to rb
the study of how the resources are allocated and the secrecy and the probabilistic
performance of the robust security endeavour. e simulations are based on Monte
Carlo trials with parameters detailed in Table 4.1.
Figure 4.3 depicts how the available power is allocated between the informa-
tion and the AN as the uncertainty of the main channel increases. Under the high-
uncertainty regime the strategy struggles to deliver a good quality communication
over the main link. erefore, it allocates less power to convey the information
while giving more power to AN generation in order to enhance the worst-case
secrecy rate RwcS by deteriorating the eavesdropping channel rather than trying
to improve the highly inaccurate main Alice-to-Bob channel. Moreover, when a
larger PZ is available and a larger security radius rs can be deployed, the strat-
egy allocates less power to AN generation making more power available to the
information. is allocation criterion is due to the fact that distant eavesdroppers
are subject to heavy path losses and so Alice does not need to devote so much
power to AN generation. us she can smartly use the available power to allocate
it mainly to information in order to enhance the secrecy rate. is behaviour is
shown in Figure 4.4 where the security performance of our approximated security
metric RwcS (estimated by Alice before transmission) is compared with the actual
secrecy rate resulting from averaging randomly generated eavesdropping chan-
nels (RS). For a fair comparison, both metrics take into account the worst-case
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to the AWGN power) versus main channel and distance uncertainties (b, rb) for dierent size
of PZ (rsmax) (relative to rb).
main channel. As expected, RS closely outperforms RwcS ; therefore, the worst-case
secrecy rate metric that we have introduced (RwcS ) is eectively the lower-bound
for the average secrecy rate. is result validates its use as a security performance
and design metric for the current problem. In practical cases, we would expect the
system to perform above RwcS because it is unlikely that the actual main channel
corresponds to the worst-case channel considered for solving the problem.
On the other hand, Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show how a larger error on the main
channel aects the secrecy rate and also show the probability of achieving a posi-
tive secrecy rate (PS = P [RS > 0]). Here, as was done in the previous chapter in
§3.3 and §3.4.1 and published in [103] and [102], the normalised secrecy throughput
(TS in the plots) is dened as a metric that quanties the loss in throughput due
to the infeasibility of solving the optimisation problem. Remarkably, in Figure 4.5,
both PS and TS reach high values even in the high uncertainty regime, highlight-
ing again the fact that close aackers represent the biggest threat to the security.
Finally, to understand the secrecy improvement of our technique, in Figures 4.3
and 4.4 the performance of the ‘naive’ scheme, that neglects the errors on both the
main link CSI and Bob’s location, is illustrated. Here a PZ is not deployed; there-
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fore, the eavesdroppers can be randomly located in the interval (0, rb]. It is worth
pointing out the security improvement achieved by the presented transmission
technique in terms of both secrecy rate and probability of secrecy when compared
to the naive scheme. is enhancement results from both the worst-case robust
formulation and the PZ deployment.
4.4 Transmission resourcesminimisationproblem
We look at a robust transmission strategy to minimise the networks’ resources us-
age to enforce an average target worst-case secrecy rate under the presence of pas-
sive eavesdroppers when considering an erroneous main link’s CSI. e strategy
should be able to allocate the minimum amount of power devoted to information
transmission and AN generation and the smallest size of the PZ by prioritising the
use of one resource over the other. A robust optimisation problem is formulated
when considering deterministic uncertainties over the main channel. is prob-
lem is recast as an SDP by using convex optimisation machinery to then solve it
eciently by interior-point based algorithms.
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4.4.1 Optimisation problem
We are interested in nding the optimal information and AN transmission covari-
ance matrices (Cw, Cη) and the size of the PZ given by the secrecy radius rs that
ensure a worst-case secrecy rate RwcS ≥ R, where R is a target average secrecy
rate. In order to eciently allocate both available resources aecting the security
performance (P and rs), as in the §3.4 and in [102], we use a Weighted Normalised
Cost Function (WNCF) that now it is dened as
CF = κ1
Tr{Cw}+ Tr{Cη}
Pmax
+ κ2
rs
rsmax
(4.25)
where κ1 and κ2 are the weights to prioritise the use of one resource over the
other and they are chosen to reect whether it is more convenient to use addi-
tional power rather than extending the PZ or vice-versa. In (4.25), Pmax and rsmax
dene the maximum available power and the largest PZ that could be physically
deployed. e resources minimisation problem is
min
Cw,Cη ,rs
CF (4.26a)
s.t. RwcS ≥ R (4.26b)
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Cw  0,Cη  0 (4.26c)
P ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax . (4.26d)
Note that while the objective function of the problem (4.26) dened in (4.25) is
linear in all the optimising variables, the constraint (4.26b) is nonconvex. ere-
fore, we need to reformulate the problem in a mathematical tractable way. With
this objective in mind, we introduce again the slack variable γe > 0 to split the
worst-case secrecy rate (RwcS dened in (4.8)) in the constraint (4.26b) . e problem
now becomes
min
Cw,Cη ,rs,γe
κ1
Tr{Cw}+ Tr{Cη}
Pmax
+ κ2
rs
rsmax
(4.27a)
s.t. min
δb∈∆b,
ςb∈ξb
SNRb ≥ γb (4.27b)
SNRe ≤ γe (4.27c)
Cw  0,Cη  0 (4.27d)
P ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax , γe > 0 (4.27e)
where we dene γb = 2R (1 + γe) − 1. is problem oers us again a straight
connection with QoS-constrained problems as the ones studied in [53, 59, 72, 103].
Although having split the former nonconvex constraint (4.26b) into the related
QoS problem in (4.27), this is still nonconvex. erefore, we use the same method-
ology as in §4.3.1 and, aer xing γe, we recast (4.27) into an equivalent convex
SDP. We address this problem in the next section.
Problem reformulation into a semidenite program
As pointed out before, the objective function in (4.27a) is linear in all the optimi-
sation variables; therefore, we draw aention to the nonconvex contraint (4.27b).
First, it is straightforward to see that the worst performance at Bob is obtained
when the intended receiver is as distant as possible, and thus the SNRb minimiser
for ςb is its maximum admissible value, rb . en, the worst-case constraint in
(4.27b) is reformulated as two quadratic inequalities as follows
−
(
hˆb + δb
)H (Cw
γb
−Cη
)(
hˆb + δb
)
+ (rˆb + rb)
α σ2b ≤ 0 (4.28a)
δHb δb − 2b ≤ 0. (4.28b)
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According to the S-procedure [87, Appendix B.2], these two quadratic inequal-
ities hold i there exists a slack variable µ ≥ 0 such that µINt + (Cwγb −Cη) (Cwγb −Cη) hˆb
hˆHb
(
Cw
γb
−Cη
)
hˆHb
(
Cw
γb
−Cη
)
hˆb − (rˆb + rb)α σ2b − µ2b
  0.
(4.29)
Here, the nonconvex contraint in (4.27b) is eectively formulated as an LMI.
Now, the constraint in (4.27c) is explicitly wrien as
Tr
{[
Cw
γe
−Cη
]
Rh˜e
}
− rαs σ2e ≤ 0 (4.30)
which is a nonconvex function because of the ‘minus term’ on the LHS involving
the exponentiation of the optimising variable rs. erefore, by using the simple
substitution r˜s = rαs , the constraint (4.30) becomes linear in all the optimisation
variables. Subsequently, this substitution has to be considered in the former ob-
jective function (4.27a) and in the resources constraint (4.27e).
Finally, for a xed value of γe > 0, the problem (4.27) is equivalent to the SDP
min
Cw,Cη,
r˜s,µ
κ1
Tr{Cw}+ Tr{Cη}
Pmax
+ κ2
r˜s
rαsmax
(4.31a)
s.t. Tr
{[
Cw
γe
−Cη
]
Rh˜e
}
− r˜sσ2e ≤ 0 (4.31b) µINt + (Cwγb −Cη) (Cwγb −Cη) hˆb
hˆHb
(
Cw
γb
−Cη
)
hˆHb
(
Cw
γb
−Cη
)
hˆb − (rˆb + rb)α σ2b − µ2b
  0
(4.31c)
Tr {Cw}+ Tr {Cη} ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ r˜s ≤ rαsmax (4.31d)
Cw  0,Cη  0, µ ≥ 0 (4.31e)
where the secrecy radius parameter is given by rs = r˜
1
α
s and µ is a slack variable.
e SDP (4.31) can be solved eciently by interior-point algorithms by using
the on-the-shelf solver SeDuMi [105] assisted by the parser tools Yalmip [106] or
CVX [107].
Remark 4 Due to the instantaneous availability of the erroneous main link’s CSI
hˆb, the optimal solution for the information transmission covariance matrix C?w of
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the SDP (4.31) is unique and rank-one. Moreover, due to the lack of the instanta-
neous availability of the eavesdropping channel hˆe, the strategy broadcasts the AN
orthogonal to C?w.
e rst part of the claim in this remark above results from the analysis of the
optimality conditions of the SDP (4.31). is study is addressed in detail in the
§4.5 of this chapter. e second part of remark 4 results from the analysis of the
simulation results where the power for AN generation is isotropically distributed
over the (Nt− 1) dimensional space orthogonal to the rank-one space spanned by
C?w. is is equivalent to saying that the AN covariance matrix C?η has (Nt − 1)
equal non-zero eigenvalues with the same magnitude.
4.4.2 Linear searching algorithm to minimise the transmis-
sion resources use
We recall that the SPD (4.31) has been solved for a xed value of γe; therefore,
it is necessary to nd the optimal γ?e that delivers the minimal cost for the CF
among all the costs resulting by considering all the admissible values for γe. is
can eciently be done by implementing an iterative algorithm that exploits the
convex way in which the CF varies as a function of γe.
Analysis of the convex nature of CF
e weighted normalised cost function CF is evaluated aer solving the SDP (4.31);
therefore, it is useful to rst understand how does the SDP allocate the network
resources. First, in order to save power, the strategy sets the worst-case SNRb and
the SNRe to their respective minimum and maximum admissible values (γb and γe)
to guarantee R. e later can also be achieved by seing an appropriate PZ size
dened by rs; here, the strategy’s outcome depends on the resources availability
and prioritisation criteria. As explained in §4.3.3, the power devoted to the in-
formation covariance matrix Cw increases monotonically with γe. Regarding Cη
and rs, when γe ' 0 we note that high power devoted to the AN generation and
a large PZ are required simultaneously; indeed, the problem might be unfeasible
under this condition. As γe increases, less power is devoted for Cη and a shorter
rs are admissible. On the other hand, the strategy makes more power available
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Figure 4.6: Analysis of the convex nature of the weighted normalised cost function CF as a
function of γe for κ1 = κ2 = 1.
for the information Cw by increasing rs rather than allocating power for broad-
casting AN. us, aer decreasing and reaching a saddle point, rs increases again
while the AN’s power monotonically decreases. Finally, the CF is the normalised
weighted summation of the increasing power for information as a function of γe,
the decreasing power devoted for AN generation and the convex function in γe
of the secrecy radius rs. is results in a convex function depicted in Figure 4.6;
where, the convex nature of CF as a function of γe is shown for one particular chan-
nel realisation hˆb = [0.23 + 0.66i,−0.92 + 0.17i,−0.31 − 0.49i, 0.24 − 0.46i]T .
e maximum power is set to Pmax = 5 and normalised relative to the AWGN
power, the secrecy radius to rsmax = 0.5 relative to rb while the upper-bounds of
the uncertainties are xed to b = 0.3 and rb = 0.3.
Now, we take advantage of the convex nature of the weighted cost function CF
as a function of γe to develop a linear searching algorithm to seek the optimal γ?e .
Algorithm 2
• Initialise γinie to a value larger but approximately equal to 0; i.e., γinie ' 0
and γende =
Pmax||hˆb||2
rˆαb σ
2
b
.
• Dene ρ as the accuracy tolerance for the optimal γ?e and N intervals.
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• Repeat while γende − γinie > ρ
– γie = γinie +
(i−1)
N
(
γende − γinie
)
, i ∈ [1, N + 1]
– Calculate CF (γie) by solving (4.31) and then evaluating (4.25) ∀γie
– Set ix = i corresponding to the minimum value among CF (γie).
– γinie =
{
γinie , ix = 1
γix−1e , ix 6= 1 , γ
end
e =
{
γix+1e , ix 6= N + 1
γende , ix = N + 1
• Set γ?e = 12
(
γinie + γ
end
e
)
.
e transmission strategy that minimises the cost function CF is the outcome
of solving the SDP (4.31) for γ?e .
Remark 5 In the case that the SDP in (4.31) is non-feasible for all γe ∈
[
γinie , γ
end
e
]
,
then the system is considered in outage and no transmission takes place to preserve
the system security.
4.4.3 Numerical results
For the analysis of the performance of the robust resources minimisation problem
we consider Monte Carlo simulations with setup specied in Table 4.2. We draw
aention to the way that the technique allocates resources for dierent prioritisa-
tion criteria and the secrecy probabilistic analysis of our robust strategy.
e Figures 4.7 and 4.8 depict the technique’s requirements in terms of power
and size of the PZ to achieve the average target secrecy rate R. Here we can see
that as the uncertainty over the main channel increases, the system uses more
resources to satisfy the security objective until they are depleted. Indeed, the re-
quired amount of total power and the size of the PZ dened by rs are determined
by the prioritisation weights κ1 and κ2 in (4.25). For instance, in Figure 4.7 the
use of power is prioritised over extending the PZ. Meanwhile in Figure 4.8 the
top priority is to save power and so the technique extends the size of the PZ. e
introduced robust technique calculates the secrecy radius showing that both, an
appropriate resources prioritisation criterion and the use of a PZ allow an ecient
energy utilisation to provide an average secrecy rate target.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the secrecy probabilistic performance of the re-
sources minimisation robust transmit strategy. Both gures show the probability
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Table 4.2: Parameters for the simulation.
Parameter Value Description
Nt 4 Alice’s number of antennas
σ2
h˜b
1 Bob’s channel elements variance
σ2
h˜e
1 Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2b 1 Bob’s AWGN power
σ2e 1 Eve’s AWGN power
Pmax 3 Maximal power for constrained systems
normalised relative to AWGN power
R 1 bps/Hz Target average secrecy rate
α 2 Path loss exponent
rˆb 1 Alice-to-Bob erroneous distance
relative to rb
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AWGN power) and size of secrecy radius (rs) versus main channel and distance uncertainties
(b, rb) for dierent size of PZ (rsmax) (relative to rb) and κ1 = 3, κ2 = 1.
of achieving an average worst-case secrecy rate larger than the target secrecy rate
R; i.e., PS = P [RwcS > R]. Moreover, the normalised secrecy throughput TS , as
dened in §4.3.4, is also ploed to quantify the loss in throughput due to the in-
feasibility of solving the optimisation problem. Owing to the ergodic denition of
secrecy considered in the metric RwcS in (4.8), in both gures the security constraint
in (4.26b) is guaranteed on average. erefore, the presented transmission mech-
anism can minimise the use of resources but at the cost of not providing a high
probability of secrecy. ese results suggest the need of an outage formulation to
provide a high secrecy rate when the objective is to minimise the use of resources.
is outage approach, as pointed out in §3.4.1 of chapter 2, has proven eective
for the case of a MISO transmission with a perfect main link’s CSI.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show that the probability of achieving a secrecy rate larger
than R by this technique is not aected by the availability of resources. However,
a larger PZ can have an important impact over the secrecy throughput, especially
under the high main channel uncertainty regime.
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4.5 Analysis of the information transmission co-
variance matrix
In order to obtain valuable insight into the nature of the optimal solutions of the
worst-case secrecy rate and the resources minimisation problems studied in §4.3
and §4.4, we analyse the internal structure of the SDPs (4.21) and (4.31). Indeed,
we examine the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions [87, §5.5.3] of
both problems aiming to shed light into the internal structure of their optimal
transmission information covariance matrix C?w.
For the sake of clarity, this analysis is split into two parts. First, we consider
a transmission resources minimisation problem related to the secrecy rate max-
imisation problem. We prove that the optimal solution of this related problem is
also optimal to the secrecy rate maximisation problem studied in §4.3.1. erefore,
we eectively establish a connection between the resources minimisation problem
addressed in §4.4.1 and the secrecy rate maximisation problem analysed in §4.3.1
and their solutions. Second, we focus on the study of the KKT conditions of the
resources minimisation problem in order to understand the properties of the opti-
mal transmission information covariance matrix C?w. is analysis will show that
the C?w for both problems is unique and rank-one, which means that the optimal
transmission scheme for our robust scheme is beamforming.
Connection between the secrecy ratemaximisation and the resourcesmin-
imisation problems
Let us drawn our aention to the transmission resources minimisation problem in
(4.26) for the particular case of κ1 = κ2 = 1. is condition yields
min
Cw,Cη ,rs
Tr{Cw}+ Tr{Cη}
Pmax
+
rs
rsmax
(4.32a)
s.t. RwcS ≥ R? (4.32b)
Cw  0,Cη  0 (4.32c)
P ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax (4.32d)
where, R? is the optimal worst-case secrecy rate that can be obtained by the se-
crecy rate maximisation problem (4.11) under the same power and secrecy radius
constraints Pmax and rsmax .
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Consider (Crmw , Crmη , rrms ) to be the solution to the transmission resources
minimisation problem in (4.32). Likewise, (CSMw , CSMη , rSMs ) is the solution of
the secrecy rate maximisation problem (4.11). Bear in mind that we assume that
both problems are constrained by the same resources availability; that is, P ≤
Pmax, 0 ≤ rs ≤ rsmax . erefore, the solution to the SDP (4.21) resulting from re-
formulating (4.11) can satisfy the constraints of (4.32). Moreover, from the resource
minimisation problem it holds
Tr{Crmw }+ Tr{Crmη }
Pmax
+
rrms
rsmax
≤ Tr{C
SM
w }+ Tr{CSMη }
Pmax
+
rSMs
rsmax
≤ Pmax
Pmax
+
rsmax
rsmax
= 2, (4.33)
which further implies that (Crmw , Crmη , rrms ) is feasible to the secrecy rate maximi-
sation problem in (4.11); that is, from (Crmw , Crmη , rrms ), Rwcs ≤ R? holds. On the
other hand, as an optimal solution of (4.32), then (Crmw , Crmη , rrms ) must satisfy
(4.32b), and so Rwcs ≥ R? holds. erefore, Rwcs = R? and that subsequently means
that (Crmw ,Crmη , rrms ) is optimal to both the resources minimisation problem (4.32)
and the secrecy rate maximisation problem (4.11).
Once we have established this important connection between the transmission
resources minimisation problem (4.26) and the worst-case secrecy rate maximisa-
tion problem (4.11) and their respective optimal solutions, in the following, and for
the sake of simplicity, we study the KKT conditions of the resources minimisation
problem.
Analysis of the KKT optimality conditions of the resources minimisation
problem
Let us consider the SDP (4.31) that results from recasting the transmission re-
sources minimisation problem in (4.26). First, and with the objective to ease the
analysis, it is useful to split the LMI in the constraint (4.31c) into three constraints.
Hence we use the S-procedure [87, Appendix B.2] to transform the former worst-
case QoS at the Bob constraint in (4.27b) into
u− v − (rˆb + rb)α σ2b ≥ 0 (4.34a)
s.t.
[
µ1INt +
Cw
γb
Cw
γb
hˆb
hˆHb
Cw
γb
hˆHb
Cw
γb
hˆb − µ12b − u
]
 0 (4.34b)
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[
µ2INt −Cη −Cηhˆb
−hˆHb Cη −hˆHb Cηhˆb − µ22b + v
]
 0 (4.34c)
where u ≥ 0, v ≥ 0 and µi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 are slack variables introduced by applying
the S-procedure.
e LMI in (4.31c) results from adding the LMIs (4.34b) and (4.34c) and replac-
ing the value for (u− v) from (4.34a) and µ = µ1 + µ2 into the LMI resulting from
the addition of the LMIs (4.34b) and (4.34c). Aer considering (4.34), the resulting
SDP is
min
Cw,Cη,
r˜s,µ
κ1
Tr{Cw}+ Tr{Cη}
Pmax
+ κ2
r˜s
rαsmax
(4.35a)
s.t. Tr
{[
Cw
γe
−Cη
]
Rh˜e
}
− r˜sσ2e ≤ 0 (4.35b)
u− v − (rˆb + rb)α σ2b ≥ 0 (4.35c)[
µ1INt +
Cw
γb
Cw
γb
hˆb
hˆHb
Cw
γb
hˆHb
Cw
γb
hˆb − µ12b − u
]
 0 (4.35d)[
µ2INt −Cη −Cηhˆb
−hˆHb Cη −hˆHb Cηhˆb − µ22b + v
]
 0 (4.35e)
Tr {Cw}+ Tr {Cη} ≤ Pmax, 0 ≤ r˜s ≤ rαsmax (4.35f)
Cw  0,Cη  0, µ ≥ 0 (4.35g)
where it is clear to see that the above SDP is equivalent to (4.31) but now consider-
ing the three constraints in (4.34) instead of the LMI in (4.31c). Now, we examine
the KKT optimality conditions dened in [87, §5.5.3] for the equivalent SDP (4.35).
First, the LMI in (4.35d) can be expressed as
A =
[
µ1INt 0
0H −µ12b − u
]
+
[
Cw
γb
Cw
γb
hˆb
hˆHb
Cw
γb
hˆHb
Cw
γb
hˆb
]
=
[
µ1INt 0
0H −µ12b − u
]
+ HˆHb
Cw
γb
Hˆb  0 (4.36)
where Hˆb =
[
INt hˆb
]
.
Now we write part of the KKT optimality conditions of the SDP (4.35) but con-
sider (4.36) instead of (4.35d) as
∇CwL =
κ1
Pmax
INt +
ρ1
γe
Rh˜e −
1
γb
HˆbΣ1Hˆ
H
b −Σ2 + ρ2INt = 0Nt (4.37a)
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AΣ1 = 0Nt (4.37b)
CwΣ2 = 0Nt (4.37c)
Cw  0,Σ1  0,Σ2  0, ρ1 ≥ 0, ρ2 ≥ 0 (4.37d)
where Σ1,Σ2, ρ1 and ρ2 are the Lagrange dual variables associated with the ma-
trices A,Cw, the constraint in (4.35b) and the power constraint in (4.35f) respec-
tively. Now, by pre-multiplying the KKT condition in (4.37a) by the information
covariance matrix Cw and considering the condition in (4.37c) we obtain
Cw
[(
κ1
Pmax
+ ρ2
)
INt +
ρ1
γe
Rh˜e
]
=
1
γb
CwHˆbΣ1Hˆ
H
b . (4.38)
Recalling that Rh˜e = σ
2
h˜e
INt , the resulting matrix inside of the brackets of the
LHS of (4.38) is a full-rank positive denite matrix irrespective of the values of the
Lagrange dual variables ρ1 and ρ2. us
rank(Cw) = rank(CwHˆbΣ1HˆHb ) ≤ min
[
rank(Cw), rank(HˆbΣ1HˆHb )
]
. (4.39)
Now, we focus our aention to the rank of the matrix HˆbΣ1HˆHb . First, we
incorporate the reformulation of the LMI (4.35d) in (4.36) into the KKT condition
(4.37b). Subsequently, we pre-multiply it by [INt 0] and post-multiply it by HˆHb to
obtain
[INt 0]
[
µ1INt 0
0H −µ12b − u
]
Σ1Hˆ
H
b + [INt 0] Hˆ
H
b
Cw
γb
HˆbΣ1Hˆ
H
b
= [µ1INt 0] Σ1Hˆ
H
b +
Cw
γb
HˆbΣ1Hˆ
H
b = 0Nt . (4.40)
Recalling that Hˆb =
[
INt hˆb
]
, we rewrite [µ1INt 0] as µ1
[
Hˆb −
[
0Nt hˆb
]]
.
Finally, (4.40) is expressed as[
µ1INt +
Cw
γb
]
HˆbΣ1Hˆ
H
b = µ1
[
0Nt hˆb
]
Σ1Hˆ
H
b . (4.41)
Now, from the expression (4.40), µ1 > 0; otherwise, CwHˆbΣ1HˆHb = 0Nt only
holds when the information covariance matrix Cw = 0 and that is not feasible for
the general case of the target average secrecy rate R > 0. erefore, the resulting
matrix within the brackets on the LHS of (4.41) is full-rank positive denite. Hence,
it holds that
rank(HˆbΣ1HˆHb ) = rank(µ1
[
0Nt hˆb
]
Σ1Hˆ
H
b ) ≤ rank
([
0Nt hˆb
])
≤ 1. (4.42)
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Finally, from (4.39) we conclude that rank (Cw) ≤ rank
(
HˆbΣ1Hˆ
H
b
)
≤ 1. In
other words, when the resources minimisation problem is feasible and for the non
trivial case when the average target secrecy rateR = 0, then the covariance matrix
of the information is rank-one; that corresponds to a beamforming transmission
strategy.
An additional conclusion arises from the rank-one property of the optimal in-
formation transmission covariance matrix. e optimal Cw for a given resource
minimisation problem is unique. is result can be seen by contradiction through
exploiting the rank-one property of Cw by considering two dierent rank-one op-
timal solutions, Cw1 and Cw2 . By the convexity optimisation property [87, §4],
it holds that Cw3 = θCw1 + (1 − θ)Cw2 is also optimal to the SDP (4.35) where
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. As Cw1 6= Cw2 , they span two dierent subspaces, and so the op-
eration above yields rank(Cw3) = 2. erefore, Cw3 cannot be optimal to (4.35)
unless Cw1 = Cw2 , conrming the uniqueness property of the optimal information
transmission covariance matrix Cw.
It is worth recalling the equivalence of the optimal solutions of the resources
minimisation problem (4.26) and the worst-case secrecy rate maximisation prob-
lem in (4.11) studied in the §4.5. erefore, we conclude that the solution of the
worst-case secrecy rate maximisation problem is also unique and rank-one. In
other words, the optimal transmission strategy for both problems that we have
studied is beamforming. is property, as seen in the analysis above, results from
the availability of the instantaneous erroneous main link’s CSI and coincides with
the results reported in [46, 67] for dierent congurations of MISO networks. e
results discussed in this section allow us to conrm the statements contained in
remarks 1 and 3.
4.6 Discussion and summary
In this chapter we have investigated a new, secure, robust transmit strategy to cope
with errors in the main link of a MISO network under the presence of an unknown
eavesdropper. e main channel mismatch has been modelled using a conservative
approach that ensures a given performance for all the (known norm) deterministic
uncertainties dened within a set. erefore, we have formulated two optimisa-
tion problems to maximise the worst-case secrecy rate in a resources constrained
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network and to minimise the use of resources subject to ensuring a target average
worst-case secrecy rate. We have recast the resulting nonconvex problems into
semidenite programs that have been eciently solved by interior-point based
toolboxes. Subsequently, we have studied the structure of both problems and ob-
tained valuable insight into the nature of the optimal solutions. Indeed, the two
problems’ optimal transmit information covariance matrices are unique and rank-
one meaning that transmit beamforming is optimal to both problems. Moreover,
the articial noise covariance matrix is orthogonal to the one-dimensional space
spanned by the transmit covariance matrix; that is, the articial noise is gener-
ated over the nullspace of the information steering beamformer in an isotropic
fashion. is result corroborates isotropic masked beamforming designs as valid
approaches to convey securely information in MISO networks in the presence of
passive eavesdroppers; even under uncertainties over the main channel.
e introduced robust techniques also use a protected zone to prevent spatially
close eavesdroppers. us, our transmission approaches determines both the op-
timal size of this secure area and the transmission covariance matrices for both
optimisation problems. e proposed approach improves the security by striking
a balance between allocating transmission power and seing the size of the pro-
tected zone in resource constrained scenarios. ese strategies shed light into the
impact that a close unknown aacker can have over the security and the associated
cost in power required to prevent close-quarters eavesdropping aacks.
In conclusion, in this chapter we have addressed a practical security problem
arising from using an erroneous channel information of the main link to steer the
information towards the intended receiver and to generate a jamming signal to
confuse aackers. is characteristic aects practical networks and, if neglected,
can jeopardise the security in MISO networks. e ecient transmission strategies
here introduced incorporate into the design a degree of uncertainty about the main
channel to address the worst-case security. Moreover, we consider an eavesdrop-
per close to the transmier; therefore, we take advantage of physical deployments
in practical networks to enforce an exclusion area that allows us not only to en-
hance the security by preventing close aacks but also to make an ecient use of
the available network resources.

Chapter5
Physical layer security in
MIMO-OFDM systems
‘e silence always dawned with
you, or perhaps I must say
between us. Save the secret with
me, in case you heard my voice’
Alejandro Filio
This chapter presents an analysis of the contribution of frequency selec-tiveness to the secrecy of multiple-antenna systems when all the trans-mission parties use orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)
signalling. We address physical layer security in frequency selective multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless channels in the presence of a passive eaves-
dropper; i.e., the associated eavesdropping channel is unknown to the transmier.
Spatial masked beamforming is chosen as secure transmission strategy, so the in-
formation is steered towards the intended receiver while articial noise (AN) is
broadcast to confuse passive eavesdroppers. By their side, the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper both employ multiple-antenna combining schemes to en-
hance their respective received signals. e contribution of channel frequency
selectivity to improve the secrecy is presented by performance and probabilistic
analysis. Moreover, we investigate the capability of the eavesdropper to jeopar-
dise the security of the system by mitigating the interfering eect of the AN using
zero forcing (ZF) as a receive beamforming strategy. e results suggest that an
104 5. Physical layer security in MIMO-OFDM systems
eavesdropper equipped with a large number of antennas can threaten the overall
security of the MIMO-OFDM system. is can be achieved by using an appropriate
receiving beamforming multiple-antenna mechanism that exploits the knowledge
that the aacker might have regarding the transmission strategy used by the trans-
mier.
We begin this chapter by summarising the most important existing secrecy
contributions in MIMO-OFDM systems pointing out the novelty of the work pre-
sented here. Next, in section 5.2 we introduce the system modelling of a masked
beamforming MIMO-OFDM network. In section 5.3 we show how multiple-antenna
systems are used at both transmission and reception to secure the communica-
tion and how the power is allocated in the frequency-domain multi-carrier system.
Here we analyse the performance of several combining strategies and their impact
on secrecy. In section 5.4 we show an analysis of the numerical results based on
simulations. Finally, this chapter ends with a brief discussion about the practical-
ity of the analysed technique and some important conclusions about the secrecy
performance of the system.
5.1 Physical layer security in frequency selective
MIMO channels
In contrast to the two previous chapters where the multiple-input single-output
(MISO) case was studied, in this chapter we address the scenario where both re-
ceiver nodes that are part of the wiretap model, the intended receiver and the
eavesdropper, are equipped with multiple antennas. is case is referred to as the
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel or multiple-input multiple-
output multi-antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) [48]. In this case, the legitimate
transmier and receiver can exploit the full degree of freedom that their MIMO
channel oers in order to maximise the signal quality dierence between the des-
tination and the eavesdropper. e rst work to point out that a proper exploita-
tion of multiple-antenna space-time diversity can enhance information security
and information-hiding capabilities was presented by Hero in [33]. is pioneer
contribution opened the door to many studies about the security capabilities of the
MIMO channel.
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Looking at the MIMO channel’s optimal precoding transmission strategy that
achieves the secrecy capacity under a total power constraint is a cumbersome task
that has aracted the aention of the research community. Indeed, the resulting
optimisation problem is nonconvex and therefore dicult to solve, and in contrast
to the MISO case, this does not necessarily accept a rank-one covariance matrix as
an optimal solution. Indeed, in this scenario, beamforming is generally a subopti-
mal transmission scheme except in the particular case of a transmier and receiver
both equipped with two antennas each, while the eavesdropper has only one an-
tenna [108]. e full MIMO channel secrecy capabilities are studied by Khisti et
al. in [34, 48] and by Oggier and Hassibi in [35, 109]. Here, the secrecy rate max-
imisation problem is reformulated as a minimax problem and solved by nding
numerically a saddle point. In contrast to these approaches, in [110] Bustin et al.
introduce a closed-form solution to the secrecy rate maximisation problem subject
to enforcing a minimum mean square error (MMSE) constraint in the transmission
covariance matrix.
ese ndings have motivated the research community to provide tractable
suboptimal alternative approaches to deal with the technically demanding problem
of the MIMO wiretap channel secrecy rate maximisation. In this context, in [111]
Mukherjee and Swindlerhurst enforce a suboptimal rank-one transmission strat-
egy to study the secrecy capabilities of the MIMO channel using dierent types
of steering beamforming vector designs at the transmier and the legitimate and
malicious receivers. Here, the performance of the intended receiver is obtained
by allocating the minimum power to guarantee a target SNR and devoting the re-
maining available power to AN generation to confuse unknown eavesdroppers.
A similar power allocation approach is used in [72] to study robust beamforming
transmission schemes in the MIMO wiretap channel when the eavesdropper uses a
MMSE design based combiner to mitigate the eect of the AN. Also in [95] Pei et al.
allocate the maximum possible power for AN generation as a valid way to increase
the probability of achieving security in a masked beamforming secure transmission
by meeting MMSE constraints at both the intended receiver and the eavesdroppers.
In [62, 63] a MMSE approach is also used at the receivers to present a probabilistic
framework about the security enhancements of a masked beamforming transmis-
sion strategy where multiple-antenna eavesdroppers are randomly scaered over
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the network. Finally, in [112] maximal ratio combining (MRC) and single combin-
ing (SC) are used at the receivers to study the secrecy capabilities of the MIMO
wiretap channel when a suboptimal transmission scheme based on antenna selec-
tion is used.
All these aforementioned references,which enforce suboptimal rank-one trans-
mission strategies to secure MIMO at fading channels, do not pay aention to the
further potential security opportunities that a frequency selective channel can of-
fer. In contrast to these contributions, in [113] Kobayashi and Debbah study the
secrecy capacity of frequency selective fading channels by introducing a Vander-
monde precoding transmission that nulls active eavesdroppers by using masked
beamforming to deal with passive aackers. Here it is proven that frequency se-
lectiveness can be exploited in the security context. Interestingly, and in contrast to
[113], in [114] Renna et al. study the secrecy capacity of single-antenna networks
using OFDM considering a sophisticated eavesdropper that is not constrained to
use OFDM signalling. is study concludes that the secrecy rate in single-antenna
networks can substantially diminish as a result of an eavesdropper not using a
fast Fourier transform (FFT)-based demodulator and taking advantage of the ad-
ditional information that the transmier encloses in the OFDM message within
the cyclic prex. Later in [115] the achievable ergodic secrecy rates and secrecy
outage probabilities of single-antenna OFDM systems are studied and suggest that
an intelligent power allocation between the subcarriers can lead to improvements
in security. is objective is pursued in [116, 117] where power allocation mech-
anisms between subcarriers are investigated to secure users in a single-antenna
multiple-users OFDM network. It is worth pointing out that neither of these works
has addressed the security contribution of frequency selective channels in MIMO-
OFDM systems.
5.1.1 is chapter’s contribution
is chapter presents a novel analysis of the secrecy improvement resulting from
frequency selectiveness in MIMO-OFDM systems. We use a suboptimal rank-one
secure masked beamforming transmission mechanism where the AN is broadcast
isotropically and orthogonal to the steering beamforming vector. We distribute the
power in an opportunistic fashion between the OFDM subcarriers using a water-
lling based allocation mechanism to enhance the likelihood of achieving security
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in subcarriers with the best quality. en, for each subcarrier we distribute the
power between the information-bearing signal and the AN using three schemes.
Firstly, we transmit information using the minimum required power to achieve a
specied ality of Service (QoS) requirement given by a target SNR to be met
at the intended receiver while the rest of the power is devoted to AN generation.
Secondly, we distribute the power equally between information and AN to max-
imise the average secrecy rate per subcarrier. Finally, we progressively vary the
power devoted to the AN in order to understand its contribution to the secrecy of
the MIMO-OFDM system. We study the performance of the system by using sev-
eral multiple-antenna receiving beamforming mechanisms at the legitimate multi-
antenna receiver and at the eavesdropper. e results suggest that frequency selec-
tivity can contribute positively to the secrecy by allowing an opportunistic power
allocation and exploiting the frequency diversity of the MIMO channel by using
OFDM.
In addition to the aforementioned study, we also study how an eavesdropper
that is aware of the transmission strategy used by the transmier can put at risk the
security of the MIMO-OFDM system. Indeed, and in contrast to the works in [53,
63, 72] where MMSE estimation is used to maximise the SNR at the eavesdropper
side, here we investigate a novel and simple method based on Zero Forcing (ZF)
through which the eavesdropper can mitigate, even null, the interfering eect of
the AN. e results suggest that a multiple-antenna eavesdropper that is aware of
the main link’s channel state information (CSI) poses a major threat to the overall
security of the system. Here the number of available antennas at the eavesdropper
and the knowledge that the eavesdropper has regarding the transmit strategy play
a critical role in the security of the system.
It is worth remarking that the analysis carried out in this chapter considers
that all the nodes taking part of the communication use OFDM signalling. In other
words, we assume that the eavesdropper has the same receiving capabilities as the
legitimate receiver. is assumption can be seen as restrictive owing to the fact
that we are eectively enforcing a limitation at the eavesdropper side. However,
we assume the worst-case for the security by making available to the eavesdropper
all the details of the transmission strategy used by the legitimate transmission par-
ties. In other words, the aacker is aware of the transmission covariance matrices
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of both the information and the AN and the perfect CSI between all the trans-
mission parties. is assumption allows us to study the contribution of frequency
selectivity in MIMO-OFDM networks and then obtain valuable insight into the im-
provements in secrecy and also the potential threats to condentiality arising from
a well informed aacker. e case of an eavesdropper with a more sophisticated
demodulator and capability to exploit information contained in the OFDM cyclic
prex is out of the scope of the present study.
5.2 System model
In this section we model a MIMO-OFDM system using masked beamforming as a
secure transmission strategy. We assume that the transmission is overhead by one
eavesdropper also equipped with multiple antennas. Note that this scenario can be
viewed as multiple single-antenna colluding eavesdroppers, that is multiple eaves-
droppers contributing their reception eorts in a cooperative fashion. Following
the well known wireless security model, the legitimate transmier and receiver
are named ‘Alice’ and ‘Bob’ while the eavesdropper is referred to as ‘Eve’.
Alice, Bob and Eve are respectively equipped withNa ≥ 2, Nb ≥ 1, andNe ≥ 1
antennas. We consider frequency selective channels with L multipath taps; there-
fore, these time dispersive MIMO channels can be described by L complex channel
matrices H(l) ∈ CNa×Nb and G(l) ∈ CNa×Ne where l ∈ [1, 2, · · · , L] denotes the
lth tap of the MIMO Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve small-scale fading channels re-
spectively. We suppose that the channels are subject to block fading; therefore,
they remain constant over the transmission of the frame and vary independently
from frame to frame. e L taps of both channels are mutually independent and
they are modelled as complex matrices with uncorrelated, zero-mean, Gaussian
distributed elements with variance σ2H/L and σ2G/L respectively. In other words,
the lth small scale fading matrix channels are H(l) ∼ CN(0, σ
2
H
L
I) and G(l) ∼ CN(0,
σ2G
L
I). It is important to point out that here we do not consider the eect of the
location of the nodes over the distance; in other words, Alice, Bob and Eve are
considered equidistant with normalised distance of unity. We assume a passive
eavesdropping scenario, and so the main link’s CSI is perfectly known to Alice
while the eavesdropping’s counterpart remains unknown to her. However, we can
assume that Alice has available statistical information regarding Eve’s channel.
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Figure 5.1: System model of a MIMO-OFDM system. Secure communication between
multiple-antenna legitimate parties in the presence of an eavesdropper over themth frequency
domain subcarrier.
We use OFDM signalling as an eective way to deal with time dispersive chan-
nels. erefore, the MIMO-OFDM model exploits the frequency diversity resulting
from the conversion of the time domain frequency selective channel into a set of
parallel at fading channels in the frequency domain [118, §9.1.2]. erefore, the
frequency selective multipath channel withL taps is now represented by an equiv-
alent OFDM system of N parallel at fading channels. In other words, we use the
frequency domain representation of the multi-tap main and eavesdropping chan-
nels given by H(m) and G(m) where m ∈ [0, N − 1]. Here, m represents the mth
subcarrier of the equivalent at-fading Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve frequency-
domain channel matrices. e frequency domain system is depicted in Figure 5.1.
Let s(m) ∈ CNa denote the steering beamforming signal vector transmied by
Alice over the mth subcarrier where m ∈ [0, · · · , N − 1]. e covariance matrix
of the transmied steering vector s(m) is given by Cs(m) = E{s(m)sH(m)}; therefore,
the power allocated to the mth subcarrier is dened by ρ(m) = Tr{Cs(m)}. We
assume a total power constraint P =
∑N−1
m=0 ρ(m). Finally, a fraction (m) ∈ [0, 1)
of the power allocated to each subcarrier is devoted to the generation of AN. us
the signal vector s(m) transmied over the mth subcarrier is modelled as follows
s(m) =
√
ρ(m)
(√
1− (m)w(m)d(m) +√(m)η(m)
)
(5.1)
where w(m) ∈ CNa is the normalised beamforming vector, that is ||w(m)|| = 1, d(m)
is the transmied scalar complex information symbol from a Gaussian codebook
with E{|d(m)|2} = 1, and η(m) ∈ CNa is the AN vector with covariance matrix
Cη(m) = E{η(m)ηH(m)}.
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Figure 5.2: Block schematic of the transmission stage of a masked beamforming MIMO-OFDM system.
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Figure 5.2 depicts a block diagram showing the implementation of the MIMO-
OFDM transmission strategy. e gure illustrates how the masked beamforming
strategy is implemented in the frequency domain using each one of the N subcar-
riers of the frequency domain main link’s MIMO channel; i.e., H(m). e output of
theN masked beamforming blocks are scrambled to form the input of theNa IDFT
blocks to add later the cyclic prex. Finally the parallel signal is de-multiplexed
into a serial stream that feeds each one of the Na transceivers at the transmission
stage.
e signal vectors received by the multiple-antenna Bob and Eve on the mth
subcarrier are respectively given by:
u(m) = H
H
(m)s(m) + nb(m) (5.2)
v(m) = G
H
(m)s(m) + ne(m) (5.3)
where H(m) and G(m) are the mth subcarrier of the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-
Eve frequency-domain channel matrices. In addition, nb(m) ∈ CNb and ne(m) ∈
CNe are the mutually independent, zero-mean, complex, AWGN vectors at themth
subcarrier such that nb(m) ∼ CN(0, σ
2
b
N
I) and ne(m) ∼ CN(0, σ
2
e
N
I).
In order to combine the signal received at the reception, we assume that Bob
and Eve use a receiving beamformer vector given by wb(m) ∈ CNb and we(m) ∈ CNe
respectively. erefore, the scalar signals at the output of the combiners are
yb(m) = w
H
b(m)u(m) (5.4)
ye(m) = w
H
e(m)v(m). (5.5)
Aer the combining stage at the receiver, we can obtain the signal-to-noise
ratios at Bob and Eve at the mth subcarrier denoted by SNRb(m) and SNRe(m) re-
spectively. e exact SNR expressions will depend upon the combining scheme
used at the receiver; indeed, we consider dierent alternatives detailed in the next
section §5.3.2. Finally, an achievable secrecy rate RS(m) over the mth subcarrier of
the modelled system model is given by
RS(m) =
[
log2
(
1 + SNRb(m)
)− log2 (1 + SNRe(m))]+ [bps/Hz] . (5.6)
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5.2.1 Probability of achieving secrecy
Let us recall that for the pure passive eavesdropping case perfect secrecy cannot be
guaranteed. Indeed, when the transmier is not aware of the eavesdropping link’s
instantaneous CSI, then perfect secrecy cannot be ensured and so a probabilistic
framework is necessary to quantify the likelihood of achieving secrecy. We dene
the probability of achieving secrecy on themth subcarrier as the likelihood that the
information can be transmied secretly over the main link at a minimum target
secrecy rate R; i.e., PS = P
[
RS(m) ≥ R
]
. is is expressed by:
PS = P
[
log2
(
1 + SNRb(m)
)− log2 (1 + SNRe(m)) ≥ R] . (5.7)
5.3 A MIMO-OFDM masked beamforming trans-
mission scheme
We aim to study the secrecy performance of a frequency selective MIMO system
using masked beamforming as a secure transmission strategy. Following the pro-
cedure discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis and presented in [102, 103], a potentially
suboptimal masked beamforming transmission strategy is enforced by steering the
information towards the intended receiver Bob and broadcasting AN orthogonally
to the beamforming vector w(m) to confuse the unknown eavesdropper. erefore,
Alice chooses the beamforming vector w(m) as the principal eigenvector t1(m) cor-
responding to the largest eigenvalue of H(m)HH(m). Subsequently, the AN vector
η(m) is generated by the weighted linear combination of the remaining Na − 1
eigenvectors. is means that the AN resulting from the equal power distribution
among the Na − 1 remaining eigenvector is broadcast isotropically and orthogo-
nally to the steering beamforming vector t1(m); i.e., tH1(m)η(m) = 0. at is
η(m) =
1√
Na − 1
Na∑
i=2
ti(m)ηi (5.8)
where ti(m) is the ith eigenvector of H(m)HH(m) and ηi is a random, complex scalar
with unit magnitude and random phase uniformly distributed; i.e., ηi = ejφi and
φi ∈ [0, 2pi). us the AN covariance matrix is given by
Cη(m) =
1
Na − 1
Na∑
i=2
ti(m)t
H
i(m). (5.9)
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5.3.1 Power allocation
As explained before, and as a result of using OFDM signalling, we address a multi-
carrier masked beamforming system. erefore, it is necessary to devise two power
allocation mechanisms. e rst one will distribute the total available power among
the subcarriers while the second one will allocate the power between information
and AN within each subcarrier.
Let us rst deal with the power allocation between subcarriers. e objec-
tive here is to increment the secrecy capabilities of the system. Based on the fact
that the transmier is not aware of the eavesdropping channel, a valid strategy to
enlarge the secrecy rate of the multi-carrier masked beamforming system given
by (5.6) is by enhancing the capacity of the main-link. is objective can be at-
tained by allocating more power to the best subcarriers in an opportunistic fash-
ion. erefore, following the Proposition 4.1 in [118, §4] the total power P is
distributed among the N subcarriers using the water-lling iterative technique as
follows
ρ(m) = max
(
0,
1
Nˆ
(
Pˆ +
N∑
i=1
1
γ(i)
)
− 1
γ(i)
)
(5.10)
where Pˆ is the available power for information once the power requested for the
transmission of the cyclic prex of length µ has been considered such that
Pˆ =
N∑
m=1
ρ(m) =
PN
N + µ
. (5.11)
In other words, we are eectively distributing the available power aer con-
sidering the power required for transmiing the cyclic prex.
We recall that waterlling is an iterative power allocation mechanism; there-
fore, in (5.10) Nˆ is the total number of subcarriers which have have been initially
allocated power; i.e., ρ(m) 6= 0. is means that Nˆ subcarriers will be considered
for the next round of power allocation. Finally, in (5.10) γ(i) denotes the channel’s
power to noise ratio and it is given by
γ(i) =
||H(i)||2F
NaNbσ2(m)
(5.12)
where σ2(m) is the noise power per subcarrier equivalent to σ2b/N .
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Once that the power per subcarrier (ρ(m)) has been determined, we need to
dene the criterion to distribute it between information and AN. In other words,
we have to calculate the fraction of power allocated to broadcast AN, i.e., (m)ρ(m),
and the one used to transmit the information signal, i.e., (1− (m))ρ(m). To do this,
we consider three dierent approaches as follows.
• e rst allocation criterion is based on the idea introduced in [53] where
a xed QoS performance is enforced at the intended receiver. Here, the pa-
rameter (m) is dened in such way that the minimal power is allocated to
guarantee a target SNR at Bob’s mth subcarrier given by SNR(m). e re-
maining power is devoted for AN generation. e idea is to allocate the
maximum amount of power for AN generation while ensuring a minimum
acceptable performance at Bob. Hence, (m) is obtained as:
(m) = 1−
SNR(m)σ
2
(m)
ρ(m)ν1(m)
(5.13)
where ν1(m) is the largest eigenvalue of H(m)HH(m).
• For the second power allocation method, we distribute the power per sub-
carrier ρ(m) following the ndings in [57]. Here it is shown that equal power
distribution between information and AN is nearly optimal to maximise the
ergodic secrecy rate. erefore, we set (m) = 0.5 for all the subcarriers that
have been allocated power by the waterlling algorithm.
• Finally, and with the aim of understanding the impact of the AN over the
secrecy of the system and then obtaining valuable insight into the multi-
carrier strategy performance, we progressively vary the fraction of power
((m)) commied to AN generation.
We use these dierent power allocation criteria between AN and information
to study the secrecy performance of the modelled MIMO-OFDM system.
5.3.2 Receiver’s combining mechanisms
Now, let us drawn our aention to the combining mechanisms that both receivers
Bob and Eve can use to enhance the received signal by exploiting their receiving
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multiple-antenna capabilities. It is worth recalling that for this analysis we as-
sume that Bob and Eve are also using OFDM signalling, therefore we constrain
our analysis to the performance of the system described in §5.2. erefore, Bob
uses maximal ratio combining (MRC) while Eve combines the received signal by
using receiving beamformers based on minimum mean square error (MMSE) and
a zero-forcing (ZF) strategies. e laer receiving combining method allows the
multiple-antenna eavesdropper, depending on its number of antennas, to cancel
or at least to mitigate the eect of the AN generated by Alice jeopardising the
security of the MIMO-OFDM system.
Receive beamforming by maximal ratio combining
e intended receiver Bob chooses MRC as the multiple-antenna combining tech-
nique in order to maximise its SNR. erefore, we use again the principal eigen-
vector t1(m) corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of H(m)HH(m) to obtain the
receiving beamformer vector wMRCb(m) as
wMRCb(m) = H
H
(m)t1(m). (5.14)
Aer obtaining the scalar signal at the output of Bob’s combiner, the SNR at
the mth subcarrier can be calculated as follows:
SNRMRCb(m) =
(
1− (m)
)
ρ(m)t
H
1(m)H(m)
[
σ2(m)INb
]−1
HH(m)t1(m). (5.15)
Note that selecting the receiving beamformer in (5.14) allows Bob to eectively
cancel the eect of the AN generated by Alice due to the orthogonality condition
between AN and the steering information beamformer vector; i.e., tH1(m)η(m) = 0.
Receive beamforming using the minimummean square error approach
Now, Eve aempts to recover the maximum possible information from the Alice-
to-Bob transmission. So from her point of view, the best multiple-antenna combin-
ing method will be the one that provides the highest SNR. is condition eectively
represents the worst-case for the security of the modelled MIMO-OFDM system.
In this context, and following [53, 63, 72], Eve uses MMSE as an optimal receiver
structure to maximise her SNR.
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In order to calculate Eve’s receiving beamforming vector, we assumed the worst-
case for the security and therefore Eve is somehow aware of the transmission strat-
egy used by Alice and dened by the transmied steering beamforming vector
(t1(m)), the AN covariance matrix (Cη(m)) and the power allocation between infor-
mation and AN ((m)).
Under this worst-case assumption, Eve’s MMSE beamforming vector at themth
subcarrier is given by:
wMMSEe(m) =
(
(m)ρ(m)G
H
(m)Cη(m)G(m) + σ
2
e(m)INe
)−1
GH(m)t1(m). (5.16)
Bearing in mind that Eve’s scalar signal at the output of the beamformer is
given by yMMSEe(m) =
(
wMMSEe(m)
)H
v(m), then Eve’s SNR at the mth subcarrier is given
by:
SNRMMSEe(m) =(
1− (m)
)
ρ(m)t
H
1(m)G(m)
(
(m)ρ(m)G
H
(m)Cη(m)G(m) + σ
2
e(m)INe
)−1
GH(m)t1(m).
(5.17)
Receive beamforming by zero forcing
Here we address the case when Eve, through the knowledge of the transmiing
strategy used by Alice, is able to mitigate the interfering eect of the AN. Under the
same assumptions noted in the above section, i.e., Eve is fully aware of her own
channel G(m) and the steering beamforming vector t1(m), Eve’s ZF beamformer
vector is
wZFe(m) =
(
G†(m)
)H
t1(m) (5.18)
with G†(m) =
(
G(m)G
H
(m)
)−1
G(m) denoting the Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse.
is receiving beamforming formulation vector allows Eve to mitigate the eect
of the AN vector η(m). is can be easily seen by considering the scalar signal at
the output of Eve’s combiner given by
yZFe(m) =
(
wZFe(m)
)H
v(m) (5.19)
which can be explicitly wrien as
yZFe(m) =
√
1− (m)√ρ(m)tH1(m)G†(m)GH(m)t1(m)d(m)
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+
√
(m)
√
ρ(m)t
H
1(m)G
†
(m)G
H
(m)η(m) + t
H
1(m)G
†
(m)ne(m). (5.20)
Here, assuming Ne ≥ Na, it is straightforward to see that the second term
that contains the AN vector η(m) is cancelled owing to G
†
(m)G
H
(m) = INe and
tH1(m)η(m) = 0. erefore, Eve’s SNR at the mth subcarrier now is
SNRZFe(m) =
(
1− (m)
)
ρ(m)
[
σ2e(m)t
H
1(m)G
†
(m)
(
G†(m)
)H
t1(m)
]−1
. (5.21)
In the case thatNe < Na, then the AN nulling operation will not be completely
successful. erefore, Eve’s SNR at the mth subcarrier can be wrien as
SNRZFe(m) = (
1− (m)
)
ρ(m)|tH1(m)G†(m)GH(m)t1(m)|2
tH1(m)G
†
(m)
[
(m)ρ(m)GH(m)Cη(m)G(m) + σ
2
e(m)INe
] (
G†(m)
)H
t1(m)
. (5.22)
Although the ZF combiner in (5.18) mitigates the AN, unlike the receiving
beamforming vector based on MMSE, it does not maximise the SNR due to the
fact that the AWGN component is amplied. On the other hand, the MMSE based
combining approach in (5.16) oers the best performance by striking a balance
between AN cancellation and AWGN mitigation.
5.4 Numerical results
In this section we present simulation results to show the contribution to secrecy
of the frequency selectivity in a MIMO-OFDM system. We also study the perfor-
mance of both ZF and MMSE as Eve’s beamforming receive strategies by analysing
the achieved secrecy probability. For the simulations, frequency selective channels
withL taps are considered, so the length of the cyclic prex in the OFDM signalling
is set to L− 1 samples in order to avoid inter-symbol interference. e simulation
parameters are detailed in Table 5.1
5.4.1 Frequency selectivity contribution to secrecy
In Figure 5.3, we use equal power distribution between the information and the
AN, i.e., (m) = 0.5, to illustrate the eect on secrecy of increasing the number of
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Table 5.1: Parameters for the simulation.
Parameter Value Description
Na 5 Alice’s number of antennas
Nb 5 Bob’s number of antennas
σ2H 1 Bob’s channel elements variance
σ2G 1 Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2b 1 Bob’s AWGN power
σ2e 1 Eve’s AWGN power
L 4 Number of channel taps
OFDM subcarriers. All the nodes have the same number of antennas. Eve considers
both MMSE and ZF as receiving beamforming methods; subsequently, we evalu-
ate SNRMMSEe(m) in (5.17) and SNRZFe(m) in (5.21). Here, when Eve is using MMSE, the
secrecy rate, (i.e., the dierence between the logarithm of Bob’s and Eve’s SNRs),
increases with the number of subcarriers N . In contrast, when Eve uses ZF this
gap remains constant due to Eve’s AN cancellation capabilities. is interesting
behaviour and the reasoning about why ZF outperforms MMSE will be analysed
in detail later in this section. For the moment, we will concentrate on the case
when Eve uses the MMSE approach.
In Figure 5.4, the impact of increasing the number of OFDM subcarriers over
the system’s secrecy is shown. Here, the power is allocated between the informa-
tion and the AN to guarantee a varying target SNR; i.e., (m) is calculated using
(5.13). All the nodes are equipped with the same number of antennas. Eve chooses
MMSE as the receiving beamforming strategy, that is Eve uses the combiner in
(5.16). In this approach, the secrecy improvement resulting from the additional
number of OFDM subcarriers is twofold. First, the gap between Bob’s and Eve’s
SNR increases, and second, the maximum target SNR that Bob can achieve with
the power available is extended. It is worth pointing out that as the target SNR at
Bob increases, the system allocates less power for AN generation and therefore the
gap between Bob’s and Eve’s SNR and subsequently the secrecy rate decreases. In
fact, there is a point where the power available at Alice is exhausted and the sys-
tem cannot provide larger target SNR values at Bob. In this scenario, there is no
power remaining for AN generation; however, there is still a gap between Bob’s
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Figure 5.3: System performance. Average SNR at Bob and Eve vs. number of OFDM subcar-
riers (N ) when Eve uses MMSE and ZF with (m) = 0.5 and Ne = 5.
and Eve’s SNR owing to the gain introduced by steering the information towards
Bob.
We again use the power allocation scheme in (5.13) to target a given perfor-
mance at Bob to analyse the eect of increasing the number of antennas at Eve.
is is depicted in Figure 5.5 where Eve’s SNR improves as the number of antennas
Ne increases. ese results follow intuition; indeed, a large number of antennas
enables Eve to mitigate the eect of the AN due to the extra spatial diversity avail-
able undermining the secrecy of the system. Indeed, there is a point in the plot
where Eve outperforms Bob showing that an eavesdropper equipped with a large
number of antennas is a great threat for the security of the system.
Now, we draw our aention to the probabilistic secrecy performance of the
technique through the methodology introduced in §5.2.1. For ease of analysis, we
consider the average secrecy rate over the subcarriers served by the water-lling
algorithm. e improvement in secrecy due to the increase of the number of OFDM
subcarriers can be clearly seen in the three cases illustrated in the Figure 5.6. Here,
the power allocation mechanism that guarantees the target SNR at Bob in (5.13)
xes the maximum secrecy rate that the system can achieve. It is interesting to
note that when the system becomes more demanding and requires a larger target
SNR at Bob, the probability of achieving a given secrecy rate with few subcarriers
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Figure 5.4: System performance. Average SNR at Bob and Eve vs. target SNR at Bob for
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Figure 5.6: Probabilistic performance. Probability of achieving a secrecy rate greater thanR
for several values of target SNR at Bob (SNR) for N = 8, 32, 64, 128 when Eve uses MMSE
and Ne = 5.
is low. is result shows again the utility of increasing the number of subcarriers
to improve the security of the MIMO-OFDM system by taking advantage of the
opportunistic power allocation between subcarriers.
In Figure 5.7 we investigate the relationship between the number of antennas
at Eve and the probability of secrecy as dened in (5.7). e results suggest again
that an eavesdropper equipped with a large number of antennas poses a major
threat to the secrecy of the system.
5.4.2 Cancellation of the articial noise
Now we turn our aention to the performance and impact over the secrecy of the
multi-carrier MIMO-OFDM system of ZF and MMSE as Eve’s combining schemes.
Indeed, in this section we analyse in detail the secrecy performance of the sys-
tem when Eve is able to mitigate the eect of the AN due to the knowledge that
she has about the transmit strategy used by Bob. is is, Eve knows the steering
beamforming vector, the covariance matrix of the AN and the power distribution
criterion between information and AN. In this context, we compare the perfor-
mance achieved by both receiving beamforming methods MMSE and ZF, respec-
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Figure 5.7: Probabilistic performance. Probability of achieving a secrecy rate greater than
R for dierent number of antennas at Eve Ne = 2, 5, 10, 25, 50 when Eve uses MMSE. e
target SNR at Bob is SNR = 10 and N = 8.
tively given by expressions (5.17) and (5.21), under dierent AN conditions. us,
we progressively vary the value of the fraction of the power allocated to AN ((m))
from zero AN power to the case when almost no power is allocated for the infor-
mation; i.e., (m) ∈ [0, 0.95]. As done before, the SNR is calculated by averaging
over the subcarriers that have been allocated power by the water-lling algorithm.
In Figure 5.8 the receiving beamforming schemes’ performance is compared for
frequency selective channels when all the nodes in the network are equipped with
the same number of antennas. Here ZF achieves a beer performance due to the
eect of the AN cancellation. Indeed, for ZF the gap between Bob’s and Eve’s SNR
remains constant for all the values of (m) due to the eective AN cancellation. In
contrast, for the MMSE combiner the gap depends on the amount of power devoted
to the AN generation.
As previously pointed out in Figure 5.3 and conrmed in Figure 5.8, ZF outper-
forms MMSE even though that MMSE is well-know as the optimal strategy to max-
imise SNR in the presence of non-Gaussian interference [118, §1.4.2], which is the
case for the AN. is performance is based on two observations. Firstly, ZF, as ex-
plained in §5.3.2, can eectively cancel the AN generated by Alice by knowing the
transmission strategy. is can be observed by comparing the equations (5.17) and
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(5.21) where the jamming eect of the AN is cancelled by ZF. Secondly, in (5.21),
we observe that the ZF combiner, although that it cancels the AN, it enhances the
AWGN; however, this AWGN amplication is not large enough to oset the AN
cancellation eect. is behaviour is based on the fact that an OFDM multi-carrier
system preserves the overall performance (given by the average SNR) by eectively
distributing the power of both information and AWGN among the subcarriers [119,
§4]. As a result, the N at fading channels are subject to a lower AWGN in each
subcarrier resulting from the distribution of the time-domain AWGN power across
the frequency domain subcarriers. is eect is opportunistically exploited by the
water-lling based power allocation; therefore, the AWGN enhancement penalty
introduced by ZF is negligible. As a result, the ZF combining scheme enhances the
achieved SNR by mitigating the AN’s jamming eect without any trade-o.
In Figure 5.9 we investigate the link between the number of Eve’s antennas
and her AN cancellation ability. As expected, when the Alice-to-Eve channel cor-
responds to a square or tall matrix, i.e., Ne ≥ Na, Eve can eectively null the AN.
Even though in the case of a fat channel matrix; i.e., Ne < Na, Eve using ZF can
only partially cancel the AN, this performance is still good enough to outperform
its MMSE’s counterpart. is is shown in Figure 5.9. ese results are corrob-
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Figure 5.11: System performance. Average SNR at Bob and Eve vs. fraction of power for
AN generation ((m)) in at fading channels for dierent number of antennas at Eve (Ne =
3, 5, 8) when Eve uses MMSE and ZF.
orated by the achieved probability of secrecy depicted in Figure 5.10 where the
likelihood of achieving a communication with secrecy rate R diminishes for all
the cases when Eve uses ZF as the combining mechanism rather than MMSE.
Finally, in Figure 5.11 we extend this analysis to the at fading channel sce-
nario where we simply examine the performance of one subcarrier. Here the re-
sults show that, as expected, the best technique for receiving beamforming, from
Eve’s point of view and the worst-case for the secrecy, is MMSE rather than ZF. As
explained before, in single-carrier systems the power of information and AWGN
is not distributed among subcarriers and thus the optimal scheme to maximise the
SNR is obtained through MMSE notwithstanding the AN cancelling capabilities of
ZF.
5.5 Discussion and summary
In this section we briey discuss the eavesdropper’s ability and the required con-
ditions to recover the information to cancel the AN broadcast by the transmier in
practical systems and then eectively jeopardise the security of the MIMO-OFDM
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network. Recapitulating §5.3.2, if the eavesdropper uses MMSE as a receive beam-
forming strategy, the worst scenario for the secrecy of the system happens when
Eve is fully aware of the transmission strategy used by Alice. In other words, Eve
somehow has to know the CSI of the main link (H(m)) and therefore she can obtain
the steering beamforming vector t1(m). Also Eve has to know the AN covariance
matrix Cη(m) and the power allocation strategy for the AN in every subcarrier
((m)). On the other hand, ZF only requires that Eve knows her own CSI (G(m))
and the beamformer vector (t1(m)) in order to aempt to null the AN. Considering
that t1(m) is chosen as the principal eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigen-
value of HH(m)H(m), then the security of the studied MIMO-OFDM system relies on
keeping the Alice-to-Bob’s CSI (H(m)) secret from Eve.
In this context, and assuming that Eve is perfectly capable of recovering her
own channel, the main problem from the eavesdropper’s perspective is how to re-
cover the main channel’s time domain signature (H). Let us consider two scenarios
about how Alice acquires H. e rst one assumes a frequency-division duplex-
ing (FDD) system relying on the quantised feedback sent back by Bob to Alice
using the feedback channel. e second scenario exploits channel reciprocity be-
tween uplink and downlink in time-division duplexing (TDD) systems so Alice
and Bob estimate the channel separately. In the rst case, Eve, in order to recover
H, might eavesdrop the non-secure Bob-to-Alice feedback channel to overhear the
CSI when Bob sends it back to Alice. In the second channel reciprocity scenario,
the task is more complicated for Eve and will require extra complexity at her side
to incorporate blind channel estimation techniques. is approach will not lead
to a completely accurate CSI and so the security of the system oered by the AN
generation will be still partially preserved.
It is worth remarking that in this chapter we have considered that all the par-
ties use OFDM signalling, including the eavesdropper. A potential threat for the
security arises when the eavesdroppers is not constrained to use OFDM and it can
exploit all the received frame to threaten the security. Indeed, as pointed out in
[114, 120], an eavesdropper equipped with a more complex receiver architecture
can take advantage of the redundant information included in the cyclic prex to
undermine the secrecy of the system. is case is out of the scope of the analysis
presented in this chapter where we have assumed that the eavesdropper is a node
of the network and therefore uses an OFDM.
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In conclusion, in this work we have studied a suboptimal secure transmission
scheme based on masked beamforming over frequency selective MIMO channels.
is mechanism does not exploit the full spatial diversity that the MIMO channel
oers and steers the information over the principal eigenvector of the main link
between transmier and receiver. e AN has been generated orthogonally to the
steering beamformer signature; therefore, the legitimate receiver can null its eect
by using an appropriate receiving combiner based on MRC. At the eavesdropper
side, we have studied the secrecy performance obtained by two receiving combin-
ing mechanisms, MMSE and ZF. Note that ZF is based in an ‘intelligent’ design
that allows the aacker to mitigate and even cancel the jamming eect of the AN.
Finally we have assumed that all the transmission parties use OFDM signalling as
an eective way to cope with the frequency selective channel.
e simulation of the MIMO-OFDM system has allowed us to investigate the
contribution of frequency selectivity to the secrecy of the communication. e
observed results suggest that frequency selectivity can contribute positively to the
secrecy of the system allowing an opportunistic power distribution among the best
OFDM subcarriers to enhance the achievable secrecy rate. However, an eavesdrop-
per equipped with a large number of antennas that is fully aware of the main link’s
CSI can mitigate the interference introduced by the AN by choosing an appropriate
multiple-antenna combining methodology. ese scenarios eectively highlight a
major weaknesses to the secrecy of the MIMO-OFDM system when using masked
bemforming as a secure transmission strategy.

Chapter6
Joint AN generation for physical layer
security in MIMO systems
‘Because speaking about you is to
exile myself into the landscapes
that I remember, like trying to nd
the key of your voice within the
dominions of a secret.’
Manuel Garcı´a
This chapter introduces a novel transmission scheme where both trans-mier and receiver, each equipped with multiple-antennas, contributeto the secrecy by jointly generating articial noise (AN). In contrast to
the traditional masked transmission mechanism where only the multiple-antenna
transmier generates a jamming signal, here we investigated if a multiple-antenna
receiver can also actively enhance the secrecy rate of the multiple-antenna wiretap
channel by broadcasting AN. In order to do this, the receiver has to devote part of
its receiving resources to jam the eavesdroppers. is fact introduces an interest-
ing trade-o in terms of what is the best approach for secrecy: i) to use the full
receiving capabilities by employing all the antennas to receive the information or
ii) to devote some of the receiver resources, in the form of antennas and power, to
jam possible eavesdroppers.
In this context, we consider a joint AN generation optimisation problem that
will allow us to investigate the aforementioned trade-o and study under what
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conditions it is useful to transmit AN and from which source(s). We study the joint
AN generation problem from two perspectives. e rst one considers the non-
practical case where the perfect channel state information (CSI) of all the nodes
is available. is scheme will allow us to understand the potential contribution of
the joint AN generation technique. e second case considers the most practical
scenario where the CSI is subject to errors due to the imperfect channel estima-
tion/feedback process. Here we also consider passive eavesdroppers that remain
hidden on the network. Both cases will shed light into whether it is useful to
allocate resources of the multiple-antenna receiver for jamming eavesdroppers.
Moreover, these cases will allow us to understand the criteria to choose the AN
generation source and under what conditions this strategy can make a positive
contribution to the secrecy of the multiple-antenna system compared to the tradi-
tional masked transmission scheme.
is chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 presents a review of the rele-
vant literature in the context of the secrecy of the multiple-antenna wiretap chan-
nel and highlights the novel contribution of this chapter. Section 6.2 models the
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel in the presence of multiple-
antenna eavesdroppers to be used to formulate the joint AN transmission optimi-
sation problem. In section 6.3 we study the secrecy performance of the joint AN
generation technique subject to perfect CSI knowledge. Here we introduce two
strategies to opportunistically select the receiver antenna conguration that of-
fers the best secrecy performance. Subsequently, section 6.4 addresses the practi-
cal case where all the CSI between all the links are subject to errors introducing a
robust worst-case secrecy rate maximisation and a power consumption minimisa-
tion strategies. Finally, section 6.5 concludes this chapter.
6.1 Joint transmitter/receiver AN generation
During recent years, the capabilities of the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wireless channel have received remarkable aention as a way to secure wireless
communications at the physical layer. e rst works in this eld exploited the
degree of freedom that the MIMO wiretap channel introduces to secure the com-
munication by enhancing the transmission over the main link and, at the same
time, impairing multi-antenna eavesdroppers reception [34, 35, 48, 109]. ese
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works have shown that the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel secrecy capacity is
given by
CS = max
Cw0,Tr(Cw)≤P
log2 det
[
I + HHCwH
]− log2 det [I + GHCwG] (6.1)
where P is the total power budget, Cw is the covariance matrix of the transmit
signal, H and G represent the MIMO main and eavesdropping channels respec-
tively and the power of the AWGN is one; i,e., σ2 = 1. Unfortunately, the afore-
mentioned contributions do not determine the transmission scheme, given by the
transmission covariance matrix Cw, that can aain the secrecy capacity of the
MIMO wiretap channel; i.e., the maximal transmission rate at which the informa-
tion can be reliably decoded at the receiver while ensuring that the error rate at
the eavesdropper cannot allow it to recover the message.
Determining the transmit covariance solution Cw for aaining the secrecy ca-
pacity of the MIMO wiretap channel is a challenging problem due to the nonconvex
nature of maximising the expression in (6.1). In this context, many suboptimal at-
tempts have been carried out to nd the transmission scheme to enhance achiev-
able MIMO wiretap secrecy rates [121, 122, 123, 124]. In contrast, Bustin et al.
introduce in [110] a closed-form expression for determining Cw and the secrecy
capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under an input covariance con-
straint. In other words, this work provided a valid expression for the secrecy ca-
pacity for any SNR but it is not applicable under an average total power constraint.
is contribution oers an optimal transmit scheme by relaxing the average power
constraint in (6.1) and seing a specic input covariance structure. Unfortunately,
this scheme introduces non-desirable limits on the per-antenna power and trans-
mit correlation structure in the resulting transmission strategy.
In order to nd the secrecy capacity (CS) subject to a total average power con-
straint, in [125] Fakoorian et al. study the rank properties of the optimal input
covariance matrix Cw that achieves the secrecy capacity. ese properties are
derived from the channel matrices of the main and eavesdropping links and it is
concluded that if HHH  GGH then the secrecy capacity is zero. In other words,
if the wiretap channel is more capable than the main one, it is not possible to at-
tain a positive secrecy capacity. Moreover, it is also shown that if HHH  GGH ,
then the optimal transmit covariance matrix Cw is full-rank; otherwise, it will be
rank-decient. ese interesting insights about the relationship between the main
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and eavesdropping channel lead to the introduction in [126] of the solution for the
MIMO Gausssian Wiretap channel under an average power constraint when the
input transmit covariance matrix is full-rank; i.e, when the channel’s condition
HHH  GGH holds.
Subsequently, in [127, 128] the authors introduce the transmit covariance so-
lution Cw required to aain the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel under a sum power constraint. In this remarkable contribution, Li et al.
use an alternating optimisation approach that consists in an iterative process sim-
ilar to water-lling to nd the optimal Cw that delivers the CS in (6.1). Here, the
authors also study the AN aided scheme; i.e., a masked precoding transmission. In-
terestingly, it is shown that incorporating AN into the transmission does not oer
any advantage in terms of a gain in secrecy rate for the case of one multi-antenna
active eavesdropper; however, it turns out to be a very useful strategy to enhance
the secrecy rate in the presence of multiple active eavesdroppers. Indeed, [128]
proves that no-AN transmission is the secrecy capacity optimal achieving scheme
for a single multiple-antenna fully determined (in terms of CSI) active eavesdrop-
per.
It is worth pointing out that [128] has considered only the transmier as a pos-
sible source of AN generation. erefore, it is not know if an AN source dierent
from the transmier might enhance the secrecy rate of the multiple-antenna sys-
tem. is AN source, external from the wiretap channel model, can be obtained
from cooperative relays operating as jammers.
6.1.1 Cooperative jamming
An alternative way to achieve spatial degrees of freedom is to use cooperative
techniques. Indeed, cooperative relaying techniques such as Decode and Forward
(DF) and Amplify and Forward (AF) have been proposed in [98, 99, 129, 130, 131]
either to secure single-antenna wireless communications at the physical layer or
to enhance the security of multiple-antenna networks. Here the idea is to rely on
cooperative nodes to emulate the eect of a multiple-antenna array to beamform
the condential information towards the intended receiver. In this context, Yang
et al. propose in [132] a secure beamforming scheme by using AF relay networks
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers to maximise the secrecy rate while com-
pletely eliminating the information leakage to all eavesdroppers. By contrast, in
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[99, 100, 101, 133, 134, 135] Cooperative Jamming (CJ) is used to enhance the se-
crecy rate by generating a jamming signal to confuse eavesdroppers from third-
party sources (named cooperative jammers). is idea was originally proposed
by Goel and Negi in [37] as an alternative to generate AN in single-antenna net-
works and so mask a condential message. An application of these cooperative
techniques is presented in [136] where the authors propose a joint cooperative
beamforming and jamming scheme to enforce security in a cooperative network
by using some nodes to beamform the information towards the intended receiver
while other nodes jam the unknown eavesdroppers by CJ.
Cooperation for security has received signicant interest from the research
community as an interesting alternative to secure communications at the physical
layer [97]. However, in contrast to multiple-antenna counterparts, they introduce
important security issues arising from relying the security of the system on third-
party cooperative nodes that might behave maliciously [137]. In this context the
concepts of untrusted and friendly relays have been introduced to dene the dif-
ferent degrees of trust within cooperative relays and therefore devise appropriate
transmission strategies [138, 139].
Secure cooperation sums up another technical challenge to the system. Coop-
erative protocols require both synchronisation between the transmission/relaying
parties and the availability of the global CSI at all the cooperative entities. is re-
quirement represents an additional level of complexity compared to multi-antenna
systems. is diculty of realising secure cooperative networks has commonly
been neglected in the literature and has not received much aention so far. Addi-
tionally, it is important to consider the willingness of the cooperative nodes to take
part in securing a third party transmission. In other words, the relays might lack
interest to compromise their resources by forwarding information and generating
AN without receiving any benet in return. erefore, it is likely that cooperative
relays are not interested in collaborating unless they receive some incentive for
their cooperation. is fact again poses a threat for the security of the system. All
these issues raise questions about the practicality of using cooperative techniques
to secure wireless networks.
134 6. Joint AN generation for physical layer security in MIMO systems
6.1.2 An articial noise generating receiver
As described in the previous section, cooperative networks, and particularly co-
operative jammers can contribute positively to the security of a network. Indeed,
an AN interference generated from a physically dierent location than the trans-
mier’s generates an additional diculty for the eavesdropper to cancel or mit-
igate the AN. In this context, an alternative mechanism to exploit the potential
security contribution of a third-party jamming node is highly desired, but with-
out increasing the network complexity and not jeopardising the overall security
of the transmission. is objective can be aained by considering a receiver that
actively participates in the secure transmission strategy by generating AN. It is
worth pointing out that the intended receiver is, alongside the transmier, the
main node interesting in preserving the condentiality of the information; there-
fore, its contribution to guaranteeing the condentiality of the transmission (in
terms of commiing resources) is very important.
e idea of a receiver generating AN to confuse eavesdroppers is very new. Li
et al. introduce in [140] a scheme where a two-antenna legitimate receiver simulta-
neously transmits AN from one antenna and receives the condential signal using
the other one. Here, the receiver eectively masks the information conveyed by a
single-antenna transmier to prevent single-antenna eavesdropping aacks. Re-
markably, this method is particularly useful when the receiver has more resources
available that the transmier and the eavesdropper is close to the receiver.
Even though the authors of [140] have shown the benets of generating AN
from the receiver in single-antenna networks, the most general case of a receiver
generating AN in a multiple-antenna system has not been studied and remains as
an open issue. Moreover, it is not known how does this technique compares to the
optimal transmission scheme that aains secrecy capacity in the MIMO wiretap
channel presented in [128].
6.1.3 Contribution of this chapter
is chapter’s novel contribution is twofold. First, we study if the transmission
of AN from the receiver can enhance security in multiple-antenna systems by
proposing that both the transmier and the receiver can jointly generate AN to
confuse a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. e objective is to understand if, and
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under what conditions, joint AN generation can enhance the MIMO wiretap chan-
nel’s CS . With this objective we formulate an optimisation problem that seeks
to derive the transmission covariance matrices that maximise the secrecy rate in
a globally power constrained system. e results suggest that a remarkable im-
provement in the secrecy rate can be achieved by generating AN solely from the
receiver. is strategy becomes particularly useful when the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel is beer than the main link’s counterpart. is scenario can occur when the
eavesdropper is equipped with a large number of antennas and experiences beer
channel fading conditions than the legitimate channel, or when it is located close
to the transmier.
e second contribution of this chapter is to introduce a robust joint trans-
mier/receiver AN generation transmission strategy under uncertainty in all the
transmission parties CSI links. erefore, we seek the optimal transmission co-
variance matrices for the following two scenarios:
• to maximise the worst-case secrecy rate in global and individually power
constrained systems for both active eavesdropping (subject to errors in the
CSI eavesdropping link) and passive eavesdropping, and
• to minimise the use of the transmission power subject to ensuring a target
worst-case secrecy rate.
We consider a mismatch in all the communication channels in order to formu-
late conservative or worst-case nonconvex optimisation problems which we ap-
proximate to tractable convex semidenite programs (SDP). We study the trade-
o between assigning the receiver’s antennas to generate AN or to receive the
information under multiple scenarios. e results suggest that that introducing
exibility in choosing the AN source improves the secrecy rate; indeed, broadcast-
ing AN is particularly useful when the instantaneous eavesdropping link CSI is not
available. e AN source depends upon the particular transmission conditions.
6.2 System model
In this section we model a MIMO system in the presence of a multiple-antenna
eaveadropper. Following the standard wireless secrecy model, we name the trans-
mier, the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper as ‘Alice’, ‘Bob’ and ‘Eve’. ey
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Figure 6.1: Systemmodel of aMIMO systemwhere AN is jointly generated by transmier and
receiver. e receiver Bob allocatesNr antennas for information reception andNn = Nb−Nr
antennas for AN generation.
are respectively equipped with Na ≥ 2, Nb ≥ 2 and Ne ≥ 1 antennas. e
MIMO Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve channels are denoted by H ∈ CNa×Nb and
Ga ∈ CNa×Ne . We consider the path-loss eect in the channel modelling by seing
H = r
−α
2
ab H˜ and Ga = r
−α
2
ae G˜a where rab and rae respectively denote the Alice-
to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve distances, with α ≥ 2 being the path loss exponent, and
H˜ ∼ CN(0,σ2
H˜
I) and G˜a ∼ CN(0,σ2G˜aI) represents the independent small-scale
fading of the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve channels.
So, Bob receives the signal transmied by Alice and, at the same time, transmits
AN. erefore, he allocatesNr ≥ 1 antenna(s) for receiving information andNn =
Nb −Nr antennas for AN generation. We denote the actual Alice-to-Bob channel
by Ha ∈ CNa×Nr , which is a subset of the full channel H consisting of only the
Nr channel vectors associated with the information-receiving antennas. Similarly,
we denote the Bob-to-Eve channel by Gb ∈ CNn×Ne which also considers the
path-loss eect due to the Bob-to-Eve distance rbe; that is Gb = r
−α
2
be G˜b where
G˜b ∼ CN(0,σ2G˜bI). We depict this system in Figure 6.1.
Alice transmits a signal vector s ∈ CNa given by s = w + ηa where w is
the information steering vector using an idealised Gaussian codebook with co-
variance matrix Cw = E{wwH}. On the other hand, ηa is Alice’s AN vector
with covariance matrix Cηa = E{ηaηHa }. Likewise, Bob’s AN vector is ηb ∈ CNn
with Cηb = E{ηbηHb }. As in [140], we assume that the AN transmied by Bob
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is cancelled at his receiving antennas by using self-interference full duplex tech-
niques [141]. It is worth pointing out that we assume that both legitimate trans-
mission parties are aware of each other’s transmission strategy; therefore, we let
P =Tr{Cw}+Tr{Cηa}+Tr{Cηb} denote the global transmit power of the system.
We study the possible secrecy enhancements of jointly generating AN from
‘both’ or ‘either’ the transmier and receiver compared to the classic MIMO wire-
tap channel secrecy capacity CS in (6.1) where Bob acts as a passive receiver. ere-
fore, we assume that all the transmission parties’ CSI and locations are known;
therefore, the secrecy rate (in bps/Hz) of our system depicted in Figure 6.1 is
RS =
[
log2 det
(
INr + W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− log2 det
(
INe + W2G˜
H
a CwG˜a
)]+
(6.2)
where we dene
W1 =
[
H˜Ha CηaH˜a + r
α
abσ
2
b INr
]−1
(6.3)
W2 =
[
G˜Ha CηaG˜a + ρ
αG˜Hb CηbG˜b + r
α
aeσ
2
eINe
]−1
(6.4)
with ρ = rae
rbe
and σ2b and σ2e (respectively) the AWGN variances at the receiving
antennas of both Bob and Eve.
6.3 Joint transmitter/receiver AN generation with
perfect CSI
Our objective is to determine the transmission strategy that maximises the secrecy
rate of the system by generating AN simultaneously from Alice and Bob in order to
confuse a multiple-antenna Eve. In other words, we seek the information and AN
transmission covariance matrices (from Bob and Alice) to maximise the secrecy
rate. For the sake of fairness we consider the optimisation problem subject to a
global power constraint Pmax. is problem can be wrien as follow
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
RS (6.5a)
s.t. P ≤ Pmax (6.5b)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0. (6.5c)
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e problem (6.5) is hard to solve due to the non-convex nature of the objec-
tive function in (6.2). erefore, in the next section we introduce a sub-optimal
approach based on MMSE to approximate (6.5) to an ecient solvable program
that will shed light about the performance of the joint AN generation technique.
6.3.1 A QoS-MMSE approach to maximise the secrecy rate
As described in the previous chapter 5, published in [142, 143] and in [62, 63, 72,
95, 110, 111], we consider an MMSE approach only for Eve as a tractable pathway
to study Eve’s performance. is approach is potentially suboptimal by enforcing
an MMSE combining receiver at Eve; however, this formulation will allow us to
analyse the possible enhancements in secrecy from a joint AN strategy. In this con-
text, we introduce the following metric R¯S , as a suboptimal but tractable version
of (6.2), as follows:
R¯S =
[
log2 det
(
INr + W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− log2 (1 + SNRe)
]+
(6.6)
where
SNRe = Tr
{
G˜aW2G˜
H
a Cw
}
(6.7)
is the signal-to-noise ratio at Eve (SNRe) aer considering a MMSE combiner; i.e.,
Eve recovers the signal by using a MMSE receiver beamforming vector to maximise
her SNR. As in[63, 72, 142], we consider the worst-case for security which assumes
that Eve is perfectly aware of the transmission strategy given by Cw,Cηa ,Cηb .
We now maximise R¯S , and so we rewrite the problem in (6.5) for the secrecy
metric R¯S by introducing the slack variable β as follows
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
,β
log2 det
(
INr + W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− log2(β) (6.8a)
s.t. log2(β) ≥ log2 (1 + SNRe) (6.8b)
P ≤ Pmax (6.8c)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0, β > 1. (6.8d)
e problem above is still nonconvex due to the objective function in (6.8a);
therefore, β > 1 is xed to a given value, which is equivalent to introducing a
ality of Service (QoS) constraint to set the maximum admissible SNRe at Eve.
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is implies that the later problem has to be solved iteratively to nd the QoS
constraint β that delivers the largest R¯S . Subsequently, we use the inequality
det (I + Σ) =
r∏
i=1
(1 + λi) ≥ 1 + Tr(Σ) (6.9)
where Σ  0, r = rank(Σ) and λi denotes the ith positive eigenvalue of Σ. e
equality in (6.9) holds i r = 1. Finally, we obtain the problem
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
1
β
(
1 + Tr
{
W1H˜
H
a CwH˜a
})
(6.10a)
s.t. Tr
{
G˜aW2G˜
H
a Cw
}
≤ β − 1 (6.10b)
P ≤ Pmax (6.10c)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0. (6.10d)
for a xed value of β.
We now recast the problem in (6.10) as a SDP by using the Charness-Cooper
transformation [104]. erefore, we introduce the slack variable ξ > 0 and dene
Cw =
C˜w
ξ
, Cηa =
C˜ηa
ξ
and Cηb =
C˜ηb
ξ
to then set
H˜Ha C˜ηaH˜a + ξr
α
abσ
2
b INr = INr . (6.11)
us, we obtain the SDP
max
C˜w,C˜ηa ,
C˜ηb
,ξ
1
β
Tr
{
H˜Ha C˜wH˜a
}
(6.12a)
s.t. H˜Ha C˜ηaH˜a +
(
ξrαabσ
2
b − 1
)
INr  0 (6.12b)
G˜Ha
[(
β − 1
Ne
)
C˜ηa − C˜w
]
G˜a+(
β − 1
Ne
)
ξrαaeσ
2
eINe +
(
β − 1
Ne
)
ραkG˜
H
b C˜ηbG˜b  0 (6.12c)
Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηa
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηb
}
≤ ξPmax (6.12d)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0, ξ ≥ 0 (6.12e)
where the linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) in (6.12b) and (6.12c) result from relax-
ing the equality in (6.11) and from replacing the denition of W2 from (6.4) into
(6.12c). Finally, ξ > 0 is relaxed to ξ ≥ 0 without any consequence since ξ = 0 is
not feasible for (6.12d).
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Table 6.1: Bob’s antenna congurations for Nb = 3. RX stands for a ‘reception antenna’
while AN represents ‘AN generation’.
Conf. Antenna 1 Antenna 2 Antenna 3
1 RX AN AN
2 AN RX AN
3 AN AN RX
4 AN RX RX
5 RX AN RX
6 RX RX AN
7 RX RX RX
e SDP in (6.12) can be conveniently solved by using solvers based on interior-
point algorithms such as SeDuMi [105] assisted by the parser toolboxes Yalmip
[106] and CVX [107].
It is worth pointing out that the SDP (6.12) is solved for a xed value of β.
erefore, an iterative exhaustive linear search algorithm, as used in chapter 4
§4.3.3 and in [143, 144], can also be used to nd the value for β that delivers the
largest R¯S .
6.3.2 Numerical results
To illustrate the performance of the joint transmier/receiver AN generation tech-
nique we consider a numerical example in which we set Na = Nb = Ne = 3. As
a result, there are 2Nb − 1 = 7 possible antenna congurations for Bob that are
illustrated in the Table 6.1. is implies that, as explained in the system model in
§6.2, in order to determine what is the Bob’s best antenna conguration that deliv-
ers the largest R¯S , we need to solve the SDP (6.12) for each one of the 2Nb − 1 = 7
possible channel congurations and then select the best conguration.
is is eectively done in the top plot of Figure 6.2 which depicts the maximum
achieved R¯S of sixteen random channel realisations and the antenna conguration
number (from Table 6.1) that aains it. is gure shows that joint AN generation
can enhance the security of the system compared to the MIMO secrecy capacity
CS in [128] that uses all of Bob’s antennas for reception; i.e., conguration 7 in
Table 6.1. Also, we can see that the best antenna conguration for Bob changes
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Figure 6.2: Upper plot: secrecy analysis for 16 random channel realisations and Bob’s best
antenna conguration for rab = rae = rbe = 1 and Na = Nb = Ne = 3. Lower plot: power
allocation for a global power constraint Pmax = 5 normalised relative to AWGN. e black
numbered dots in the upper plot represent the best antenna conguration given in Table 6.1
for each channel realisation.
across channel realisations. Remarkably, the power allocation (normalised relative
to the AWGN power) depicted in the lower plot of Figure 6.2 suggests that trans-
miing AN from Alice is not necessary while broadcasting AN from Bob is useful
to enhance R¯S .
ese remarkable results give rise to two main questions: i) under what cir-
cumstances is it convenient to transmit AN from Bob? ii) what is the antenna
conguration that Bob should use to achieve the best security performance? We
address these two questions in the following section by introducing two antenna
conguration selection criteria that will not only oer answers to these two ques-
tions but also reduce substantially the complexity of the transmission technique.
6.3.3 Receiver’s antenna conguration criteria
Although the potential benets of Bob transmiing AN are now clear, analysing
all the possible 2Nb − 1 antenna congurations at the receiver to maximise R¯S is
a cumbersome task. Indeed for each antenna conguration, the problem in (6.12)
needs to be solved. erefore, it is desirable, in order to reduce the problem com-
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plexity, to have a criterion to systematically choose the best conguration and
solve the corresponding SDP in (6.12). is is not a trivial task, due to the existing
trade-o between using all Bob’s antennas for reception (to enhance the transmis-
sion rate in the main link) and increasing the number of Bob’s antennas devoted
for broadcasting a more directive AN to further jam Eve.
In this context, we now introduce two channel conguration mechanisms that
will reduce the complexity of nding the best antenna conguration and also pro-
vide a useful insight into the problem nature. e objective here is to use alterna-
tive, low-complexity means to estimate in advance what would be the best antenna
conguration. Once that this conguration has been determined, we will use it to
solve the SDP in (6.12) and then opportunistically deliver the largest secrecy rate
(R¯S) that the instantaneous channel realisation might oer.
Degrees of freedom analysis
is criterion chooses the antenna conguration based on the analysis of the de-
grees of freedom (DoF) of the three wireless channels between Alice, Bob and Eve
involved at the transmission. As pointed out in [125, 126, 128], the secrecy capa-
bility of the wiretap channel depends upon exploiting the DoF of HHH −GaGHa ;
indeed, the rank of the transmission covariance matrix corresponds to the number
of positive eigenvalues of HHH − GaGHa . is implies that if HHH  GaGHa
then achieving secrecy is not possible because the eavesdropping MIMO channel
is more capable that the main one [125]. In this scenario, transmiing AN from
Bob can be particularly useful in order to deteriorate Eve’s signal quality thus al-
lowing a positive R¯S . As we consider AN generation from Bob, we carry out a
similar analysis and then we take into account the DoF of GbHGb −GaHGa that
gives the dierence between the channels that Eve sees for receiving the AN from
Bob and the information from Alice.
We analyse all the possible (2Nb − 1) antenna congurations (dening the kth
conguration as k ∈ [1, 2Nb − 1]) at Bob and consider the channels Hka ∈ CNa×Nkr
and Gkb ∈ CNkn×Ne between Alice-and-Bob and Bob-and-Eve where Nkr and Nkn
are respectively the number of Bob’s antennas for information reception and the
number for AN generation in the kth antenna conguration. Denote λki as the ith
positive eigenvalue of HkaHka
H −GaGHa and let µkj be the jth positive eigenvalue
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of Gkb
H
Gkb −GaHGa. en we form two column vectors:
δka =
[
λk1 · · ·λki , 0, · · · , 0
]T ∈ RNt (6.13)
δkb =
[
µk1 · · ·µkj , 0, · · · , 0
]T ∈ RNe (6.14)
that we stack together (where α < 1 is a weight for the vector δkb ). In other words,
we form the matrix ∆ ∈ RNt+Ne×2Nb−1 as follows:
∆ =
[
δ1a δ
2
a · · · δka · · · δ2
Nb−1
a
αδ1b αδ
2
b · · · αδkb · · · αδ2
Nb−1
b
]
. (6.15)
Parameter α allows us to weight the contribution of the eigenvalues corre-
sponding to the dierence between AN and information received by Eve (δkb ) com-
pared to those of the wiretap channel (δka). Subsequently, we perform the sum of
the column vectors of the matrix ∆. e result of the sum is stored in a row vector
δ¯1 where all its elements have been normalised by the maximum component of δ¯1
and sorted in descending order. Vector δ¯1 eectively represents the sorted channel
congurations where the rst element corresponds to the antenna conguration
that delivers the best performance considering the DoF analysis presented here.
Eigen-transmission analysis
e second conguration selection criterion is based on the analysis of a subopti-
mal, but simple, eigen-transmission strategy for solving the problem (6.5). Again,
we analyse all the possible k ∈ [1, 2Nb − 1] antenna congurations at Bob; that is,
considering the k channels Hka and Gkb . Now, similar to the optimal MISO secrecy
solution [46], we transmit using the beamforming vector tk ∈ CNa that corre-
sponds to the principal eigenvector of the pencil
(
INa + H
k
aH
k
a
H
, INa + GaGa
H
)
.
erefore, we eectively simplify the problem by enforcing a suboptimal rank-one
transmission scheme to evaluate the k dierent channel congurations to then se-
lect the best one and solve the SDP (6.12). Based on the results in §6.3.1, we do
not consider AN generation from Alice; this strategy is consistent with the results
reported in [46, 48, 109, 126, 128]. On the other hand, Bob steers the AN towards
Eve by also beamforming the jamming signal over the direction of the principal
eigenvector ηk ∈ CNkn associated to the largest eigenvalue of GkbGkbH . Hence, we
consider again a potentially suboptimal rank-one transmission covariance matrix
for Bob’s AN. is strategy yields the following secrecy rate
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R˜kS = log2
(
1 +
ξPmaxr
−α
ab t
kHH˜kaH˜
kH
a t
k
σ2b
)
−
log2
(
1 +
ξPmaxr
−α
ae t
kHG˜aG˜
H
a t
k
(1− ξ)Pmaxr−αbe ηkHG˜kbG˜kHb ηk + σ2e
)
(6.16)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] denes the global power distribution between Alice’s transmied
information and Bob’s AN. Subsequently, we maximise R˜S over ξ. We write this
problem as
max
0<ξ≤1
(
σ2b + ξPmaxa
k
) (
Pmax(1− ξ)ck + σ2e
)
σ2b [(Pmax(1− ξ)ck + 1) + ξPmaxbk]
(6.17)
where we dene
ak = r−αab t
kHH˜kaH˜
kH
a t
k (6.18)
bk = r−αae t
kHG˜aG˜
H
a t
k (6.19)
ck = r−αbe η
kHG˜kbG˜
kH
b η
k. (6.20)
e power allocation problem in (6.17) can be eciently solved by linear search
algorithms, as has been done in §3.4.2 of chapter 3 in this thesis and also in [102].
Finally, for each kth conguration we store the maximum value of R˜kS in a nor-
malised decreasing-order vector δ¯2, similarly to what we have done for the nor-
malised δ¯1. e rst-element of the vector δ¯2 eectively corresponds to the an-
tenna conguration that delivers the best performance using the eigen-transmission
strategy.
Remark 6 In the case where the selected antenna conguration for either method is
to use all of Bob’s antennas for reception (Nr = Nb), then the alternating optimisation
strategy introduced in [128] oers the best performance due to the sub-optimality of
our technique in §6.3.1.
Remark 7 When HHH − GaGHa  0, i.e., all the eigenvalues are positive and
non-zero, then broadcasting AN from Bob is not necessary as it cannot outperform
the MIMO secrecy capacity CS .
In general, when the rank of the main channel is larger than the rank of the
eavesdropping channel (Na > Ne), there exists an eective null-space, and so the
best conguration is to use the full degrees of freedom of the MIMO channel where
all Bob’s antennas are allocated for reception.
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Remark 8 It is advisable to set a threshold τ ∈ [0, 1] to dene the channel congu-
rations achieving a selection criterion performance larger than τ to be considered in
the analysis.
e two introduced selection strategies are based on approximation mecha-
nisms and therefore they are not totally accurate, in particular, when the perfor-
mance obtained from dierent antenna congurations is similar. In this scenario
the dierences between the elements within either of the vectors δ¯1 and δ¯2 cor-
responding to these congurations are small and could lead to not choosing the
antenna conguration that delivers the largest secrecy rate. As a countermeasure,
it is advisable (but optional) to set a threshold (τ ∈ [0, 1]) to introduce into the
analysis the channel congurations achieving a selection criterion performance
larger than τ . We recall that the elements of δ¯1 and δ¯2 are ordered in descend-
ing magnitude starting from 1; therefore we will consider the elements larger or
equal to τ that correspond to the selected antenna congurations. For example, we
could analyse the secrecy performance oered by all the antenna congurations
aaining a performance larger than than τ = 0.9. is procedure improves the
accuracy in selecting the best antenna conguration that will be used to solve the
SDP (6.12) but increases the complexity of the strategy.
6.3.4 Numerical Results
Our analysis of the joint transmier/receiver AN generation technique perfor-
mance is based on both the average secrecy rate achieved (R¯S) and the probability
of achieving a joint AN generation’s secrecy rate (R¯S) larger than the MIMO wire-
tap channel secrecy capacity CS . We also compare the performance delivered by
the channel conguration selection strategies by looking at the level of accuracy
in choosing the best channel conguration and the level of complexity associated
with solving this the problem. We consider Monte Carlo simulations with setup
values given in the Table 6.2.
First, we pay aention to the joint AN technique performance when the num-
ber of antennas at Eve increases. In Figure 6.3 we see that broadcasting AN from
Bob is particularly useful when the eavesdropping channel’s DoF increases. In-
deed when Ne < Nb our strategy is largely outperformed by the MIMO wiretap
CS in [128], therefore allocating Bob’s resources for AN generation is useless. In
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Table 6.2: Simulation parameters setup.
Parameter Value Description
Na 3 Alice’s number of antennas
Nb 3 Bob’s number of antennas
σ2
H˜a
1 Alice-to-Bob’s channel elements variance
σ2
G˜a
1 Alice-to-Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2
G˜b
1 Bob-to-Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2b 1 Bob’s AWGN power
σ2e 1 Eve’s AWGN power
Pmax 5 Maximal power for constrained systems
normalised relative to the noise power
α 2 Path loss exponent
rab 1 Alice-to-Bob normalised distance
contrast, when Ne ≥ Nb, broadcasting AN from Bob is useful. Interestingly, joint
AN generation yields the best performance at Ne = 4 because an eavesdropper
equipped with a larger number of antennas can mitigate the eect of the AN thus
reducing the eectiveness of an external interference.
We now turn our aention to the performance of the conguration selection
strategies and their savings in complexity. As explained in remark 8, in order to
increase the successful channel conguration selection rate (SCCSR) we consider
a threshold τ to analyse the congurations that potentially might deliver a larger
R¯S . We study how τ aects the secrecy performance, the SCCSR and the associated
complexity cost. Figure 6.4 shows that the eigen-transmission method is beer
than the DoF analysis across all the values considered for τ in terms of choos-
ing the best channel conguration (SCCSR); however, the complexity associated is
considerably higher. It is worth pointing out that we measure the complexity by
calculating the ratio between the number of channel congurations chosen by the
channel selection strategy above τ to the total number of possible channel congu-
rations; i.e., 2Nb−1. Interestingly, the eigen-transmission method outperforms CS
even when choosing τ ≥ 0.9. is behaviour is not found with the DoF analysis.
To analyse the eect of the location of the aacker on the security we con-
sider a travelling eavesdropper moving in straight line from Alice towards Bob
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Figure 6.3: System performance. Eect of the number of eavesdropper’s antennas (Ne) on
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Figure 6.5: A travelling Eve moving over a straight path from Alice towards Bob and beyond,
when rab = 1.
and beyond. is is depicted in Figure 6.5 where, based on a normalised Alice-
to-Bob distance rab = 1, the Bob-to-Eve distance (rbe) can be easily inferred from
the Alice-to-Eve distance (rae). For example, when Eve is moving from Alice to-
wards Bob; i.e., rae = d1 < rab; then rbe = 1 − d1 (P1 in Figure 6.5). When
Eve is travelling beyond Bob then rae = d2 > rab and rbe = d2 − 1 (P2 in Fig-
ure 6.5). For the sake of clarity, in Figure 6.6 we only consider in the x-axes the
Alice-to-Eve distance, so Bob-to-Eve’s distance can be obtained as explained; e.g.,
rae = 0.25⇒ rbe = 0.75; rae = 1⇒ rbe → 0; rae = 1.25⇒ rbe = 0.25. It is worth
pointing out that the distances between nodes are relative to rab.
Figure 6.6 shows the possible improvements in terms of achievable secrecy rate
by broadcasting AN from Bob when Eve is moving as described above. e gap
between the maximal achievable R¯S and the MIMO wiretap channel CS is larger
when the aacker is closer to Alice due to the positive eect of jointly broadcast-
ing AN that counters the smaller path losses that the eavesdropping link suers
under this condition. is gap decreases for rae > rab meaning that it is not so
useful generating AN from Bob under this scenario because the eavesdropping
channel is already poor due to large path loses owing to Eve’s large distance from
Alice. is behaviour is conrmed in the lower plot in Figure 6.6 where the prob-
ability that the R¯S achieved by the joint AN strategy outperforms CS is almost
one when Eve is close to Alice. is proves that the generation of AN from Bob
is particularly useful when Eve is under favourable channel conditions compared
to the main link. Figure 6.6 also illustrates the good performance of the DoF and
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eigen-transmission strategies to select Bob’s channel conguration. Here, again
the eigen-transmission approach is the one that delivers the best performance.
In summary, in this section we have shown that the receiver can enhance the
secrecy of the multiple antenna wiretap channel by transmiing AN from some
of its antennas. Our study has proved that a judicious selection of the receiver’s
antennas to broadcast AN can provide a larger secrecy rate compared to the se-
crecy capacity CS obtained when the receiver purely receives the information. In
the next section, we study the performance of the joint transmier/receiver AN
generation technique under the realistic scenario where the CSI available at the
nodes is either subject to errors or is not available.
6.4 Robust joint transmitter/receiver AN genera-
tion
In this section we consider a MIMO system where both Alice and Bob have avail-
able a mismatched version of all the transmission parties’ CSI. We also draw aen-
tion to the practical case when the legitimate transmission parties are not aware
of the presence of silent eavesdroppers hidden in the network. We refer to the
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former scenario as active eavesdropping with partial information regarding the
eavesdropping channel and the laer case as passive eavesdropping. In addition,
we now consider that the transmission is overheard by K multiple non-colluding
single-antenna eavesdroppers; therefore, here we do not enforce an MMSE ap-
proach as in §6.3.1. In order to concentrate our analysis in the performance of the
joint AN generation technique, we study the average performance of many chan-
nel realisations instead of taking advantage of the particular channel conditions.
In other words, in this section we do not consider a dierent antenna receiving
conguration at Bob for each channel realisation as was done in §6.3.3. In con-
trast, here we study the average performance over many realisations that the joint
AN generation technique oers for dierent antenna congurations.
In this context, we consider that Alice and Bob are equipped with Na ≥ 2
and Nb ≥ 2 antennas while the kth Eve is a single-antenna node. We take into
account the same consideration regarding Bob’s full-duplex capabilities; therefore,
he uses Nr ≥ 1 antennas to receive information and Nn = Nb − Nr antennas to
broadcast AN. As in §6.2, the eective MIMO Alice-to-Bob channel is a subset
of the full channel H and it is denoted by Ha ∈ CNa×Nr . Now, we denote the
mutually independent Alice-to-the kth Eve and Bob-to-the kth Eve vector channels
as gak ∈ CNa and gbk ∈ CNn . Here, we again consider separately the small-scale
fading channels, g˜ak ∼ CN(0, σ2g˜aI) and g˜bk ∼ CN(0, σ2g˜bI), and the path-loss
eect due to the free-space propagation over the distances from Alice and Bob to
the kth Eve given respectively by raek and rbek with k = 1, · · · , K . e system is
depicted in Figure 6.7.
We follow the transmission scheme detailed in §6.2; therefore, Alice transmits
a signal vector s = w + ηa formed by the steering information and the AN com-
ponents. e transmission vector covariance matrix is Cw while Alice’s AN co-
variance matrix is Cηa . Bob’s AN vector is ηb with covariance matrix Cηb . Let
P =Tr{Cw}+Tr{Cηa}+Tr{Cηb} denote the total transmit power of the system.
e received signals at Bob and the kth Eve are respectively
yb =r
−α
2
ab H˜
H
a w + r
−α
2
ab H˜
H
a ηa + nb (6.21)
yek =r
−α
2
aek g˜
H
ak
w + r
−α
2
aek g˜
H
ak
ηa + r
−α
2
bek
g˜Hbkηb + nek (6.22)
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where nb ∈ CNr and nek ∈ C are independent AWGN such that nb ∼ CN(0, σ2b I)
and nek ∼ CN(0, σ2e). For this system, the secrecy rate (in bps/Hz) is
RS =
[
log2 det
(
INr + WH˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− max
k=1,··· ,K
log2 (1 + ωk)
]+
(6.23)
where we dene
W =
[
H˜Ha CηaH˜a + r
α
abσ
2
b INr
]−1
(6.24)
ωk =
g˜HakCwg˜ak
g˜HakCηag˜ak + ρ
α
k g˜
H
bk
Cηbg˜bk + r
α
aek
σ2e
(6.25)
and ρk =
raek
rbek
is the ratio between the Alice-to-the kth Eve and Bob-to-the kth Eve
distances.
6.4.1 Robust transmission strategy
Our transmission model considers the practical assumption that Alice and Bob
only have available a mismatched version of all the transmission parties’ CSI.
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erefore, and similarly as in §4.2.1 of chapter 4, we use a deterministic robust
model to consider the worst-case for the security. erefore, the actual instanta-
neous channel lies within a known set of uncertainty values whose range repre-
sents the amount of uncertainty about the channel. is robust design leads to
worst-case formulations that achieve a given performance for any channel reali-
sation within the dened set [84]. e channel errors are dened as
∆ = H˜a − Hˆa, s.t. ∆ ∈ ξab = {∆ : ||∆||F ≤ ab}
δak = g˜ak − gˆak , s.t. δak ∈ ξae = {δak : ||δak || ≤ ae}
δbk = g˜bk − gˆbk , s.t. δbk ∈ ξbe = {δbk : ||δbk || ≤ be} (6.26)
where Hˆa, gˆak and gˆbk are the observed mismatched versions of the small-scale
fading Alice-to-Bob, Alice-to-the kth Eve and Bob-to-the kth Eve channels. e
errors ∆, δak and δbk are unknown to Alice and Bob but lie within the deterministic
sets ξab, ξae and ξbe dened by the known values ab, ae and be.
Once we have considered the above robust formulation, we dene the worst-
case secrecy rate (RwcS ) as the lower-bound secrecy rate that our strategy can deliver
for any channel uncertainty within the dened deterministic sets. is security
metric is given by
RwcS =
min
∆∈ξab
log2 det
(
INr + WH˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− max
k=1,··· ,K
max
δak
∈ξae,
δbk
∈ξbe
log2 (1 + ωk)
+
(6.27)
where W and ωk are dened in (6.24) and (6.25).
6.4.2 Robust worst-case secrecy rate maximisation
In this section we maximise the worst-case secrecy rate RwcS subject to determin-
istic errors in all the transmission channel signatures when both multiple antenna
nodes, transmier and receiver, can generate AN. is scenario can be seen as an
active eavesdropping case where the legitimate communication parties have avail-
able partial knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ CSI. In addition, we also consider the
pure passive eavesdropping case where the transmier and receiver use statistics
regarding the eavesdropping channels. It is important to note that our model also
assumes errors on the main channel that can be due to errors in the feedback pro-
cess.
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Regarding the power availability, two dierent network setups are studied. e
rst one considers that the network is globally power constrained while the second
case is focused on the most practical scenario where transmier and receiver have
individual power budgets. e rst setup represents the most challenging problem
from the optimisation point of view owing to the fact that a joint optimisation
process has to be carried out on both nodes, requiring a smart distribution of the
total available power. Despite the complexity, as stated in §6.3, this case allows
us to present a fair performance benchmarking against techniques generating AN
solely from Alice. On the other hand, the individually constrained network reects
a practical situation in which each node has a given amount of power available and
therefore a joint optimisation in terms of power distribution is not required. In the
following, we study in detail both scenarios.
Globally constrained network
We aim to nd the transmission covariance matrices Cw,Cηa , and Cηb to maximise
RwcS in (6.27) in a globally power constrained system. erefore, we write this
problem as
max
Cw,Cηa ,Cηb
RwcS (6.28a)
s.t. Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0 (6.28b)
P ≤ Pmax (6.28c)
where Pmax is the total global available power.
Optimising the above problem is challenging due to the nonconvex nature of
the objective function (6.28a). erefore, as a rst step to recast this problem into a
tractable expression, we introduce the slack variable β, that, by the epigraph form
[87, §4.1.3], allows us to split RwcS in (6.27) into two terms. us, (6.28) becomes
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
,β
min
∆∈ξab
log2 det
(
INr + WH˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− log2 β (6.29a)
s.t. max
δak
∈ξae,
δbk
∈ξbe
(1 + ωk) ≤ β, ∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.29b)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0 (6.29c)
P ≤ Pmax, β > 1. (6.29d)
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Problem (6.29) is still nonconvex and so we need rst to nd an approxima-
tion for the objective function (6.29a) to later approximate it as a convex function.
erefore, we use the inequality in (6.9) to relax (6.29a) and set a mathematical
tractable lower-bound for our security performance metric in (6.27). is relax-
ation potentially might lead to a suboptimal solution but it allows us to deal with
the problem in an ecient and tractable fashion. e problem becomes
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
,β
min
∆∈ξab
1
β
(
1 + Tr
{
WH˜Ha CwH˜a
})
(6.30a)
s.t. max
δa∈ξae,
δb∈ξbe
ωk ≤ β − 1, ∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.30b)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0 (6.30c)
P ≤ Pmax, β > 1. (6.30d)
e relaxed problem (6.30) is still nonconvex and so we x the slack variable
β to an arbitrary value. By doing this, (6.30b) eectively sets the maximum al-
lowed signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the Eves; therefore, we implicitly optimise
the problem for a ality-of-Service (QoS) level such as in §3.3 of chapter 3 and in
[53, 59, 72, 103]. By contrast, here we are interested in maximising the secrecy rate
irrespective of Eves’ QoS; therefore, we look for the optimum β? that delivers the
largest RwcS . Although the QoS problem can be solved straightforwardly, it xes the
system performance to a QoS metric thus limiting the security performance of the
technique. On the other hand, our endeavour oers the best security performance
at the cost of introducing an extra level of complexity.
Now, we turn our aention to transforming the above nonconvex problem into
an SDP. First, we use the Charnes-Cooper transformation [104] to deal with the
term within the trace operator in (6.30a), and so we introduce the slack variable
ξ > 0 to dene Cw = C˜wξ , Cηa =
C˜ηa
ξ
and Cηb =
C˜ηb
ξ
. We obtain the following
problem
max
C˜w,C˜ηa ,
C˜ηb
,ξ
min
∆∈ξab
Tr
{
W˜H˜Ha
C˜w
β
H˜a
}
(6.31a)
s.t. max
δak
∈ξae,
δbk
∈ξbe
g˜HakC˜wg˜ak
g˜HakC˜ηag˜ak + ρ
α
k g˜
H
bk
C˜ηbg˜bk + ξr
α
bek
σ2e
≤ β − 1, ∀k = 1, · · · , K
(6.31b)
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Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηa
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηb
}
≤ ξPmax (6.31c)
C˜w  0, C˜ηa  0, C˜ηb  0, ξ > 0 (6.31d)
where, as in (6.24), we dene W˜ =
[
H˜Ha C˜ηaH˜a + ξr
α
abσ
2
b INr
]−1
.
We relax the above maximin problem by introducing into the problem the in-
equality
H˜Ha C˜ηaH˜a + ξr
α
abσ
2
b INr  INr (6.32)
that allows us to eectively split the objective function in (6.31a) leading to a new
constraint resulting from the Charnes-Cooper transformation. We point out that
when Σ  Φ then it holds that Tr {Σ} ≤ Tr {Φ}, and so the problem can be
wrien as
max
C˜w,C˜ηa ,
C˜ηb
,ξ
min
∆∈ξab
Tr
{
H˜Ha
C˜w
β
H˜a
}
(6.33a)
s.t. max
∆∈ξab
Tr
{
H˜Ha C˜ηaH˜a + ξr
α
abσ
2
b INr
}
≤ Tr {INr} (6.33b)
where the constraints (6.31b), (6.31c), and (6.31d) still hold.
It is easy to see that the relaxation introduced in the previous step is tight when
the equality in (6.33b) holds. Now, we use the denition of the Frobenius norm to
rewrite the deterministic uncertainty set denition as follows
∆ ∈ ξab = {∆ : ||∆||F ≤ ab} =
{
∆ : Tr
{
∆H∆
} ≤ 2ab} . (6.34)
Now, we use the well-known vectorisation property Tr
{
∆H∆
}
= δHδ, where
δ = vec {∆} is the vectorised version of the error matrix channel. We recall from
(6.26) that the actual channel is given by H˜a = Hˆa + ∆. erefore, we consider
the vectorised version of the actual channel h˜a = hˆa + δ, where h˜a = vec
{
H˜a
}
.
Now, we can write (6.33a) as
max
C˜w,C˜ηa ,
C˜ηb
,ξ
min
∆∈ξab
[
hˆa + δ
]H (
INr ⊗
C˜w
β
)[
hˆa + δ
]
. (6.35)
Subsequently, we lower-bound the minimum value for the inner minimisation
in (6.35) by the slack variable u ≥ 0, and then we expand the objective function to
yield
max
C˜w,C˜ηa ,
C˜ηb
,ξ,u
u (6.36a)
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s.t. − δHAδ − 2Re
{
hˆHa Aδ
}
− hˆHa Ahˆa + u ≤ 0 (6.36b)
δHδ − 2ab ≤ 0 (6.36c)
where A = INr ⊗ C˜wβ .
e above worst-case conditions in (6.36b) and (6.36c) are quadratic and convex
in δ for a xed C˜w. Moreover, the channel error vector δ is dened over the non-
empty convex set ξab. us, according to the S-procedure [87, §B.2], these two
quadratic inequalities hold i there exists µ1 ≥ 0 such that[
µ1INt + A Ahˆa
hˆHa A −µ12ab + hˆHa Ahˆa − u
]
 0. (6.37)
e objective function (6.33a) now is given by
min
C˜w,C˜ηa ,
C˜ηb
,ξ,u
− u (6.38a)
s.t.
[
µ1INt + A Ahˆa
hˆHa A −µ12ab + hˆHa Ahˆa − u
]
 0 (6.38b)
Now we turn our aention to the inequality (6.33b) introduced by the Charnes-
Cooper transformation. As was done before, aer vectorising the channel matrices
and considering the error denition in (6.34), we expand this constraint as(
hˆa + δ
)H
B
(
hˆa + δ
)
− (Nr)
(
1− ξrαabσ2b
) ≤ 0 (6.39a)
∀δHδ − 2ab ≤ 0 (6.39b)
where B = INr ⊗ C˜ηa .
According the S-procedure, the two quadratic inequalities in (6.39) hold i there
exists µ2 ≥ 0 such that[
µ2INaNr −B −Bhˆa
−hˆHa B −µ22ab − hˆHa Bhˆa + (Nr) (1− ξrαabσ2b )
]
 0. (6.40)
Finally, we have to reformulate the eavesdropping constraint in (6.31b). us,
we expand the former constraint as follows
max
δak∈ξae
g˜Hak
(
C˜w − (β − 1)C˜ηa
)
g˜ak − min
δbk∈ξbe
ραk (β − 1)g˜HbkC˜ηbg˜bk
− (β − 1)ξrαbekσ2e ≤ 0,∀k = 1, · · · , K. (6.41)
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To reformulate the above constraint, we introduce for each kth Eve the upper
and lower-bounds to the maximisation and minimisation operations in 6.41. ese
are respectively given by the slack variables vk ≥ 0 and tk ≥ 0. Recalling the
deterministic robust denition in (6.26) we obtain
vk − tk − (β − 1)ξrαbekσ2e ≤ 0 (6.42a)
s.t. (gˆak + δak)
H C (gˆak + δak)− vk ≤ 0 (6.42b)
δHakδak − 2ae ≤ 0 (6.42c)
− (gˆbk + δbk)H (β − 1)ραk C˜ηb (gˆbk + δbk) + tk ≤ 0 (6.42d)
δHbkδbk − 2be ≤ 0 (6.42e)
∀k = 1, · · · , K
where he have dened the auxiliary variable C = C˜w − (β − 1)C˜ηa .
We use again the S-procedure, to express the two sets of two quadratic inequal-
ities in (6.42b), (6.42c) and in (6.42d), (6.42e) for each kth Eve. us, both sets hold
i for each kth Eve there exists µ3k ≥ 0 and µ4k ≥ 0 such that[
µ3kINa −C −Cgˆak
−gˆHakC −µ3k2ae − gˆHakCgˆak + vk
]
 0 (6.43)
and [
µ4kINn + (β − 1)ραk C˜ηb (β − 1)ραk C˜ηbgˆbk
(β − 1)ραk gˆHbkC˜ηb ϑ2k
]
 0 (6.44)
where whe dene the auxiliary variable
ϑ2k = −µ4k2be + (β − 1)ραk gˆHbkC˜ηbgˆbk − tk. (6.45)
Once we have reformulated the objective function and the eavesdropping con-
straint of the former problem in (6.31), we obtain an equivalent tractable SDP. We
consider the reformulation of the objective function in (6.38), the LMI for the new
Charnes-Cooper inequality in (6.40), the inequality (6.42a) and the LMIs in (6.43)
and (6.44). We also keep the former constraints (6.31c) and (6.31d) to yield
min
C˜w,C˜ηa ,C˜ηb
,ξ,u,
vk,tk,µ1,µ2,µ3k
,µ4k
− u (6.46a)
s.t.
[
µ1INaNr + A Ahˆa
hˆHa A −µ12ab + hˆHa Ahˆa − u
]
 0 (6.46b)
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[
µ2INaNr −B −Bhˆa
−hˆHa B ϑ1
]
 0 (6.46c)
vk − tk − (β − 1)ξrαbekσ2e ≤ 0 (6.46d)[
µ3kINa −C −Cgˆak
−gˆHakC −µ3k2ae − gˆHakCgˆak + vk
]
 0 (6.46e)[
µ4kINn + (β − 1)ραk C˜ηb (β − 1)ραk C˜ηbgˆbk
(β − 1)ραk gˆHbkC˜ηb ϑ2k
]
 0 (6.46f)
Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηa
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηb
}
≤ ξPmax (6.46g)
C˜w  0, C˜ηa  0, C˜ηb  0, ξ ≥ 0, u ≥ 0, vk ≥ 0, tk ≥ 0, (6.46h)
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3k ≥ 0, µ4k ≥ 0,∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.46i)
where we use the slack variables u, vk, tk, ξ, µ1, µ2, µ3k , µ4k and we relax ξ > 0 to
ξ ≥ 0 without consequence since ξ = 0 is not feasible for (6.31c).
It is worth pointing out that the objective covariance matrices are given by
Cw =
C˜w
ξ
, Cηa =
C˜ηa
ξ
and Cηb =
C˜ηb
ξ
, and that we have dened
A = INr ⊗
C˜w
β
,B = INr ⊗ C˜ηa ,C = C˜w − (β − 1)C˜ηa
ϑ1 = −µ22ab − hˆHa Bhˆa + (Nr)
(
1− ξrαabσ2b
)
ϑ2k = −µ4k2be + (β − 1)ραk gˆHbkC˜ηbgˆbk − tk. (6.47)
e above SDP is eciently solved by interior-point algorithms implemented
by on-the-shelf tools [105] assisted by the parser tools such as Yalmip [106] and
CVX [107].
Remark 9 e solution of the SDP (6.46) satises rank (C˜w) ≤ rank
(
HˆHˆH
)
. In
other words, our strategy might exploit the full degree of freedom of the Alice-to-Bob
MIMO channel to convey information rather than using a transmission strategy using
a rank-one covariance matrix, which is the case of beamforming.
is implication has a further impact regarding the optimality of the regarding
solution proposed in this section. Indeed, from (6.9), the relaxation in (6.30) is tight
i rank (C˜w) = rank
(
HˆHˆH
)
= 1. For uncorrelated channels, this condition
is only satised in the case of MISO systems. erefore, the solution oered by
our technique is a suboptimal approximation to the maximal worst-case secrecy
rate unless Bob uses one reception antenna and devotes Nb − 1 antennas to AN
generation.
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Secrecy rate lower bound
To evaluate the worst-case secrecy rate RwcS it is necessary to determine the matrix
error channel ∆? ∈ ξab that delivers the worst security performance that denes
the secrecy rate lower bound. To achieve this objective we formulate an optimi-
sation problem by considering the transmission covariance matrices C?w and C?ηa
obtained from solving (6.46). is problems is as follows
min
∆∈ξab
Tr
{
Z
(
Hˆa + ∆
)H
C?w
(
Hˆa + ∆
)}
(6.48a)
s.t. Tr
{
∆∆H
} ≤ 2ab (6.48b)
where we dene the auxiliary matrix variable
Z =
[(
Hˆa + ∆
)H
C?ηa
(
Hˆa + ∆
)
+ rαabσ
2
b INr
]−1
. (6.49)
Problem (6.48) is not convex, and so we need to recast it into a tractable way.
To do so, we use the Charnes-Cooper transformation in (6.31) to rewrite it as
min
∆∈ξab
Tr
{
Z˜
(
Hˆa + ∆
)H
C˜?w
(
Hˆa + ∆
)}
s.t. Tr
{
∆∆H
} ≤ 2ab
where C˜?w = ξ?C?w, C˜?ηa = ξ
?C?ηa are the solutions to SDP (6.46) and
Z˜ =
[(
Hˆa + ∆
)H
C˜?ηa
(
Hˆa + ∆
)
+ ξ?rαabσ
2
b INr
]−1
. (6.51)
Using the inequality Z˜  INr resulting from the Charnes-Cooper transforma-
tion we can write
min
∆∈ξab
Tr
{(
Hˆa + ∆
)H
C˜?w
(
Hˆa + ∆
)}
(6.52a)
s.t. Tr
{(
Hˆa + ∆
)H
C˜?ηa
(
Hˆa + ∆
)
+ ξ?rαabσ
2
b INr
}
≤ Tr {INr} (6.52b)
Tr
{
∆∆H
} ≤ 2ab. (6.52c)
Now, we use the vectorised version δ of the error channel matrix ∆ and the
channel uncertainty deterministic denition in (6.34) to introduce the slack vari-
able Λ = δδH . is variable is subsequently relaxed to Λ  δδH and, by using
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the Schur complement [87, §A.5.5], it is expressed as an LMI. Finally, we use the
vectorised versions of the channel matrix Hˆa given by hˆa to obtain the following
SDP
min
δ,Λ
Tr
{(
INr ⊗ C˜?w
)
hˆahˆ
H
a
}
+ 2Re
{
hˆHa
(
INr ⊗ C˜?w
)
δ
}
+ Tr
{(
INr ⊗ C˜?w
)
Λ
}
(6.53a)
s.t. Tr
{(
INr ⊗ C˜?ηa
)
hˆahˆ
H
a
}
+ 2Re
{
hˆHa
(
INr ⊗ C˜?ηa
)
δ
}
+ Tr
{(
INr ⊗ C˜?ηa
)
Λ
}
+Nr
(
ξ?rαabσ
2
b − 1
) ≤ 0 (6.53b)[
Λ δ
δH 1
]
 0,Tr {Λ} ≤ 2ab. (6.53c)
Aer solving this SDP by using interior-point based algorithms [105], we are
ready to calculate RwcS for the xed value of β. Hence
RwcS (β) =
[
log2 det
(
INr + Z
?
(
Hˆa + ∆
?
)H
C?w
(
Hˆa + ∆
?
))
− log2 (β)
]+
(6.54)
where we emphasise that C?w and C?ηa are obtained by solving (6.46) and ∆
? is
obtained by the SDP (6.53). We dene
Z? =
[(
Hˆ + ∆?
)H
C?ηa
(
Hˆ + ∆?
)
+ rαabσ
2
b INr
]−1
. (6.55)
It is worth remarking that we have determined the worst-case secrecy rate RwcS
for the xed value of β. As we are interested in nding the largest RwcS irrespective
of β, then we have to look for the optimal value β? that maximises RwcS . is can be
found by one-dimensional exhaustive searching algorithms as in §4.3.3 of chapter
4 and also in [144]. It is important to note that due to specic problem conditions
such as the instantaneous CSI, distance between nodes, power available, etc., the
results from the SDP in (6.46) might not return a positive RwcS for all the dened
range of β. In this case, there is not a feasible solution, so the system is considered
in outage and transmission does not take place.
Individually constrained networks
In this section we study a robust security approach towards CSI uncertainties in a
network subject to individual power constraints. In other words, we maximise the
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worst-case secrecy rate looking at the practical case when both the transmiing
and receiving parties each have a limited amount of available power. is problem
is wrien as follows
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
RwcS (6.56a)
s.t. Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0 (6.56b)
Tr {Cw}+ Tr {Cηa} ≤ Pa (6.56c)
Tr {Cηb} ≤ Pb (6.56d)
where Pa and Pb are the available transmit power at Alice and Bob.
Aer analysing the structure of RwcS in (6.27) and owing to the separate indi-
vidual power constraints, problem (6.56) can be split into two problems. First, we
look for Bob’s AN covariance matrix (Cηb) under a power constraint given by Pb,
and then we design Alice’s transmission covariance matrices Cw and Cηa under
Alice’s power constraint Pa.
In this context, the objective of the rst problem is to design an AN signal
from Bob given its covariance matrix Cηb that maximises the confusing eect at
the eavesdroppers. is worst-case problem is formulated as
max
Cηb
min
k=1,··· ,K
min
δbk∈ξbe
g˜HbkCηbg˜bk (6.57a)
s.t. Cηb  0 (6.57b)
Tr {Cηb} ≤ Pb. (6.57c)
As an eective way to deal with the above maximin optimisation problem, we
introduce the slack variable u ≥ 0 that eectively sets a lower-bound for the inner
minimisations in (6.57a). us, the problem above becomes
max
Cηb ,u
u (6.58a)
s.t. (gˆbk + δbk)
H Cηb (gˆbk + δbk) ≥ u, (6.58b)
∀δHbkδbk ≤ 2be,∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.58c)
Cηb  0,Tr {Cηb} ≤ Pb, u ≥ 0. (6.58d)
As in the previous section, the K sets of quadratic constraints in (6.58c) can be
expressed by using the S-procedure [87, §B.2] to obtain the following SDP
min
Cηb ,u,µk
− u (6.59a)
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s.t.
[
µkINn + Cηb Cηbgˆbk
gˆHbkCηb −µ2be + gˆHbkCηbgˆbk − u
]
 0, ∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.59b)
Cηb  0,Tr {Cηb} ≤ Pb, u ≥ 0, µk ≥ 0. (6.59c)
Bob’s AN covariance matrix C?ηb is obtained by solving (6.59) using interior-
point algorithms [105]. Subsequently, we have to evaluate the eect of Bob’s AN
at the eavesdroppers. us, we have to determine the worst-case channel error
δ?bk that delivers the worst performance for our strategy; i.e., the δbk within the
deterministic set that minimises the eect of Bob’s AN at the kth Eve. is is found
by solving the following problem for each kth Eve
min
δbk ,Λbk
Tr
{
C?ηbΛbk
}
+ 2Re
{
gˆHbkC
?
ηb
δbk
}
+ Tr
{
C?ηbgˆbk gˆ
H
bk
}
(6.60a)
s.t.
[
Λbk δbk
δHbk 1
]
 0,Tr {Λbk} ≤ 2be. (6.60b)
In (6.60), the objective function (6.60a) results from expanding g˜HbkC
?
ηb
g˜bk , con-
sidering that g˜bk = gˆbk +δbk and introducing the slack variable Λbk = δbkδ
H
bk
. is
variable is relaxed to Λbk  δbkδHbk and expressed by the Schur complement [87,
§A.5.5] in the LMI in (6.60b). Finally, the eect of the AN broadcast by Bob into
the kth Eve is evaluated as
ANbk =
(
gˆbk + δ
?
bk
)H
C?ηb
(
gˆbk + δ
?
bk
)
. (6.61)
Once we have determined the eect of the AN broadcast by Bob into the K
eavesdroppers, we now have to solve the second problem that seeks to determine
Alice’s transmission covariance matrices Cw and Cηa to maximise the worst-case
secrecy rate in (6.27). erefore, we formulate the second problem as
max
Cw,Cηa ,β
min
∆∈ξab
log2 det
(
INr + WH˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− log2 β (6.62a)
s.t. max
δak
∈ξae,
δbk
∈ξbe
(
1 +
g˜HakCwg˜ak
g˜HakCηag˜ak + ρ
α
kANbk + r
α
bek
σ2e
)
≤ β, ∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.62b)
Cw  0,Cηa  0, P ≤ Pa, β > 0. (6.62c)
where W is dened in (6.24). In (6.62) we have again split the problem by intro-
ducing a slack variable β as a way to recast it into a SDP.
We notice that the objective function (6.62a) is similar to the one in (6.29);
moreover, the constraint in (6.62b) only diers from (6.29b) in the term regarding
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Bob’s AN; i.e.,ANnk . erefore, aer considering a xed β, we can follow the same
methodology used in the previous section to reformulate (6.29) and recast (6.62)
into the following SDP
min
C˜w,C˜ηa ,ξ,u,
µ1,µ2,µ3k
− u (6.63a)
s.t.
[
µ1INaNr + A Ahˆa
hˆHa A −µ12ab + hˆHa Ahˆa − u
]
 0 (6.63b)[
µ2INaNr −B −Bhˆa
−hˆHa B ϑ1
]
 0 (6.63c)[
µ3kINa −C −Cgˆak
−gˆHakC ϑ3k
]
 0 (6.63d)
Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηa
}
≤ ξPa (6.63e)
C˜w  0, C˜ηa  0, C˜ηb  0, ξ ≥ 0 (6.63f)
u ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3k ≥ 0,∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.63g)
where we include the slack variables u, ξ, µ1, µ2 and µ3k . In the reformulation
process we again used the Charnes-Cooper transformation [104]; therefore, the
former optimising variables are given by Cw = C˜wξ and Cηa =
C˜ηa
ξ
. We again let
hˆa = vec
(
Hˆa
)
and the auxiliary variables A, B, C and ϑ1 are dened in (6.47).
Finally, in (6.63) we dene
ϑ3k = −µ3k2ae − gˆHakCgˆak + (β − 1)ξ
(
ραkANbk + r
α
bek
σ2e
)
. (6.64)
e solution of the above SDP can be eciently obtained by interior-point
algorithm based tools [105]. It is worth pointing out that the SDP in (6.63) considers
a xed value of β; therefore, we have to nd the β? that maximises RwcS . is can be
done using linear searching algorithms like the one introduced in §4.3.3 of chapter
4 and also in [144]. If a positive worst-case secrecy rate RwcS cannot be achieved
for any of the admissible values for β, then the system is considered in outage and
transmission does not take place.
Passive eavesdropping
In this section we now consider the practical case when Alice and Bob are not
aware of the presence of passive eavesdroppers; therefore, they do not know the
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instantaneous mismatched CSI of the eavesdropping links. As an alternative to
model this challenging problem, the legitimate transmission parties can assume
the second-order statistics of the eavesdropping channels.
In this scenario, as in §4.2.2 of chapter 4, we dene a new secrecy metric given
by the average worst-case secrecy rate (R¯wcS ). is metric is based on the ergodic
secrecy rate which considers that the intended transmission parties have avail-
able the main link’s CSI but only statistical information about the eavesdropper’s
channel [46, 54]. In our problem, we transmit jointly AN from the receiver and
transmier; therefore, we consider that both, Alice and Bob assume statistics re-
garding the small-fading eavesdropping channel’s elements. ese are given by
the covariance matrices Rg˜a = E{g˜ak g˜Hak} = σ2g˜aINt and Rg˜b = E{g˜bk g˜Hbk} =
σ2g˜bINn ,∀k = 1, · · · , K .
Subsequently, we use again the concavity property of the logarithm function
and Jensen’s inequality [87, §3.1.8] to approximate the ergodic secrecy rate to a
tractable metric named average worst-case secrecy rate R¯wcS that is given by
R¯wcS =
[
min
∆∈ξab
log2 det
(
INr + WH˜
H
a CwH˜a
)
− max
k=1,··· ,K
log2 (1 + θk)
]+
(6.65)
where W is dened in (6.24) and
θk =
Tr {CwRg˜a}
Tr {CηaRg˜a}+ ραkTr {CηbRg˜b}+ rαaekσ2e
(6.66)
is eectively the mean SNR at the kth Eve aer using the assumed second-order
statistics about the random eavesdropping channels.
We are aware that by this approximation our strategy might lead to a sub-
optimal solution for the passive eavesdropping problem. However, the problem
formulation is simplied, and by noting that, in (6.65), we consider the worst-case
performance, the metric R¯wcS eectively introduces a lower-bound on the actual
ergodic secrecy rate to our current problem.
Now, we write the average worst-case secrecy rate maximisation problem sub-
ject to a global power constraint as
max
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
R¯wcS (6.67a)
s.t. Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0 (6.67b)
P ≤ Pmax (6.67c)
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where the global available power in the network is dened by Pmax.
is problem is nonconvex owing to the nature of the metric R¯wcS in (6.65).
However, we can follow the same procedure used in the previous section of this
chapter to address the nonconvex problem (6.28). As a result we obtain a problem
similar to (6.30) but replacing the eavesdropping constraint in (6.30b) by
Tr {CwRg˜a}
Tr {CηaRg˜a}+ ραkTr {CηbRg˜b}+ rαaekσ2e
≤ β − 1,∀k = 1, · · · , K. (6.68)
Aer using again the Charnes-Cooper transformation, we let Cw = C˜wξ , Cηa =
C˜ηa
ξ
and Cηb =
C˜ηb
ξ
. Subsequently, the inequality (6.68) can be expressed as
Tr {CRg˜a}−(β−1)ραkTr
{
C˜ηbRg˜b
}
−rαaekσ2e(β−1)ξ ≤ 0,∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.69)
where C is dened in (6.47).
By noting the connection between the problems (6.67) and (6.30) we can solve
the passive eavesdropping average worst-case secrecy rate problem under a global
power constraint by using the SDP (6.46) but considering the constraint (6.69) in-
stead of the inequality (6.46d) and the LMIs (6.46e) and (6.46f). e resulting SDP
is
min
C˜w,C˜ηa ,C˜ηb
ξ,u,µ1,µ2
− u (6.70a)
s.t.
[
µ1INaNr + A Ahˆa
hˆHa A −µ12ab + hˆHa Ahˆa − u
]
 0 (6.70b)[
µ2INaNr −B −Bhˆa
−hˆHa B ϑ1
]
 0 (6.70c)
Tr {CRg˜a} − (β − 1)ραkTr
{
C˜ηbRg˜b
}
− rαaekσ2e(β − 1)ξ ≤ 0, ∀k = 1, · · · , K
(6.70d)
Tr
{
C˜w
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηa
}
+ Tr
{
C˜ηb
}
≤ ξPmax (6.70e)
C˜w  0, C˜ηa  0, C˜ηb  0, ξ ≥ 0, u ≥ 0, vk ≥ 0, tk ≥ 0, (6.70f)
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3k ≥ 0, µ4k ≥ 0,∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.70g)
where u, ξ, µ1, µ2 are slack variables and A, B and ϑ1 are dened in (6.47).
As the SDP (6.70) considers a xed β, we have to nd the optimal β? that max-
imises R¯wcS . is value can be obtained by linear searching algorithms as the one
in §4.3.3 of chapter 4 or in [144].
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Remark 10 From the simulation results it turns out that Alice’s AN is isotropically
broadcast over the Na − r dimensional space orthogonal to the r-dimensional space
spanned by HaHHa , where r = rank
(
HaH
H
a
)
. In other words, C?ηa hasNa− r equal
non-zero eigenvalues. A special case arises when Na ≤ Nr. In this case, and as we
assume independent distributed uncorrelated channels, r = Na, and so C?ηa is either
zero-power or rank(C?ηa) ≥ 1. is special situation means that Alice leaks AN to the
receiver. As regards Bob, he distributes the power isotropically among the Nn equal
eigenvalues of Bob’s AN covariance matrix C?ηb .
It is worth remarking that the use of an average secrecy metric, as in the case
of R¯wcS , guarantees security only from an average point of view. is might be a
weak criterion for the security of certain applications; therefore, for a stronger
denition of security, an outage based formulation of secrecy can be enforced to
oer a given probability of achieving secrecy. is stronger security approach has
been considered for the MISO case in chapter 3 of this thesis and in [14, 55, 56,
67, 70, 90, 102, 103, 140]. e outage formulation for a MIMO problem studied in
this chapter is a challenging problem that remains open in the literature. is is
an interesting direction for further research.
6.4.3 Robust worst-case power consumption minimisation
e objective of this section is to nd the optimal transmission covariance matrices
at Alice and Bob that minimise the global power consumption subject to guaran-
teeing a target worst-case secrecy rateR. e legitimate transmission parties have
available a mismatched version of the actual CSI of all the channels involved in the
transmission. erefore, the joint transmier/receiver AN generation problem is
wrien as follows
min
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
P (6.71a)
s.t. RwcS ≥ R (6.71b)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0. (6.71c)
e above problem is not convex due to the nature of the constraint (6.71b);
therefore, as we did before, we introduce and x the slack variable β to split RwcS
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into two terms and this helps towards reformulating (6.71) into a tractable problem.
To do so, we use the relaxation in (6.9) to approximate the original problem as
min
Cw,Cηa ,
Cηb
Tr {Cw}+ Tr {Cηa}+ Tr {Cηb} (6.72a)
s.t. min
∆∈ξab
Tr
{
WH˜Ha CwH˜a
}
≥ 2Rβ − 1 (6.72b)
max
δak
∈ξae,
δbk
∈ξbe
(1 + ωk) ≤ β, ∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.72c)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0, β > 1 (6.72d)
where W and ωk are dened in (6.24) and (6.25).
We turn our aention to the objective function in (6.72a) to note that it is al-
ready linear, and so we concentrate on the nonconvex constraint (6.72b). By ob-
serving that Σ  Φ⇒ Tr {Σ} ≤ Tr {Φ}, we can express (6.72b) as
min
∆∈ξab
Tr
{
H˜Ha
(
Cw − $
Nr
Cηa
)
H˜a
}
−$rαabσ2b ≥ 0 (6.73)
where $ = 2Rβ − 1.
We use again the vectorisation property Tr
{
∆H∆
}
= δHδwhere δ = vec {∆}
to expand the inequality above and obtain
−hˆHa Dhˆa − 2Re
{
hˆHa Dδ
}
− δHDδ +$rαabσ2b ≤ 0 (6.74a)
∀δHδ − 2ab ≤ 0 (6.74b)
where we dene
D = INr ⊗Cw −
$
Nr
INr ⊗Cηa . (6.75)
According the S-procedure [87, §B.2], the two quadratic inequalities in (6.74)
hold i there exists µ1 ≥ 0 such that[
µ1INaNr + D Dhˆa
hˆHa D −µ12ab + hˆHa Dhˆa −$rαabσ2b
]
 0. (6.76)
Now we observe that (6.72c) is exactly the same as (6.30b). erefore we can
reformulate it into a inequality similar to (6.42a) and the LMIs (6.43) and (6.44) but
without considering the Charnes-Cooper transformation. Finally, we obtain for a
xed β the following SDP
min
Cw,Cηa ,Cηb
,
vk,tk,µ1,µ2k
,µ3k
Tr {Cw}+ Tr {Cηa}+ Tr {Cηb} (6.77a)
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s.t.
[
µ1INaNr + D Dhˆa
hˆHa D −µ12ab + hˆHa Dhˆa −$rαabσ2b
]
 0 (6.77b)
vk − tk − (β − 1)rαaekσ2e ≤ 0 (6.77c)[
µ2kINa −C −Cgˆak
−gˆHakC −µ2k2ae − gˆHakCgˆak + vk
]
 0 (6.77d)[
µ3kINn + (β − 1)ραkCηb (β − 1)ραkCηbgˆbk
(β − 1)ραk gˆHbkCηb ϑ4k
]
 0 (6.77e)
Cw  0,Cηa  0,Cηb  0, vk ≥ 0, tk ≥ 0 (6.77f)
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2k ≥ 0, µ3k ≥ 0,∀k = 1, · · · , K (6.77g)
where we use the slack variables vk, tk, µ1, µ2k , µ3k and the vectorised channel
hˆa = vec(Hˆa). We dene the auxiliary variables
C = Cw − (β − 1)Cηa
D = INr ⊗Cw −
ω
Nr
INr ⊗Cηa
ϑ4k = −µ3k2be + (β − 1)ραk gˆHbkCηbgˆbk − tk
$ = 2Rβ − 1. (6.78)
e above SDP is eciently solved by interior-point algorithms based soware
[105] assisted by toolboxes like the ones in [106, 107].
We note that the solution of the SDP (6.77) does not lead in general to a solution
where rank(C?w)=1 holds. erefore, as discussed in remark 9, the solution for the
SDP (6.77) is suboptimal to the original problem (6.71). Finally, we need to retrieve
the optimal β? that delivers the target RwcS with the minimum use of power. is
can be done by using a linear searching algorithm similar to the one in §4.4.2 of
chapter 4. If the SDP (6.77) is infeasible for all the analysed values of β, then the
system is considered in outage and transmission does not take place.
6.4.4 Numerical results
We concentrate our analysis on the resource allocation and secrecy performance
of our proposed jointly AN generation technique under various scenarios. In com-
parison to §6.3 where we take advantage of the characteristics of the instantaneous
CSI of the links to select the best possible antenna conguration at the receiver that
delivers the largest secrecy rate, here we study the overall average performance
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Table 6.3: Parameters values used for the simulations.
Parameter Value Description
Na 3 Alice’s number of antennas
Nb 4 Bob’s number of antennas
σ2gˆa 1 Alice-to-Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2gˆb 1 Bob-to-Eve’s channel elements variance
σ2
Hˆ
1 Alice-to-Bob’s channel elements variance
ab 0.1 Main channel uncertainty
σ2b 1 Bob’s AWGN power
σ2e 1 Eve’s AWGN power
α 2 Path loss exponent
of the technique by considering the mean performance between all the channel
realisations. is procedure simplies the analysis, but we lose the opportunity
to take advantage of the instantaneous CSI between the transmission parties to
enhance the secrecy. is average analysis is particularly useful and allows a fair
comparison against the passive eavesdropping case where the eavesdropping links
CSI are not available. Monte Carlo trials are considered with the parameters listed
in Table 6.3.
It is worth remarking that, in contrast to the previous §6.3.1, here we have
considered the case of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. is dierent as-
sumption in the problem topology, as we will see in the results, will provide an
interesting new insight for the power allocation, specially for the passive eaves-
dropping case not studied before. On the other hand, this setup will conrm that
the best strategy for the security in the single-antenna active eavesdropping sce-
nario is to use all the receiver’s antennas for reception.
Figure 6.8 shows the eavesdropping links’ CSI uncertainty eect over the power
allocation strategy. Here, more power is devoted to AN generation in the high un-
certainty regime; interestingly, and in contrast with the results in the MIMO wire-
tap channel case in §6.3.2, now the strategy generates jointly AN from both Alice
(mainly) and from Bob to confuse the single-antenna eavesdroppers. is dier-
ence in the power allocation outcome is due to the presence of multiple single-
antenna eavesdroppers. Indeed, Figure 6.9 conrms the previous result in remark
7 showing that in the presence of single-antenna active eavesdroppers, the best
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Figure 6.8: Power allocation. Active eavesdropping power distribution between information
(INFO), Alice AN (ANA) and Bob AN (ANB) vs. eavesdropping channel uncertainty (ae, be)
for dierent receiving/AN-generating antennas at Bob (Nr, Nn) when K = 2, Pmax = 6
(normalised relative to AWGN power) and rbe = rae = 1 (relative to rab).
way to enhance the RwcS is to use all the available antennas at Bob to receive the
information even under uncertainty in the eavesdropping link. In this scenario it
is justied that Alice has to generate the AN. In other words, even under erroneous
instantaneous CSI availability the best security strategy is to exploit the full degree
of freedom of the MIMO main channel. Remarkably, the robust strategy presented
can achieve high RwcS even under the eavesdropping links high CSI uncertainty. It
is also worth pointing out that the joint AN generation scheme achieves the same
average security performance as the traditional Alice-AN alone approach.
Now we turn our aention to the passive eavesdropping case studied in §6.4.2
and depicted in Figures 6.10 and 6.11 where the distances between nodes consid-
ered are available. As in §6.3.4 and illustrated in Figure 6.5, we again consider a
travelling eavesdropper moving in a straight line from Alice towards Bob and be-
yond. erefore, in Figures 6.10 and 6.11 the x-axis species only the Alice-to-Eve
distance while the Bob-to-Eve distance can be easily inferred.
Figure 6.10 shows how the distance between the nodes inuences the AN source
selection. Interestingly, for the passive eavesdropping case, Bob is preferred as the
AN generator while Alice only broadcasts AN when Eve is close to her. e se-
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Figure 6.9: System Performance. Active eavesdropping achievedworst-case secrecy rate (RwcS )
comparison between joint AN and only Alice AN generation vs. eavesdropping channel uncer-
tainty (ae, be) for dierent receiving/AN-generating antennas at Bob (Nr, Nn) whenK = 2,
Pmax = 6 (norm. relative to AWGN power) and rbe = rae = 1 (relative to rab).
curity performance is shown in Figure 6.11 where, and in contrast to the active
eavesdropping case (under eavesdropping channel uncertainties), the best strat-
egy now to maximise RwcS is to devote some of Bob’s antennas to AN generation
and leave Alice with only the information transmission task. e best performance
is aained when Eve is close to Bob because less power is needed for AN leaving
more resources to convey the information. e results in Figure 6.11 suggest that
secrecy can be improved if the AN is broadcast by Bob compared to the tradi-
tional scheme where Alice solely generates AN. Figure 6.12 clearly compares the
aained performance between passive and active eavesdropping (with eavesdrop-
ping channel uncertainties). Here it is shown that for the passive case, it is worth
allocating the receiver’s antennas to broadcast AN to maximise RwcS while for the
active case, the best strategy (for single-antenna eavesdroppers) is to use all the
receiver’s antennas for reception.
Figure 6.13 illustrates the power allocation for the worst-case secrecy rate max-
imisation subject to individual power constraints in the presence of an active eaves-
dropper. is problem is studied in §6.4.2 where it is assumed that Alice and Bob
have available an erroneous version of the eavesdropping links’ CSI. e results
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show that, following intuition, Bob uses all his available power to jam the aacker
irrespective of its location. is strategy allows Alice to devote her power mainly
to conveying the information; however, when Eve is close to Alice, she still broad-
casts AN to secure the transmission in the presence of a close active single-antenna
eavesdropper.
Now we devote our aention to the results of the power minimisation problem
studied in §6.4.3. Figure 6.14 depicts the power allocation resulting from solving
the SDP (6.77) to guarantee dierent values of the target worst-case secrecy rate
R. Here, the results suggest that the robust joint AN technique consumes more
power than transmiing AN only from Alice to achieve a target R. is result
is corroborated in Figure 6.15 where it is obvious that for single-antenna active
eavesdropping the best strategy to minimise the power consumption is to devote
all of Bob’s antennas for reception irrespective of the location of the eavesdropper.
is result again coincides with our nding in the remark 7 where we concluded
that allocating antennas at Bob is useful only when the rank of the MIMO main
channel is equal to or smaller than the rank of the eavesdropping channel. at is
not the case of the MISO eavesdropping channel (rank-one) case considered here.
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Bob (Nr, Nn) whenK = 1, and ae = be = 0.5.
Finally, Figure 6.16a shows a comparison between the joint AN transmission
strategy and the traditional approach where only Alice generates AN to maximise
the worst-secrecy rate. Here we consider that Alice uses only one antenna for
receiving information. Moreover, we assume the presence of two eavesdroppers
and that the distances between all four nodes are set to unity. For the case of ac-
tive eavesdropping (with uncertainty in the eavesdropping channel), our strategy
generates AN from both Alice and Bob depending on the instantaneous channel
conditions. By contrast, for the passive case our technique generates AN only from
Bob rather than from Alice. Due to a lack of the eavesdropping links’ instantaneous
CSI, the approach avoids leaking Alice’s AN to Bob, so Alice only conveys the in-
formation while Bob isotropically broadcasts AN. For the passive eavesdropping
case the power allocated for information and AN is the same in both of the tech-
niques benchmarked; however, the dierence is that the joint AN generation strat-
egy broadcasts the AN from Bob. e worst-case security rate achieved is depicted
in Figure 6.16b; here, the exibility introduced by the joint AN generation scheme
is reected in a slight improvement in RwcS for the active eavesdropping case whilst
for the passive scenario both techniques achieve the same performance.
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Figure 6.16: Comparison of techniques for secrecy rate maximisation. Power allocation and
RwcS vs. eavesdropping channels uncertainty (ae, be) for two eavesdroppers (K = 2) when
Nn = 3, rae = rbe = 1 (relative to rab) and Pmax = 8 (normalised relative to AWGN power)
for passive (PE) and active (AE) eavesdropping.
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In this chapter we have studied a joint transmier and receiver AN generation
technique to enhance the security of the wiretap MIMO channel. First, we have
considered perfect channel state information in all the links in order to study
whether the receiver can enhance the secrecy of the multiple antenna wiretap
channel by transmiing AN from some of its antennas. Indeed, a judicious alloca-
tion of the receiver’s antennas can provide a larger secrecy rate compared to the
secrecy capacity obtained when the receiver uses all its antennas to receive infor-
mation. In order to take advantage of the instantaneous channel conditions, we
have introduced two low-complexity antenna selection techniques to determine
the best antenna conguration that enhances the secrecy rate of the system. We
have shown that transmiing AN from the receiver is particularly useful when the
eavesdropping channel has greater capacity than the main channel; for instance,
when the multi-antenna eavesdropper has more antennas than the receiver or it is
closer to the transmier. On the other hand, the technique has proved, like other
contributions, that generating AN from the transmier does not enhance the se-
crecy of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel.
Secondly, we have studied a practical case that arises when the channel state
information of the transmission parties available at the legitimate nodes are sub-
ject to errors. To deal with this scenario, we have investigated a robust approach
for multiple-antenna systems that generate AN from both legitimate communica-
tion parties. e strategy copes with inaccurate channel state information in all the
instantaneous links to address the worst-case secrecy rate maximisation subject to
global and individual power constraints and the total power consumption minimi-
sation. Moreover, we have addressed the practical case when the eavesdroppers
remain silent within the network and therefore only statistical information about
the eavesdropping links can be assumed. e proposed suboptimal technique in-
troduces a lower-bound approximation to the worst-case secrecy rate to deal with
the optimisation problems in a tractable way. In contrast with the rst case, here
we have considered multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. In this scenario, the
results conrm that the best strategy to enhance the secrecy of the system when
the aackers are totally or partially known is to exploit the full degree of freedom
of the multiple-antenna main link; i.e., to use all the receiver’s antennas to listen to
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the communication. Here, transmiing AN from the transmier might be useful;
particularly, when the eavesdroppers are close to it. On the other hand, if there
is no information regarding the eavesdroppers then allocating antennas at the re-
ceiver is useful to maximise the secrecy rate. e power distribution depends upon
the instantaneous channel conditions and the location of the nodes.
It is important to point out that for fairness of comparison with the traditional
scheme that generates AN only from the transmier, this analysis has been car-
ried out considering a global power constrained system. We also have considered
the individually constrained network where the utility of our joint AN generation
scheme in practical networks is larger. Indeed, the proposed transmission scheme
is particularly aractive in systems where the resources of the transmier (in terms
of power and number of antennas) are restricted, such as the uplink of a wireless
system. In such a system, the base station (the receiver) can improve the security
by judiciously exploiting its available resources to jam eavesdroppers.
e secure approach presented in this chapter introduces exibility regarding
the AN generation to enhance the system security by generating a jamming sig-
nal from the receiver and/or from the transmier. Indeed, the introduced secure
scheme proposes to opportunistically jointly broadcast AN. e generation source
selection will depend upon the particular transmission characteristics such as the
number of antennas at the nodes, the instantaneous fading channel conditions,
the location of the transmission nodes, etc. We have proposed an intelligent strat-
egy to dene the best transmission scheme to enhance security in the multiple-
antenna wiretap channel. is endeavour compares positively with traditional
secure masked transmission mechanisms where the AN is solely generated by the
transmier. e work proposed opens interesting elds for further research such
as joint AN robust transmission techniques in the presence of multiple-antenna
eavesdroppers. Of particular interest is the case where partial or no information
about the eavesdropping channels is available at the legitimate nodes. ese sce-
narios would require stronger and technically challenging security policies such
as a probabilistic security denition based an in outage formulation.
Chapter7
Conclusions
‘You reached for the secret too
soon; you cried for the moon.
Shine on you crazy diamond.’
R. Waters, R. Wright, D. Gilmour.
This thesis has described the security vulnerabilities of wireless communi-cations and pointed out the paramount importance of addressing themfrom new perspectives. In particular, we have drawn aention to con-
dentiality issues arising from the broadcast nature of the radio frequency wireless
channel. We have identied physical layer security as a promising framework
to secure wireless networks against eavesdropping threats from an information-
theoretic perspective. Physical layer security addresses wireless vulnerabilities
where the weaknesses lie; i.e., at the transmission level.
We have provided signal processing multiple-antenna transmission schemes
to secure wireless communications at the physical layer against eavesdropping
aacks. We have chosen masked transmission strategies to improve the secu-
rity by steering the information towards the intended receiver and at the same
time broadcasting articial noise to confuse eavesdroppers. We have considered
practical scenarios where networks are constrained in transmission resources and
only have erroneous information regarding the mathematical representation of the
link between legitimate transmission parties. We have addressed worst-case secu-
rity perspectives by considering eavesdroppers without computational restrictions
that can take advantage of any situation to put at risk the security of the system.
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e beginning of this thesis is devoted to the study of MISO systems; that is a
multiple-antenna transmier conveying a condential message towards a single-
antenna receiver in the presence of single-antenna eavesdroppers. In this scenario,
we have distributed the power between information and articial noise to guar-
antee a high probability of secrecy even in the presence of eavesdroppers close
to the transmier. We introduced a protected zone to physically prevent close-
quarter eavesdropping aacks. We have quantied the secrecy improvements and
the possible energy savings resulting from extending the size of the exclusion area.
At the same time, we determined the additional amount of power required, mainly
for articial noise generation, to secure the networks from close eavesdroppers.
We have addressed the practical case of a transmier only aware of an erro-
neous mathematical representation of the link between the legitimate transmission
parties. In this context, a MISO robust transmission scheme has been presented to
provide high levels of security, given by the worst-case secrecy rate, in the pres-
ence of unknown eavesdroppers. Again, we have considered closer aackers to
provide security at the expense of additional power. We have also presented a
strategy to prioritise and minimise the use of power and reduce the size of the
protected zone to ensure an average worst-case secrecy rate. We have shown that
the optimal transmission strategy that aains the largest secrecy rate is to beam-
form the information towards the intended receiver and broadcast the articial
noise isotropically and orthogonal in the direction of the steering message.
In the second part of this thesis, we have addressed security in the MIMO wire-
tap channel; that is, all the communication devices are equipped with multiple-
antennas. First, we considered a suboptimal masked beamforming strategy to
study the security opportunities that the frequency selective channel oers when
all the nodes use OFDM signalling. Remarkably, we showed that the security of
the system can be enhanced by taking advantage of an opportunistic power allo-
cation between the OFDM subcarriers. We paid aention to a multiple-antenna
eavesdropper that, by using smart combining schemes, can jeopardise the security
by cancelling the jamming eect of the articial noise.
Finally, we have introduced a secure transmission alternative for resources
constrained networks. Here we have exploited the full degree of freedom of the
MIMO wiretap channel instead of limiting the transmission technique to a beam-
forming scheme. We introduced the novel idea of a joint articial noise transmis-
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sion where the receiver allocates its resources to contribute actively to secure the
communication. We have shown that a remarkable enhancement in the security
can be aained; particularly, in cases when the main channel is worse than the
eavesdropping one. Our technique has shown that generating articial noise from
the transmier is not useful in improving the security. However, at the receiver’s
antenna array, if we opportunistically switch some of the antennas between re-
ception and broadcasting articial noise we can make a positive contribution to
the system’s security by taking advantage of the instantaneous channel condi-
tions. We have provided two schemes to reduce the complexity of determining the
best receiver’s antenna distribution. Finally, we also have considered the eect of
erroneous channel information between all the transmission nodes providing a ro-
bust scheme that can improve the security by dynamically choosing the jamming
source.
In conclusion, this thesis has presented innovative and eective multiple-antenna
signal processing strategies that take advantage of the wireless channel conditions
to secure wireless networks at the physical layer. We have considered practical
problems to devise smart secure endeavours that look at securing transmissions
by preventing the eavesdroppers from even receiving the wireless signal.
7.1 Further research
e rst problem that has already aracted our aention is providing a robust
joint transmier/receiver articial noise generation transmission scheme in the
presence of multiple-antenna eavesdroppers. As in §6.4.1 of chapter 6, two sce-
narios can be considered. First, the case of an eavesdropper whose channel signa-
ture is only partially known (subject to uncertainties), and second, a pure passive
multiple-antenna eavesdropper. e maximisation of the secrecy rate is partic-
ularly complicated in both scenarios; indeed, outage formulations are needed to
ensure secrecy from a probabilistic point of view. e resulting optimisation prob-
lems are particularly challenging and require sophisticated mathematical tools to
reformulate them into tractable convex expressions [145]. To solve this problem
we look at alternating optimisation techniques such as those used in [127, 128].
e work presented in this thesis addresses security and condentiality issues
in point-to-point single-user networks. In practical networks, the radio frequency
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spectrum is shared among multiple users communicating with a centralised entity
such as a base station or an access point. erefore, it is crucial to address secu-
rity issues in multi-user networks paying aention to the broadcasting and multi-
casting channels [32]. In the rst scenario, a common message is transmied to
multiple legitimate receivers, while in the second scenario multiple condential
messages are transmied to multiple intended receivers. ese multi-user scenar-
ios present new security issues arising from the cases when a legitimate user of
the network becomes a potential eavesdropper of a message that is not intended
for it. Physical layer security in multi-user networks has recently aracted at-
tention in the information-theory research community. Here, the multi-receiver
wiretap channel and the compound wiretap channel are the information-theoretic
concepts that characterise broadcasting and multicasting networks respectively
[31, 146, 147, 148]. Our particular research interest is in multi-user signal pro-
cessing strategies considering joint articial noise generation, and how this can
improve the security of the system without interfering with other valid users.
Emerging multi-layer security approaches are an exciting direction of research
that have the potential to oer a holistic approach towards securing wireless net-
works. For instance, as the wiretap model requires a pre-authenticated chan-
nel, and it does not confront security vulnerabilities arising from impersonation
threats. erefore, complementary security strategies, still based on the physical
layer, are necessary to provide security services such as authentication. is could
be done through introducing a unique mark on the transmied information, by
ngerprinting the conveyed message as a way to validate legitimate users creden-
tials [45]. Moreover, the wireless channel’s randomness can be exploited to distil
security keys by taking advantage of the uniqueness and random characteristic
of the instantaneous wireless link between the two legitimate users [149]. is
potentially would overcome traditional cryptographic key administration and dis-
tribution issues. Both aforementioned strategies are traditionally performed at the
upper layers of the communication model, so incorporating the physical layer as
a source of secrecy leads to multiple-layer security approaches that promise to be
a robust and eective way to secure wireless networks.
Finally, a crucial area for further research work is to provide practical proof-
of-concept of physical layer security. Although the past few years have seen many
theoretical advances in physical layer security, the lack of practical demonstrators
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of these concepts is noticeable. Indeed, fundamental research is still necessary
towards the realisation of practical secure networks at the physical layer. Here
an integrated research perspective which considers the interdependence and in-
terrelationships between dierent security approaches has to be considered. e
objective is to close the gap between theory and practice and then create an in-
tegrated realisation of wireless networks secured at the physical layer where the
wireless channel is the source of secrecy. is research approach will enable the
development of solutions that have the potential to actually be deployed in the real
world to confront current and emerging wireless security threats.
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